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ABSTRACT 
This work stems from the debate about ethically reforming America's health 
system in response to the enduring scarcity of resources. There are at least three 
essential components to successfully instituting needed changes: a philosophically-
defensible guideline, effectively-designed programs or legislation, and political 
willpower. This dissertation represents the first component. 
Two distributive justice decisions are central to this dissertation. One decision 
is how to apportion resources among competing governmental programs such as Social 
Security, education, agriculture, and transportation. This is known as the macro-level. 
The other decision is how to apportion health-care resources to competing ailment or 
disease categories such as cancer, eye care, cystic fibrosis, and burns. This is known as 
the meso-level. 
An ethical criterion or standard is needed with which to make such important 
decisions. Some proposals choose a consequentialist criterion in terms of the benefits 
resulting from health while others use a Kantian-like criterion of right action. Still other 
proposals focus on the notion of a good human life. The criterion selected for this 
dissertation comes from the philosophical work of John Dewey, an influential American 
philosopher in the first half of the 1900s. This criterion precedes the aforementioned 
criteria: it is the concept of the good itself 
Several philosophers have developed comprehensive theories about the good. I 
considered the theories of Plato, Kant, and Iris Murdoch as well as that of Dewey. 
Ill 
Dewey's theory is used herein because it has the greatest potential for engaging or 
examining the practical case of health-care reform. In other words, the theories of the 
other three philosophers are less able to evaluate and critique how societal goods and 
medical treatments are and are not good. 
Dewey's concept of the good is applied to the practical macro-level programs of 
health care, national defense, education, and the arts in order to determine their relative 
goodness. Dewey's concept is also applied to the practical meso-level programs of 
prenatal care, kidney dialysis, and assisted reproductive technologies so as to determine 
their comparative goodness. The outcome of these comparisons is then examined in 
terms of the impact on distributive decision-making at a public policy level. 
lV 
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CHAPTER I 
Fixing the U.S. Health System: the search for an ethically defensible solution 
Introduction 
In the first two years of President Bill Clinton's first term, the focus was to 
substantively revamp the country's health-care system. Elected representatives in the 
Senate and in Congress agreed, by and large, that the existing system continued to be 
costly, inefficient, and unfair. Likewise, hospital administrators and medical practitioners 
were frustrated in having to bear excessive economic risks for adequately treating ill or 
dying Americans who were indigent. Politicians, hospital administrators, and medical 
professionals formed a unified public voice calling for major changes. The proposed 
Health Security Act (1994) emphasized inclusion, choice, and competition: all 
Americans were to have some kind of comprehensive insurance coverage (including 
those who were unemployed and those with high-cost chronic conditions such as 
HIV/AIDS), available governmental health plans were to be differently structured, and 
an open marketplace for health plans was encouraged so as to maintain lower costs yet 
high quality. 
Unfortunately this groundswell of support gradually evaporated as the work of 
various committees became swathed in secrecy and as the proposed legislation promised 
to make the system even more unwieldy. The proposed legislation did not survive 
political debate and thus was never voted on in either chamber. 
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Since the early 1990s, the need to control health-care expenditures has been led 
primarily by insurance and management companies, acting under the doctrine of 
managed care. The term "managed care" means: 
Any plan that finances and delivers health care through an organized 
network of providers. A broad term used to describe organizations that 
combine the financing and delivery of health care services to control costs 
and utilization (www.cff.org/publications04.htm), or 
A relatively new term coined originally to refer to the prepaid health care 
sector (e.g., HMOs1) where care is provided under a fixed budget and costs 
are therein capable ofbeing "managed". Increasingly, the term is being used 
by many analysts to include PPOs2 and even forms of indemnity insurance 
coverage that incorporate preadmission certification and other utilization 
controls (www.amso.com/terms.html). 
This system is very different to the fee-for-service system of American medicine 
that was in place until the late 1980s. Under the fee-for-service system, what was 
provided to each individual patient was determined solely by the physician in terms of 
what she thought was medically best for her patient. Insurers reimbursed all reasonable 
1. "HMO" means a health maintenance organization. It is typically a company offering health 
insurance and medical care at a set price to those people it covers. There are different kinds of 
HMOs: (1) a staff model wherein the HMO owns clinics and employs physicians, (2) a group 
model wherein the HMO contracts with different physicians and clinics to provide services, (3) 
an independent provider association model wherein the HMO contracts with such an association 
which, in tum, contracts with physicians, (4) a direct contract model wherein the HMO contracts 
directly with physicians, and (5) a mixed model made up of all of the above 
(www.amso.com/terms.html). 
2. "PPO" means a preferred provider organization. It is a "system in which a payer [e.g., an 
insurance company] negotiates lower prices with certain doctors and hospitals. Patients who go to 
a preferred provider get a higher benefit-for example, 90 percent or 100 percent coverage of 
their costs-than patients who go outside the network" (Ibid). 
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costs without much question. Accordingly, decisions about what constituted good 
medical care were separate from decisions about whether the predicted benefits justified 
the costs and about who should be responsible for such costs. 
With a managed care system, there are two parties involved in deciding what 
therapy is prescribed: the doctor who diagnoses and prescribes treatment and the 
insurance company that pays for such treatment. Reflective of its name, managed care 
incorporates an economic or business perspective in controlling (i.e., managing) a 
patient's treatment (i.e., care). Just as there are diagnostic risks and recuperative risks in 
medicine, there are economic risks. Economic risk arises in terms of the uncertainty of 
what effectively treating or responding to a disease or injury will ultimately cost. Is 
prescribing drug A at $X per month going to be more cost effective than, for instance, 
physiotherapy for Y months? Because each patient's condition, response, and adherence 
to treatment is individual, there is no certainty at the individual patient level as to what 
will be the total costs of treatment or assistance. As a result, the associated economic 
risks are shared among physicians through reimbursement incentives and discentives, 3 
patients through deductibles and co-payments, 4 and insurance companies. 
3. An example of a financial incentive would be reimbursing a physician an added $50.00 ifhe 
prescribes a generic drug over a branded drug, given that the former is typically much less 
expensive than the latter. An example of a disincentive would be deducting $50.00 from his 
reimbursement payment because he referred a patient immediately onto a specialist instead of 
first trying to treat the patient himself. The disincentive is thus a type of penalty to the physician 
for making a decision that resuhed in the insurance company incurring higher costs. 
4. Co-payments and deductibles are stipulated by health insurance companies. An example of a 
co-payment is that an enrollee must pay $10.00 to his physician for each and every visit. An 
example of a deductible is that an enrollee must pay the first $250. 00 of costs incurred (which 
may be incurred over several visits) for the treatment of a medical condition. 
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Under the fee-for-service system, the financial risks were born by insurers only. 
Physicians were able to prescribed one medication or treatment modality and then 
change to another without personally bearing any of the economic costs of their medical 
decisions. Similarly, if a medically-sound treatment could be either an antibiotic pill or 
bed rest, when a physician opted for the former, she incurred no financial impact from 
her decision for the more expensive treatment. The situation was the same for patients in 
terms of bearing no or virtually no economic costs of treatment when under the fee-for-
service system. Thus only the insurance companies or self-insured employers bore the 
financial consequences of a patient's health and adherence to a treatment regime and of a 
physician's treatment choices. 
But now therapies and interventions available to enrollees in a particular 
insurance plan are restricted based on the financial resources of the total pooled group. 
There is subsequently an inherent balancing act in terms of what each member of the 
group actually receives: if treating A uses 60 % of the annual pooled funds, then B and 
C have only 40% of the total funds available for their health needs. 
Yet managed care has not addressed all the problems. The initial reduction in the 
annual rate of expenditures has not lasted. Once again health-care costs exceed 
inflationary and population growth rates. There is significant earnings instability in the 
industry in that companies can post large profits one year and large losses the next. And 
the power of managed care organizations is seen by many people as excessive relative to 
the power of physicians and patients. 
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In light of these problems, several solutions come readily to mind. One solution 
might be to shift from a mixed system of public and private funding and go to a private 
system wherein all decisions are left to the marketplace populated by "buyers" (i.e., 
patients) and "sellers" (i.e., individual physicians or physician groups). Another solution 
to control costs could be to restrict expensive new technologies unless they deliver 
proportionally greater health benefits than less expensive, existing technologies. And a 
final suggestion might be to let the American public, rather than corporations, decide 
which interventions and therapies will and will not be made publicly available to whoever 
needs them. 
Regrettably none of these three responses stands out as obviously superior to the 
other three. In response to the suggestion to shift all services to the demands and 
opportunities of a capitalistic marketplace, defensible standards for distributing health 
care are not limited to efficiency and control. Relevant ethical standards include 
decisions as to who is or is not responsible for whom in American society. Furthermore 
just because someone is willing to buy X at $Y does not mean that someone else is 
willing to make X or sell X at $Y. And vice versa. Accordingly, an open marketplace 
does not guarantee that every demand is met. When this is applied to the case of health 
care, it means that if there are inadequate profits in developing a treatment for a medical 
condition, no company is likely to bother with the necessary R & D or the necessary 
manufacturing and distribution costs. Thus there may be groups of patients whose needs 
remain unmet solely for economic reasons, a situation often labeled as "market failure." 
5 
With respect to the suggestion of increasing the ''benefit threshold" of expensive 
new technologies, a new technology's benefits, burdens, and risks are learned over time. 
Thus medical progress is typically incremental and uncertain thereby frustrating definitive 
and timely cost-benefit analysis. And finally public consensus on the priority of different 
health interventions may be very hard to obtain. It can be very difficult to compare 
different interventions such as effective pain management versus preserved motor skills 
versus restored cognitive functioning. Further, people can have highly disparate views as 
to what counts as medically essential versus non-essential and medically urgent versus 
non-urgent. The elusiveness of consensus is based largely on the fact that medical 
interventions are often not simply about restoring biological processes that are 
objectively valued. Instead many interventions affect aspects of life that are 
idiosyncratically valued such as radical mastectomy for breast cancer, prescription drugs 
with very serious side effects, and placing a patient on a ventilator who may never be 
successfully weaned from it. 
The debate over health-care reform has not just been focused on improving the 
system's efficiency or size. It has primarily been focused on the unjustifiable inequities 
or lack of fairness of the system. Access to medical care and procedures is determined 
largely by a person's ability to pay for such care or ability to be gainfully employed by an 
employer large enough to provide health insurance for its employees. At present, forty-
three million Americans lack any or adequate health care insurance (Statistical Abstracts 
of the United States 2001). People who are wealthy have access to convenient and the 
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latest health-care procedures while people of lower economic groups do not. But as 
illustrated by the three suggestions to revamp the system, easy programmatic or 
structural answers are not viable. 
This dissertation's goal is to present and defend a viable answer. With this said, 
however, it is imperative to acknowledge that there are at least three components to 
actual change to the nation's health system. The first component is identifying a 
defensible guideline or means of prioritization with which to make allocation decisions 
among competing goods at the macro-level of society and among competing goods at 
the meso-level of health care. This dissertation focuses on this component only. In 
addition to a justifiable guideline, sound program and legislative policies must be 
instituted in terms of how the system will actually work and how responsibilities will be 
divided. And then willpower on the part of the politicians and the public is needed so as 
to ensure that the necessary legislation is successfully passed and the necessary agencies 
set up and funded. And so this dissertation represents the first step in a renewed effort 
to improve the U.S. health system so that is more ethically defensible. 
The numbers: serious and urgent 
In most discussions about health-care reform, some statistic is invariably 
employed to illustrate the troubled and troubling state of the American system. The 
numbers help confirm that the status quo is unacceptable. Statistics can identify telling 
symptoms of the immense structural problems in the American health-care system, 
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problems both moral and mechanical. By "mechanical," I mean problems that are 
process-related or programmatic, such as inefficiencies and redundancies. In deciding 
which statistics of the seemingly infinite choices available to present in this dissertation, I 
focused on statistics about health care at a societal level, rather than at the level of the 
individual patient, practitioner, or institution. 
Since the passage of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965, the country's 
total health expenditures increased from $42 billion to $1,424 billion in 2001, an increase 
of3,291% over thirty-six years (see Table 35). Table 4 presents the annual rate of 
increase. Tables 5 and 6 present statistics on the country's population and its annualized 
rate of increase in a similar period. Table 7 shows the annual rate in increase in the 
consumer price index between 1965 and 1999. Comparing Tables 5, 6, and 7 with Table 
3, a conclusion is that the increase in health-care expenditures cannot be fully explained 
by commensurate increases in the population (i.e., there are simply more people needing 
medical care) or in the costs of goods. In other words, relative to each person, more and 
more interventions and therapies are being prescribed and administered. 
Arnold Reiman, the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, 
employs a label to describe modem-day medicine which initially may seem misguided or 
mistaken: as a "medical-industrial complex" (1980, 963). However he is provocatively 
drawing our attention to the reality of medicine as big business. In the United States, 
health care constitutes one dollar out of every seven dollars spent in the nation's one 
trillion dollar domestic economy in 1997. Table 8 lists other major industries to confirm 
5. All tables cited in this chapter can be found in the Appendix. 
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the centrality of health care to our economy. Relman's challenge, I believe, is that it is 
nai"ve to continue to rely on the traditions of Hippocrates and Florence Nightingale as 
adequate guides for research and treatment. Beneficence is not a cornerstone of 
successful businesses in America. Private business, even if ethically driven, can 
contradict or frustrate these ethical traditions of health care. 
Can the increase in total health expenditures be explained by a comparable 
increase in the American population? No, because the country's population itself has 
only increased 41. 7% over approximately the same thirty-six year period. If the 1965 
level of expenditures is multiplied each year by the annual consumer price index rate and 
the annual increase in the population, the 1965 expenditures of$ 42 billion would be 
roughly$ 450 billion in 2000. Yet the expenditures in 2000 were $1.3 trillion. This 
indicates that the amount of expenditures almost tripled over and above rising costs and 
a growing population base. 
When compared to all the domestic economic activities from 1965 to 2001, (that 
is, the gross domestic product or GDP), health services and products have grown from 
5.8% of the national economy to 14.3%. Projections suggest that at its present rate of 
growth and expected demographic changes, health care could represent 22% of the GDP 
by 2010, 26.5% by 2020, and 31.4% by 2030. That is, by 2030, almost one dollar of 
every three dollars spent within the U.S. will be health-related (see Tables 9 and 10). 
The federal government's yearly budget has shown a comparable shift towards a 
greater and greater proportion directed towards health and away from other national 
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priorities. In 1970, 6.2% of the budget was health-related; in 2001, the percentage was 
20.5%. In comparison, education constituted 4.4% in 1970 and 3.4% in 2001; defense 
41.8% in 1970 and 15.5% in 2001, and transportation-commerce-housing 4.7% and 
2.3% respectively. Even Social Security, the social program deemed the bedrock of the 
U.S. social mandate, has grown at a slower rate than health care: as 15.4% of the 
federal budget in 1970 but only 22.5% in 2001 (see Tables 11 and 12). Given the 
division of social responsibilities, state and local government budgets have witnessed a 
dramatic a shift in the proportion of their budgets allocated for health care (see Tables 13 
and 14). 
As health-care costs constitute an increasing proportion of America's economy, 
whether it is in the form of research or in purchases of services and products, the 
outcome of this public and private financial investment reveals another problem. Relying 
on basic mortality and morbidity statistics, America's expenditures are a larger 
percentage of its economy in comparison to other developed countries and yet the health 
outcomes are primarily worse (see Tables 15, 16, and 17). 
Moreover all of the seven other countries listed in Table 17 provide universal 
health coverage to their citizens. In the United States, however, approximately forty-
three million have no insurance, be it privately- or publicly-provided. But private 
insurance should not be considered an obvious panacea. 6 First, the percentage of 
6. While the priorities of profits and fidelity to shareholders are commonly questioned today in 
the case of managed care companies, the same concerns arise with indemnity insurance 
companies that have been the financial backbone of the non-governmental sector of the health-
care system up until the mid-l 980s. 
employees joining their employer's subsidized insurance plan is decreasing somewhat 
due to the increased premiums or deductibles they must now incur (see Tables 18, 19, 
20, and 21). Second, the 1995 SUPPORT study7 found that almost one-third of the 
families, which had a seriously ill or dying member, lost their life savings or major source 
of income because of a family member's serious illness. Of this group, 96% had medical 
insurance (Covinsky et al 1994). 
In sum, these statistics affirm that (a) as a business, health care has become a 
major industry and driver of the American economy, (b) as one of many governmental 
initiatives, its hunger for funds appears insatiable, ( c) as part of a societal mandate, its 
benefits have not been shared equitably; and lastly, (d) the bias in favor of scientific and 
technological innovation and cures has not produced similar direct gains in basic health 
measures in comparison to other countries' efforts. 
Possible answers: Engelhardt, Callahan, and Daniels 
In the biomedical ethics literature, there has been a robust and extensive debate 
about changing the American health system to increase its fairness. Proposals developed 
by H. Tristram Engelhardt, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Callahan are especially 
noteworthy for two reasons. First, each proposal is based on a sustained philosophical 
critique of the nature of both medicine and society. In other words, their 
7. The SUPPORT study was a landmark, five-year study of the medical care of patients at the 
end-of-life, meaning those who had six months or less oflife left [see the SUPPORT Principal 
Investigators report, JAMA 274, no. 20 (1995): 1591-8.] 
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recommendations are not merely about adding or ending programs or agencies, but 
rather are about core commitments. The revisions proposed by Engelhardt are very 
different from those by Daniels and Callahan. This is the second reason to examine their 
recommendations: such disparity encourages a more rigorous debate. Accordingly, 
each theorist's recommendations for increasing the ethical basis of the U.S. health system 
will be analyzed and critiqued herein. Following this examination will be a discussion of 
the philosophical work that remains which, in tum, constitutes the overarching thesis of 
this dissertation. 
In his widely read book, The Foundations of Bioethics ( 1986), H. Tristram 
Engelhardt frames justice around notions of freedom and possessions: 'Justice is first 
and foremost giving to each the right to be respected as a free individual in the 
disposition of personal services and private goods" (Engelhardt 1986, 354). In terms of 
the most defensible structure of America's health system, he supports having two levels 
of care. One level would provide basic care for all citizens; the other level would allow 
people to use their discretionary income to purchase more or better care if they so 
wished. Ethical justification for this dual system comes from the fact that: 
Not all property is privately owned. Nations and other social organizations 
may invest their common resources in insuring their members against losses 
12 
in the natural and social lotteries. 8 On the other hand, ... not all property is 
communal. There are private entitlements, which individuals may freely 
exchange for the services of others (Engelhardt 1986, 361 ). 
In other words, any resulting inequality of care is defensible given its moral and factual 
inevitability. To appeal to "moral inevitability," Engelhardt holds that the ethical 
principles of beneficence and autonomy are foundational to health care. As a result, it is 
desirable to design a system that combines cooperation with privacy. And by ''factual 
inevitability," he means that most developed countries already have a dual system which 
implies that no sweeping changes are needed. In other words, his recommendation is not 
so radical that it is unlikely to be adopted. 
Yet in an article published over ten years after The Foundations, Engelhardt 
moves toward a much more libertarian stance. In "Freedom and Moral Diversity: The 
Moral Failures of Health Care in the Welfare State" (1997), he argues forcefully against 
governmental provision of any health care plan: 
Postmodernity as an epistemological predicament, not merely as a 
sociological fact, is the recognition that, outside of a revelation of a 
canonical standard, one cannot authoritatively choose among content-full 
understandings of moral probity, justice, or fairness without begging the 
question or engaging in an infinite regress (648). 
8. The natural lottery involves every human being in that each of us is subject to a specific 
genotype and phenotype. For instance, some people will have the genetic code to be tall and 
blonde (i.e., the Western stereotype for beauty), others will have the genetic code for a serious 
disease, and still others will innately be athletic. The social lottery also involves every human 
being in that each of us is born into a particular type of family, economic class, race, religious 
affiliation or lack thereof, and so on. In the case of both types oflottery, there is no personal 
responsibility (i.e., praise or blame); the associated outcomes are due to good or bad luck. The 
ethical implication is that people should be helped who have incurred the bad luck of a 
disadvantageous genotype or phenotype. 
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In a democracy, morality is secular, he says, which in tum "is procedural, and its 
legitimacy is limited by the consent of those who participate in common endeavors" 
(Engelhardt 1997, 649). Therefore any health policy is valid only if those it affects agree 
to it. As a consequence, the American health system must reflect and facilitate the wide 
diversity of opinions as to what constitutes a good life. America is highly pluralistic in 
terms of having "numerous competing moral accounts or narratives" (Ibid, 648). 
Moreover individual freedom and autonomy are of fundamental importance in this 
country. Thus the system should be made up of various health plans that reflect different 
moral commitments. Individuals then can chose which plan most closely mirrors their 
values regarding health, life, and death. 
Engelhardt allows only three roles for government. One is to provide vouchers 
to those who are economically disadvantaged. These people can then decide 
autonomously whether to use the monies for health care and if so, select which plan 
meets their personal risk profile and health priorities best. Providing vouchers is 
optional, says Engelhardt, depending on whether a government sees itself as responsible 
for financially helping those in low economic groups. The next two roles are not 
optional, but are mandatory for a government of a democratic and capitalistic society. 
These two roles are to ensure that citizens have accurate and full information for good 
decision making and to ensure that the market does not restrict productivity, creativity, 
or quality of services and products. 
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This position is seriously troubling on four counts. First, Engelhardt prioritizes 
freedom too heavily. Imagine that a group of insurance companies decides to focus 
exclusively on enrollees who are nonsmokers, not overweight, and below age 50. Ifno 
other company is willing to cover those who do smoke or who are obese, these citizens 
will be responsible for all their medical bills. As mentioned earlier, relying on a 
capitalistic marketplace can result in market failure in that there can be unmet health 
needs. Privileging freedom is reminiscent of Darwinism: only the strong, whether 
strength is in the form of numbers, wealth, or power, will prevail. 
As a way to counter paternalism by physicians, individual autonomy is desirable 
for three basic reasons. I am most likely to know my own goals and priorities better than 
anyone else. I am self-actualizing in terms of control of and responsibility for myself and 
my life. And I deserver a zone of privacy as to what my life is about. 
Yet Leonard Fleck, an insightful philosopher of bioethics at Michigan State 
University, offers a practical cautionary note about autonomy by questioning how really 
robust is the autonomy of the poor, the dying, or the chronically ill. Engelhardt would 
ensure that their lives are not interfered with by others. But a more accurate way to 
understand what is happening is that '1hey are being ignored, left alone to cope with 
their own miserable conditions" (Fleck 1989a, 179). As such, autonomy seems like a 
concept that should not be defended vigorously. Autonomy is valuable only if a person 
has interests, goals, and resources. For instance, her autonomy is of immense value if 
she can choose to use her vacation time for foreign travel or for remodeling her home. 
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But it is bereft of value if she finds life boring, is physically unable to travel, or lacks the 
money to remodel. Freedom is not only an end in itself, it is also a means. 
Engelhardt's conception of a person is also worrisome. In the mode of Kant, he 
holds that "it is because members of Homo sapiens are usually self-conscious, rational, 
and possess a moral sense that being a human is so significant" (1986, 107). He 
continues that not every human being qualifies as a person; for instance, infants, those 
who are mentally impaired, or those who are comatose. This excluded group of beings, 
however, does warrant some level of consideration because they are social beings. A 
social being is a being that has some relationship with a person. As a result, cruel 
treatment of someone with severe Alzheimer's disease is discouraged because such 
behavior may become habituated in the person and then it is more likely that those who 
are legitimately persons could be treated badly. For Engelhardt, disease and injury are to 
be remedied because they ultimately interfere with personhood. 
Yet there is much more to worry about than reduced cognitive skills or self-
consciousness. There are the psychological, emotional, and relational aspects of a 
person. Moreover ethically weighty concepts such as compassion, witnessing,9 mercy, 
and patience are outside Engelhardt' s viewpoint. Just as these ethical qualities are not 
central for him, Sharpe notes that "forms of neglect (which we ordinarily understand as 
blameworthy non-interference) will invite no moral censure" (1992, 306). 
9. Witnessing is the opposite of abandonment. It is standing by another person who is in pain or 
dying and directly facing the reality of the situation as it is. A witness realizes that there is 
nothing to be fixed and no happy ending to pursue. To witness requires the virtues of 
attentiveness, honesty, patience, and courage (Frank 1991). 
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A fourth shortcoming in Engelhardt's position involves his libertarian emphasis 
on possessions or ownership. His suggestion that it is up to individuals to negotiate how 
to value and exchange services and products presumes medical services and products are 
privately held or owned. Yet a significant portion of medical training and remedies is the 
outcome of publicly-supported endeavors. Most medical and nursing schools are funded 
by public taxes. So too for the research and development of most treatment modalities, 
be they a new drug, a new suturing technique, or a new rehabilitation technique. 
Because this knowledge, skills, and interventions are public goods, distributive justice is 
imperative. As Fleck points out, ''The good that physicians would hope to do for any 
one patient is legitimately constrained by the medical good that they must provide to 
other patients" ( 1989a, 177; italics added). 
Therefore there is a legitimate role for government to monitor how the benefits 
(e.g., remedy, rehabilitation, and rescue) and burdens (e.g., taxation and participation in 
research studies) of medical care are distributed in American society. As Callahan notes, 
''The paradox of health is that it is both acutely personal and consumptively public" 
(1990, 103). "Consumptively public" means that consumption or use of services and 
treatments relies on a collective effort to research, manufacture or develop, and provide 
such services and treatments. Because of the extraordinarily large costs involved, 
contemporary health care must be a societal or communal enterprise. 
In summary, Engelhardt's proposal to leave the provision of and access to 
medical care to the open marketplace and individual choice is ethically unsupportable. I 
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now tum to the recommendations of another philosopher in biomedical ethics, Daniel 
Callahan. Callahan offers one of the most definitive or concrete ways to ethically revamp 
the U.S. health system. His position is developed across three books, Setting Limits: 
Medical Goals in an Aging Society (1987), What Kind of Life: The Limits of Medical 
Progress (1990), and The Troubled Dream of Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death 
(2000), each of which explores the role of medicine in our lives as well as the purposes 
of human life itself 
An important starting point is Callahan's claim that the most significant social 
effect of medical progress is '1:he way it reshapes our notion of what it is to live a life" 
(1990, 25). We now expect, he contends, to live longer and healthier, an expectation 
that includes the years of old age. Callahan judges such an expectation to be unrealistic 
and unsupportable in light of the financial limitations of the health system. He argues 
that a societal goal should be to help as many Americans as possible achieve a natural life 
span: 
A "natural life span" may then be defined as one in which life's possibilities 
have on the whole been achieved and after which death may be understood 
as a sad, but nonetheless relatively acceptable event (Callahan 1987, 66). 
The kinds of possibilities that he countenances are having a family, travel, work, 
education, and aesthetic enjoyments. 
From this position, he rejects provision of medical treatments to extend life 
beyond sixty-five or seventy years of age. In other words, publicly-financed research and 
insurance programs should investigate and provide life-extending modalities only for 
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those below age sixty-five. Chemotherapy would thus not be offered to give an eighty-
two year old woman with bone cancer another year oflife. This does not mean, 
however, that Callahan is opposed to all medical treatment for the elderly. He would 
support provision of care that maintains the eighty-two year old woman's quality of life. 
Powerful analgesics would therefore be available as would nursing home care. 
Callahan dismisses the popular image of the elderly pursuing lives of independent 
leisure; that is, the stereotypic images of playing golf and bridge, taking Caribbean 
cruises, and spending most of their time with fiiends. He sees such activities as being 
self-centered and hedonistic, and therefore ethically unimportant for public policy in 
terms of what medicine should and should not offer. So the justification for providing 
medical support aimed at quality of life stems from the special societal role Callahan does 
ascribe to the elderly: serving the young. To discharge their responsibilities of teaching, 
nurturing, and assisting the young, elderly people must not be in pain, cognitively 
disoriented, or communicatively impaired. 
I have two major concerns with Callahan's proposal. First, Jecker (1989) points 
out that it is one thing to deem a person's death as not bad and quite another thing to say 
that person has no right to medical care. What Jecker is contrasting here are beneficence 
and rights, two very different ethical concepts. Callahan erroneously conflates rights 
with consequences, she notes. He asserts that if the death of a person is not bad, then 
that person has no right to certain kinds of medical care. In other words, only if a 
person's death is deemed bad, perhaps because there are young children involved, then 
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the person can legitimately exert his right to medical treatment. Yet why should the 
badness or goodness of death affect whether a person has or does not have a right? For 
instance, the fact that an elderly person's death may be expected and regrettable (and 
therefore not bad) does not impact such basic rights as voting or free speech. 
A second challenge against Callahan involves unacceptable discrimination. At 
the outset, discrimination means to carefully observe and differentiate between objects, 
events, or people. This then is about perception, comparison, and judgment and so is 
neither ethical nor unethical. Discrimination becomes unethical when the selected 
qualities are not applied consistently or are inaccurate or irrelevant and yet used for 
important decisions. Requiring a specific level of eyesight for airplane pilots is not 
unethically discriminatory because it is necessary for reading the plane's controls. But 
requiring a person to be able-bodied for a theatre ticket-taker job is unethical because 
walking is not necessary to competently perform the associated duties. 
In the case of Callahan's denial of effective and standard medical treatments to 
those over sixty-five years of age, he ignores other groups of people and the kinds of 
treatments to which they should not have access. More strongly phrased, he seems to 
have targeted the elderly and placed the burden of''fixing" the U.S. health system at only 
their expense. This subsequently undermines his frequent appeal to community in that in 
a strong community, everyone shares and everyone sacrifices. His recommendation 
makes no demands of those who are not elderly. 
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Callahan could reply that his proposal is fair because at some point in time, 
everyone will become old and thus face age-based rationing. This reply does indeed 
mediate the apparent unfairness of his position. Yet a more fair system would be to 
apply his criteria of medicine assisting in the basic or universal goals or purposes of each 
stage of life and of medicine not assisting in idiosyncratic goals or purposes of each stage 
oflife. 
In conclusion, Callahan's recommendation to revamp the American health system 
is not adequately developed. He must apply the notion of what is the purpose of a 
particular stage of life to all stages of life before deciding the medical care that does and 
does not contribute to such purposes. Norman Daniels, the last philosopher in 
biomedical ethics to be engaged in this chapter, focuses on the human species in general 
as did Callahan. 
In Just Health Care ( 1985), Daniels rejects need being the chosen criterion with 
which to decide what medical treatments are or are not offered to Americans. Need per 
se is too ambiguous and too elastic to establish firm constraints on expenditures. 
Delineating what a person needs can be an exercise that is far too subjective to be the 
basis of public policy design. Yet Daniels does not dismiss all types of need: 'lhe needs 
which interest us are necessary to achieve or maintain species-typical functioning" (1985, 
26). Species-typical functions are deemed objectively valuable in that "we need them 
whatever else we need" (Ibid, 27). Thus there is a level of equality in desirability here 
that helps to ethically ground his position. 
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Added ethical justification comes from the direct connection made between 
species functioning and opportunity, the latter clearly resonating with basic ethical 
principles in the United States. A person must be able to perform certain functions, such 
as communicating, thinking, walking, and seeing to be able to take advantage of 
possibilities presented to him. Daniels does, however, place a limit on opportunities. He 
suggests that publicly-funded health care is defensible only if it preserves or restores 
typical species functioning necessary for a normal range of opportunities for a given 
society. Such a range involves the types oflife plans and goals that reasonable citizens 
have in the society. 
While he embraces equality in the case of functions, he does not prescribe a kind 
of radicalized equality; that is, trying to make all people equal in all aspects. Instead 
Daniels demands that there be equality of opportunity for those who share similar 
abilities and skills. The opportunity range will then be markedly different for those who 
are artistically talented compared to the range of those who are of average intelligence 
and drive. In addition to not asking for radical equality, he does not demand equal 
successes, but only that equal ranges of opportunities are available to people. 
There are three problems with Daniels' proposal to revamp the American health 
system. First, he focuses too exclusively on physiological functions and far too little on 
the tragedy of pain, suffering, and death (Stem 1983). Humans are not simply about 
action and achievements. As Stem notes, "To say that what is unjust about letting 
someone die for lack of health care is that it deprives him of opportunity is like saying 
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that what is really wrong with killing people is that you are depriving them of liberty" 
(Stem 1983, 348). Furthermore, the close connection of functions and opportunity 
means that many standard medical procedures would not be funded. Birth control 
would be a private matter because it is counter to species functioning. Yet having 
children and controlling one's reproductive capacities is deeply tied to personal identity, 
not just species functioning. And since dental care does not affect opportunity 
significantly, it would also become a private matter. 
A second problem surrounds the notion of species typicality. Daniels offers an 
inadequate explanation as to what counts as being typical for Homo sapiens. Is it the 
actual capacities of humans, such as, say, fifty percent of all people are literate? Or is it 
to be based on what the norm can be if certain social changes occur, such as making 
books and teachers available to all and then deciding what is typical (Jecker 1989)? 
I have a further concern with Daniels' position. This concern involves the 
contextualizing of the range of opportunity, namely ''for a given society." Societies can 
be very unjust as to what some groups of people are permitted to do and strive for 
versus what other groups are permitted to do and strive for. A classic example is the 
United States two hundred years ago when slavery existed. A more contemporary 
example is the mid-1900s, prior to the women's liberation movement, when women were 
restricted to the home and a handful of careers ( e.g. nursing and teaching). It is very 
troubling to restrict health care to specific social structures. The result may be that 
health care helps reinforce social imbalances and the oppression of certain citizens. 
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The work by Engelhardt, Callahan, and Daniels of ways to revamp the U.S. 
health system is provocative and weighty and has generated further debate about an 
exceedingly important issue. Yet all three proposals have substantial shortcomings that 
need to be addressed. 
This dissertation's structure: what and why 
The issue remains of how to restructure the U.S. system so that it is a fairer 
system. For the purposes of this dissertation, fairness is defined as an ethically defensible 
distribution of benefits and burdens among those involved or affected. One possible way 
to address this issue would be to take the work of Engelhardt, Callahan, or Daniels and 
modify it so as to alleviate the problems discussed above. While such work could be 
worthwhile, this dissertation tackles health-care reform in a different way. John Dewey's 
work in ethical theory constitutes the theoretical analysis of this dissertation, followed by 
a practical analysis wherein his theory is applied to macro-level and meso-level health-
care decisions. But prior to launching into Dewey's theory, an explanation is first 
needed as to why this dissertation's strategy is a justified approach for developing a 
viable candidate for health-care reform. 
Engelhardt holds that being able to do what one chooses with minimal 
governmental interference represents a good life. Callahan contends that a life of family, 
work, travel, and so on-the common parameters of a reasonable life-are what most 
humans should be assisted in accomplishing. And Daniels holds that having many 
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opportunities to consider and possibly pursue is a good life. In each case, the underlying 
ethical question is ''What is a good life for a human being?" Other answers are possible: 
for example, a life of spiritual or religious fulfillment or a life of happiness. From these 
alternative answers, analysis could ensue as to how health care can facilitate achieving 
such a good life. 
In this dissertation, however, I want to begin with a meta-ethical question, 
namely ''What is it for something to be good?" This question logically precedes the 
question ''What is a good human life?" My interest in the concept of the good and its 
relevance to health-care was prompted by the work of Michael Walzer in Spheres of 
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983). If something is valueless, then 
how it is distributed does not matter. But if something has a public value, then how, 
when, and to whom it is distributes matters. To have a public value is to be good, says 
Walzer. The point about public value versus private value can be illustrated as follows. 
Imagine that there is a large boulder on a riverbank, the result of geological and climatic 
forces. The boulder might be used for sitting by a passing hiker or for a lookout point by 
a small bird. Since the distribution of the boulder is not questioned here-and thus 
involves no public or communal relationships-it falls outside Walzer's concern about 
justice. Certainly the boulder has a value for the hiker, but it is a private value, not a 
public one. But if at some time the river area is to be purchased from the state, then the 
boulder acquires a public value because it is possible for the new owner to prevent others 
from making the boulder available to hikers. 
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The notion of public value comes from Walzer' s intriguing characterization of 
distributive justice: 
The idea of distributive justice has as much to do with being and doing as 
with having, as much to do with production as with consumption, as much 
to do with identity and status as with land, capital, or personal possessions 
(1983, 3; italics added). 
In other words, how things are distributed in a society says something significant about 
the citizens themselves in their inter-relationships with others. Walzer does not restrict 
his analysis to that which we readily think of as being distributed, namely consumer items 
such as computer, clothes, and cars. Instead he examines various ''things" that humans 
carefully and often ritualistically distribute, such as love, divine grace, dangerous or 
arduous work, and public honor. 
He argues persuasively that in any society, if access, acquisition, and allocation of 
something that has value is to be ethical, its nature must be first be understood before 
deciding on distributive systems and mechanisms. A good' s nature is neither a brute fact 
nor mere physical attributes, occurring independently of its social and historical context. 
Pivotal to Walzer's thesis is the trenchant claim that a good's nature manifests in its 
communally-bestowed meaning and significance. As such, different natures necessitate 
different systems and reliance on only one system for every kind of good is disfiguringly 
Procrustean. For instance, Walzer argues that the good of money is its ability to 
facilitate exchanges and transfers. 
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Yet certain things are not supposed to be readily exchanged and thus should not 
be monetarized. An example might be human sexuality or children; they are to be 
distributed in other ways that are appropriate to their nature. The notion of 
appropriateness leads to Walzer' s imagery of spheres of justice wherein it is ethical not 
to ''break" the defined boundaries of a sphere of interaction and distribution by using the 
wrong distributive mechanism. Given what sexuality means or represents to most people 
in America, exchanging it for money is the wrong, and therein immoral, mechanism. But 
given what sexuality means or represents in the Netherlands, where prostitution10 is 
legal, a monetary exchange is morally permissible. On behalf of Walzer, I think 
prostitution is not considered "right" or morally permissible in the Netherlands because it 
is legal. Instead because giving someone sexual pleasure is, in essence, simply providing 
a service, just as banking or housecleaning are services which can be exchanged for a fair 
price. Sexuality thus is not tied to personal identity or committed relationships. Thus 
since sex work is service work, it receives similar employment protection under the law 
as does other service work. 
Walzer's conception of what it is for something to be good vis-a-vis distributive 
justice connects to the case of health care. As noted earlier, contemporary health care 
requires collective effort and resources. The involvement of a community or a society 
10. This use of the word "prostitution" is not accurate. In the Netherlands, women who 
exchange sexual pleasure for money are known as sex workers, not prostitutes. The word 
"prostitute" is pejorative and conderrming, denoting socially-disapproved behavior. Walzer 
would suggest that goods can have different meanings based on cultural norms. Thus sexuality 
in America means something different than sexuality in the Netherlands and thus different rules 
of exchange are warranted. 
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means that fairness is an ethical concern. And so the question of what is the nature of 
health-care's goodness follows. This then prompts a meta-ethical question of what is it 
for something to be good. To answer this question, John Dewey's theory of the good is 
examined. Dewey's theory is selected on the basis that it will be most useful in exploring 
the good of health care. Other theories of the good developed by Plato, Kant, and Iris 
Murdoch were not chosen because I judged them less amenable to examining the 
practical case of health care. The appeal of Dewey's theory is reinforced by his 
commitment to pragmatism wherein emphasis is placed on gradual progress, compromise 
among the parties involved, and responding to specific situations (as opposed to relying 
on theories or abstractions). Given the urgent need for health-care reform in the United 
States, pragmatism is a promising approach to actually causing incremental changes to 
occur and to continue to continue. Paul Starr, a well-known economist, has argued that 
the most likely way to realize change in America is through incrementalism; in other 
words, through "small" compromises that are part of ongoing process of change (1992). 
A weakness in Walzer's thesis is the possibility of relativism. Imagine a country 
that is very financially impoverished. Consequently, its government decides to rely on 
individual choice and resources for the distribution of health-care services. If a citizen is 
wealthy, he can purchase as much health care as possible. But since the majority of 
citizens are very poor, most will rely on home remedies to combat illness or mend an 
injury. Predictably, the general health of the population will be very poor. However if 
health-care's value is completely relative, then there is no basis for criticizing this result. 
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Prohibition of criticism relates to the philosophical theory of ethical relativism. 
Ethical relativism posits that what is morally right and wrong depends on an individual's 
or a community's interests and values. In other words, since Jehovah Witnesses reject 
the use of blood products in medical care on the grounds that to do so is immoral, then 
such use for them is immoral. But the Catholic community has no such objection to 
blood products and so to use them in surgery on a Catholic person is morally acceptable. 
Therefore use of blood products is morally impermissible for Jehovah Witnesses and 
morally permissible for Catholics and there is no inconsistency or contradiction in such a 
conclusion, says the ethical relativist. 
But if ethical relativism is correct, there is a worrisome consequence: I am 
precluded from criticizing the values of another nation just as citizens of another nation 
are precluded from criticizing my country's values, on the grounds that the source of 
rightness comes from the group itself Yet don't many Westerners believe that they can 
legitimately criticize, say, Islamic strictures on Afghani or Saudi women? And don't 
many orthodox Muslims want to legitimately criticize the materialism of the West? 
Yet relativism can be challenged by asserting that there are some values that 
anthropologists hold to be fundamental to all human life such as truth-telling and a 
proscription against violence within the community (Palmer 2002). And so it is 
acceptable to make the normative statement that in all communities, membership and 
safety should be publicly supported. This still allows that there may be activities that are 
not universal and so could be within the parameters of ethical relativism. The ensuing 
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issue then is accurately identifying what aspects of humans are universally important and 
what aspects are contextually or historically important. 
Distributive justice involves two levels of society. There is first the question of 
what proportion of public resources should be allocated to competing societal projects, 
one of which is the physical and mental well-being of the populace. There is the 
subsequent question of what proportion of health-care resources should be allocated 
among competing patient groups, such as those with cancer, chronic asthma, and 
seriously impaired newborns. In work of Engelhardt, Callahan, and Daniels referred to 
above, they tackle the issue about allocations to particular patient groups, a meso-
allocation issue. Yet in another chapter ofDaniels' book, Just Health Care (1985), he 
asks: is health care special? By "special," he is wondering about health-care's worth 
relative to other social programs, a macro-allocation question. The consequence he 
would like to draw is that if it is, say, the most special, then it should gamer the largest 
proportion of societal resources, be they financial, effort, time, and allegiance. Daniels 
does not answer this question in Just Health Care; presumably, posing the question was 
all that he wanted to do in the book. 
Yet it is a critical question and one that will be directly taken up in this 
dissertation by comparing health care as a Deweyan good to three other societal 
endeavors: national defense, education, and the arts. Certainly there are other societal 
endeavors that are deemed good: income protection, voting, highways, Social Security, 
and environmental safety to name but a few. Yet national defense, education, and the 
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arts are chosen because there are published financial statistics of the tax dollars they 
consume and, even more importantly, there have been and will likely continue to be 
recurring political debates as to whether they do or do not receive appropriate funding. 
Thus they are chosen because of timeliness. 
Pursuant to this macro-level application of Dewey's theory, there will be a meso-
level application. The three kinds of health-care intervention to be scrutinized are the 
treatment for end-stage renal disease (ESRD) is compared to prenatal care and to 
reproductive technologies. These three are selected because they represent very 
different kinds of intervention. Dialysis for ESRD is emblematic of intensive, 
technologically-rich medical care. Moreover ESRD is specifically included under 
Medicare for federal reimbursement. Prenatal care is emblematic oflong-term, 
preventive care or public health care. And reproductive technologies demonstrate the 
creativity of medicine in control and manipulate what are often thought of as natural 
processes. 
In conclusion, the American health system should be changed so as to increase its 
fairness. The status quo cannot be tolerated because health-care expenditures continue 
to rise at unacceptable rates and, in tum, threaten other valued social programs. To 
tackle this problem, the philosophical work of John Dewey is used to help us think of 
health and health care in a new way. Based on this theoretical work, the insights gained 
will be applied to macro-allocation and meso-allocation decisions. This application is 
valuable for two reasons. First, methodologies for comparing competing social goods 
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have not yet been formulated by biomedical ethics theorists. Second, examination of 
how different rationing criteria would impact funding of different medical interventions 
has been absent in the literature as well. This dissertation's objective is to identify and 
defend an ethically-defensible criterion for decision making and then apply it to the kinds 
of distributive decisions that typify health care today. 
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CHAPTER II 
Complexities in the U.S. Health System: why there is no easy solution 
Introduction 
Prior to delving into the writings of John Dewey, there are four issues I explore 
in this chapter: the nature and role of money in health care, the nature of rationing, 
replacement of the American system with that of another country, and the state of 
medicine today. Assuredly there are many other issues that illuminate and confirm that 
the health system is highly complex. But the aforementioned four are of particular 
interest here because from my reading on the subject of health-care reform, either they 
have not been discussed at all or I have new points to contribute to the debate. 
Money emerges from the background 
Historically the locus of attention and effort within medicine was the special 
dyadic relationship between a patient and his physician. The patient evinced suffering, 
mortality, and wlnerability while the physician represented expertise, remedy or rescue, 
and duty. Each of these features was seen as ethically weighty and complex. And so it 
made sense that the medical and philosophical communities scrutinized this relationship 
thoughtfully and critically. A physician was believed to have deep and binding 
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responsibilities towards every patient. And a patient was believed to be able to trust his 
physician without limit. 
However the primacy and insularity of the physician-patient relationship was 
tempered somewhat with the development of family practice medicine in the 1960s. No 
longer was a patient presumed to be akin to a free-floating Leibnizian monad in terms of 
being fully self-actualizing and self-motivating or as being unencumbered and detached. 
A patient came to be seen as closely tied to, and situated within, some familial 11 context. 
Accordingly the benefits and burdens of any medical intervention were recognized as not 
just impacting the patient in significant ways, but also as impacting the family unit and 
individual family members. 
And no longer was the generalist physician presumed to be the sole professional 
responsible for patient care. Specialist physicians, nurses and other allied health 
professionals were acknowledged to be directly and substantively involved in patient 
treatment and rehabilitation. Thus the medical ethics literature since the 1960s has 
recognized that family members, specialists, and non-physician professionals are 
11. Today "family" can be defined in multiple ways. The stereotype of the nuclear family (i.e., a 
married, heterosexual couple and their biological children) is now seen as out-dated and 
needlessly confining to the possibilities of supportive and committed relationships. In fact, the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organiz.ations (JCAHO) defines family as 'lhe 
person(s) who play a significant role in the patient's life, which may include a person(s) not 
legally related to the patient" (2001, 125). 
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important participants or stakeholders12 in most medical encounters. In terms of"whose 
interest is at stake?" and '~ho should respond?" in any medical interaction, the 
aforementioned dyad was subsequently replaced by metaphors of a wheel or a web, 
illustrative of the multiplicity of interpersonal and inter-professional connections. 
Since the end of the 1980s, the difficulties in balancing these competing interests 
and roles have been compounded by the monetary aspects of health care. The presence 
of money in health care is admittedly not new. But today, money's increased importance 
means that it is not simply one of many factors in an efficient health-care system. Instead 
money has emerged from the background to be now an overt determinant of health 
itself Studies in the U.K. show that a person's economic class is one of the strongest 
correlates to personal health: the greater the income level, the better the health. Such 
strong and direct correlation was not found for such factors as education, age, gender, 
marital status, or geographic location (Lynch et al 2000; Marmot et al 1997; Arber 1996; 
Carr 1990). 
Many politicians, employers, and individual Americans see major inadequacies, 
excesses, and injustices in the current system: too little, too much, not fair. The fact 
12. In the past ten years, various articles in the literature of business theory have challenged the 
traditional claim that a corporation's primary focus should be only its customers and/or its 
shareholders. The concept of a stakeholder reflects that a myriad of parties has vested interests 
or stakes in a company's decisions and operations. These parties can be as diverse as a 
governmental agency, a competitor, and a supplier. Accordingly this concept encourages 
discussions about the kinds of rights and duties that a company has vis-a-vis all of its 
stakeholders and about balancing such competing interests. Thus nurses are stakeholders in 
medical care because their involvement is legitimate and significant. They are owed certain 
recognition and treatment by physicians and patients. Thus "stakeholder" is an ethically richer 
concept than "participant" which admittedly conveys involvement, but no implication either of 
valued involvement or of duties owed by others. 
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that these worries are so widely shared across a highly pluralistic and heterogeneous 
populace attests, I believe, to their seriousness and magnitude. Moreover these 
problems have not simply appeared at the fringes of the system nor been restricted to 
only a few discrete areas. Instead they have come to permeate the entire health system. 
Money and organization: multidimensional factors 
It is informative, I think, to briefly examine how deep and how pervasive are 
these problems. Moreover such an examination helps explain why simply increasing the 
total amount of dollars flowing to health care would prove inadequate for addressing the 
monetary pressures and conflicts. I believe that only talking about "money" glosses over 
existing complexities of this side of health care. Consequently I first want to consider 
four kinds of monetary concern: (1) money itself, (2) business, (3) finance, and (4) 
economics, each of which, for my purposes, has a distinctly different meaning. 
I define "money" as being the familiar medium of exchange, ''business" as the 
typical demands and limitations of a capitalistic marketplace, "finance" as possible 
sources and uses of an institution's or program's funds (Cross 1999, 135-6), and lastly, 
"economics" as the optimization of resource inputs to outputs in the context of fulfilling 
people's material needs and wants (Knopf 1991, 89). 
Second, I believe that it is helpful to examine how health care is delivered in this 
country by utilizing organizational analysis, again to underscore how the monetary 
problems arise in very different "places" in the system. My belief opposes the 
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provocative claim made by Larry McCullough, a bioethicist at Baylor College of 
Medicine, wherein he holds that America has no health-care system. He contends that 
the word "system" denotes "a rationally organized, highly coordinated, and centrally 
controlled way of doing something" (1994, 484). This definition sets a high standard for 
what can qualify as a system. From McCullough's vantage point, the U.S. health system 
lacks such features and thus he concludes that in fact the country's ''health care is a non-
system" (Ibid, 485). Perhaps initially surprising, he does not lament the absence of 
systematization. Instead he applauds such a situation on moral grounds because it 
preserves pluralism of values and helps reduce paternalism. 
I counter McCullough by allowing that a system need not be either monolithic or 
monovalent. The U.S. way of delivering health care is based on the premise that the 
funding comes from two primary sources: the public qua government and the private 
qua corporate. This is rational based on a belief in shared responsibility for medical care 
and progress. The system is coordinated in that there is clear separation of 
responsibilities: a patient "enters" the health system through one physician's office and 
then is referred further to treatments, examinations, and specialists. The same applies 
when a patient enters the system through an emergency department: she is subsequently 
admitted to the technology "rich" hospital and its specialists. Because the American 
health system is so advanced and has so many possibilities for treatment, it is very 
complex. But it is coordinated as evidenced by the familiar routine of appointments, 
paperwork, referrals, and so on. 
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As for McCullough's criterion of central control, I agree that that this accurate in 
the case for U.S. health care. But I want to challenge McCullough in that his version of 
control occurs only ifthere is a single administrative office. I suspect that the U.S. 
Postal Service would qualify as would the U.S. Mint. But such a standard excludes too 
many other organizations that have worked out national versus state versus local 
administrations (e.g., McDonald's, banks, and the Red Cross). Moreover there are other 
forms of central control: regulations, licensing, and professionalization. Each of these is 
prevalent in health care. And as a final rebuttal to McCullough, because the existing 
system does have numerous kinds of participants, heteronomy and dictatorial paternalism 
are reduced. In sum, I see American health care as a system, albeit highly complex. 
I think a more illuminating way to understand how health care is delivered in this 
country is through an organizational approach. The concepts of micro-, meso-, and 
macro- levels are informative here. While the terms "micro-level" and "macro-level" are 
familiar in the mainstream bioethics literature, "meso-level" is still relatively new. 
The connection among these three organizational terms can be illustrated 
progressively by moving from the narrowest perspective to the widest perspective on the 
delivery of health care. To speak about the micro-level in health care is to refer to 
particular or identifiable patient-professional interactions. Moving to a more generalized 
vantage point, the meso-level refers to institutional or bureaucratic settings for such 
interactions (e.g., an outpatient clinic or an acute care hospital). A macro-level 
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perspective refers to society's explicit or implicit sanctioning of various health 
alternatives contra other societal goals. 
So how do the different categories of money impact the different levels of health-
care delivery? I begin by claiming that all four categories do not impact substantively all 
three levels. As reflected in Table 1 below, I see the micro-level as being affected most 
directly by the first two monetary categories: money and business. 
First, money. Medicine tends to be among the highest paid occupations in this 
country. And wealth (i.e., having money) not only provides material benefits; it can also 
provide power. Recognizing such returns for services rendered, an immediate ethical 
question is whether, in caring for those who are vulnerable and suffering, a physician 
might be wrongly compensated at some point. In other words, fees may be so large that 
they cannot be considered fully earned, and so are not fully deserved. Moreover power, 
as a secondary gain, may be an inappropriate reward. A further question centers on 
money creating serious conflicts of interest for the physician in his role as an advocate 
for his patient. While the questions about desert and power have received minimal 
Table 1. Relevancy of Kinds of Money to Levels of Organization in Health Care 
( ✓ = is relevant) 
Money Business Financing Economics 
Micro-level ✓ ✓ 
Meso-level ✓ ✓ 
Macro-level ✓ ✓ 
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attention in the clinical literature, the question about financial conflicts of interest has 
consumed much of the debate over the morality of managed care and an unfettered 
marketplace (see Rodwin 1993). 
In the case of business issues, a physician's private practice is challenged by the 
inherent demands of securing a customer base and generating adequate profits to sustain 
the practice. A quick review of such medical journals as Medical Economics confirms 
the importance and complexity of office management techniques for the private practice 
physician. In addition to being competent both in terms of clinical practice and in 
personal interactions, a physician must now be a skilled businessperson. But is it really 
possible for a physician to responsibly and capably wear two "hats," that of the physician 
and of the office manager or entrepreneur, when both are so dissimilar and are in conflict 
at times? In fact, such conflict can be so dramatic that it ultimately constitutes a deep 
betrayal of certain fiduciary duties (Ubel 1999, 1675). 
Health care at the meso-level (i.e., in the clinic or hospital) faces ethical 
challenges from the second and third monetary categories, namely business and finance. 
Just like for-profit businesspeople, hospital administrators face a competitive and 
dynamic environment, as does an individual physician, in their decisions of what 
treatments and services a hospital will offer. Today, said treatments and services are 
often characterized as "service lines" and patients as "customers." These new labels 
cohere with the concept of commodification wherein goods are presumed to be price-
able, fungible, and subject to property rights and participants are presumed to be 
40 
prudent, informed "acquirers." Institutional mandates shift from responding to and 
caring for the sick and dying to offering a package of financially-sustaining services. Not 
surprisingly, this recent change in labels represents a dramatic ethical shift in answering 
the questions of'~hat is at stake?" and •~ho is at risk?" in any medical encounter. The 
inevitability of such conflict has resulted in many individual physicians forming group 
practices and then employing office or business managers to handle the financial and 
administrative responsibilities. 
There are numerous possible alternatives for institutional financing: for instance, 
insurance companies' reimbursement rates, internally-generated revenues, governmental 
allocations, and local philanthropic contributions. Certainly a for-profit organization will 
pursue some different sources compared to a non-profit organization. But in either case, 
ethical concerns for institutional administrators include how "encumbered" is each 
source of financing and how stable is each source. The idea of being encumbered means 
determining whether the monies provided are restricted by any specific limitations as to 
their use (e.g., tied to a project for supporting unwed teenage mothers or for 
rehabilitation of spinal cord injuries). Regardless of whether funding flows from 
government-to-hospital or from patient population-to-hospital, stability denotes 
commensurate commitment. Predictable and longer term funding allows administrators 
to shift away from a financial crisis mode and thereby make a greater and more trusting 
commitment to the community the institution serves. 
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And lastly, I believe that both of the last two monetary issues, finance and 
economics, are particularly pertinent to the macro-level of health-care delivery. 
Financing involves state and federal governmental decisions about the amount and kinds 
of sourcing (i.e., taxation levels and lines13). In other words, who must contribute to the 
public coffers and how much must each contribute. Financing inflows are a separate 
governmental decision to the decision of who will receive said funds. Next are the 
questions of who will benefit and in what ways when the monies are '1:ransformed" into 
medical procedures and services. An immediate ethical question concerning finances 
focuses on the fitting social balance between non-profit versus for-profit institutions in 
the delivery of health care and their operational freedoms and duties. 
Economics involves optimizing the capacity of said public funds to fulfill 
society's competing priorities (e.g., the arts versus education versus the infrastructure). 
Ethically challenging is finding a defensible equilibrium between stimulating the health-
care industry (such as promoting research) and controlling its unethical or illegal 
tendencies (such as patenting for economic gain). Innovation and service expansion can 
be part of the benefits while extemalities14 and market monopolization (e.g., patenting 
13. A tax line is the "what" of taxation as opposed to "how much." Property tax, income tax, 
alcohol tax, and a general sales tax are four examples of tax lines. 
14. An extemality is the harmful consequence of person or company Q's actions wherein the 
consequence is borne by those who (a) are not person or company Q and (b) have not sought nor 
received any commensurate benefit from Q. An example is a hog farm's toxic effluent that 
pollutes a nearby river system that is the water source for homes downstream from the farm. The 
polluted water qualifies as an extemality because the agent or producer incurs none of the direct 
harms that result. The homeowners incur them. And if they are not employed at the farm and do 
not purchase any of its products, they then receive none of the farm's benefits. Moreover the 
homeowners likely never agreed to take on such burdens. 
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specific human genes) can be part of the burdens. 
At present, one out of every seven dollars in the U.S. domestic economy is 
devoted to health care. There are no reasonable grounds to presume that more funds 
would not be required to meet all health needs or to provide benefits to everyone who 
could be so benefited. To support such a claim, six factors are salient: (1) the enduring 
existence of disease, injury, and suffering, (2) the difficulty in collectively prioritizing 
individually subjective health needs (e.g., the value of psychological counseling for post-
partum depression versus the value of estrogen-replacement therapy with fewer bad side 
effects versus the value of IVF for an infertile woman), (3) our cultural fear of death, ( 4) 
the fact that people are living longer and longer and yet the rate of morbidity increases as 
we age, (5) our cultural trust in technological answers to social and personal problems, 
and (6) the industriousness of institutions (research and/or commercial) to develop new 
medications, therapies, and equipment. In other words, it is impossible to predict at 
what point the demand for more funds in health care would ever be sated. More bluntly, 
could health care use every available dollar if no restrictions were instituted? 
Certainly use of the word "money" can serve as a kind of shorthand for the above 
monetary issues. However my contention that the monetary side is really of four kinds 
and that the loci of delivery is at three levels underscores why it is impossible to readily 
prevent and resolve the ethical problems generated by the role of money in health-care 
development, access, and delivery. 
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A new understanding of rationing 
Despite the seemingly insatiability of demand and the intransigence of resource 
scarcity, many Americans believe that rationing in health care is a new phenomenon: a 
phenomenon courtesy of managed care. Just the opposite is true. Rationing has 
occurred for decades; it simply has remained hidden and thus unacknowledged. The fact 
that a percentage of the population has not been insured or has been underinsured, and 
who are too poor to cover their own medical expenses, is a form of rationing. This 
constitutes rationing at a societal level, not at the bedside. In other words, the decision 
of who would not receive any benefits or would receive less than they wanted is made by 
linking medicine with the ability to pay. Because of such an inability, people in need of 
care do not become patients (that is, they are not under a physician's care) unless in 
extreme cases of rescue. If a patient has the financial resources [be they from an 
employer's health insurance plan, a governmental health plan (e.g., Medicare or 
Medicaid), or personal resources], then once a physician-patient relationship develops, 
the physician would advocate on behalf of her patient. But if a patient lacks such 
financial resources, then no lasting relationship arises and no advocate is identified. 
Why has rationing not been noticed? As noted by Asch and Ubel ( 1997), the 
health-care rationing debate has been confounded somewhat because the definitions 
employed have been inconsistent. They state that the majority of economists define 
rationing as "allocating goods in the face of scarcity" while other writers define it as 
cost-based limitations by treatment-type or by disease-type (1997, 1668). This range of 
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definitions implies a lack of clarity as to what constitutes health-care rationing. If we do 
not know the defining criteria, then it is not surprising that actual instances are 
overlooked. 
Distinct from the issue of inconsistency, the kinds of phrasing identified by Asch 
and Ubel are also, I believe, problematic because they are euphemistic. The fundamental 
problem with euphemisms is that they mask, thereby tempering conflict and concern and, 
in tum, rendering a topic or position tolerable. A euphemism is morally troubling 
because it can allow us to walk past when we should become involved in some way. 
With these two concerns in mind, namely inconsistency and masking, I want to 
assume an ethically challenging stance. Accordingly I characterize rationing as being----at 
its core-about saying "no" to someone or to some people, despite their needs, their 
anguish, or their good reasons. "No" seems to intuitively require stronger criteria; in 
essence to "raise the bar" for what counts as adequate ethical justification. Moreover 
this connotation holds regardless of whether the specific monetary issue at hand is 
money, business, financing, or economics. At some point, a decline in physician income, 
a marginal profit margin, non-renewal of a philanthropic grant, or a comparably small 
benefit all translate into someone telling a patient or patient group "no." 
Let me elaborate on this notion of needing more justification in the case of"no." 
An illustration of the asymmetry occurs in the case of informed consent. During the 
initial philosophical and legal discussions about what constitutes valid informed consent, 
the issue that consent had two ''faces," namely assent and dissent, arose. When a patient 
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agrees to the therapy that her physician recommends, it seems intuitively clear that the 
criteria for accepting her agreement should be few. Yet when she disagrees, it seems just 
as clear that the criteria for accepting her refusal should increase. What accounts for this 
apparent asymmetry? 
The same situation occurs, I believe, when responding to a request from someone, 
ceretus paribus. If someone asks, ''May I borrow your car?" my answer of"Okay" 
demands little explanation. But if my answer is "No," then there is a shared sense that 
some kind of explanation is warranted. Why might this be so? 
"No" signals a thwarting or obstructing of someone's plan which is unethical, 
other things being equal. The charge of immorality is justified by Kant's position on the 
inherent and immeasurable dignity of humans as presented in the Foundations of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Flowing from such dignity, a person's plans have value 
such that they should not be hindered unless there is a morally adequate reason to do so. 
Furthermore Kant's privileging of individual autonomy means that the person is best able 
to decide what does and does contribute to her interests and well-being. And so when 
"no" is the reply to someone's request, it represents an obstacle to that person's chosen 
goals or preferences. Unless there is an adequate account forthcoming, the "no" is 
unethical from a Kantian perspective. In the example of refusing a physician's advice, a 
patient's refusal is questioned because it is presumed that the physician's advice will 
support her projects and interests. In the example of not lending the car, it appears that 
a plan is being obstructed. 
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With this said then, I think the demand for making "no" explicit accords with 
ordinary morality. The health-care system currently hides or masks the "no" it, in 
essence, says to the millions of Americans who have no health coverage. The 
importance of making this explicit can be underscored from another perspective. The 
local media often run a story of a person who has been turned down for a life-saving 
operation because of lack of funds or lack of available organs. In either instance, the 
issue is hard scarcity. The familiar response of readers and viewers is for the community 
to rally some kind of support such that the surgery is reimbursed or there is a directed 
organ donation. This kind of response reflects the power of what is labeled as an 
"identifiable life." An identifiable life is one where we know the person's identity; his 
situation becomes personal to us and thus it is easier for us to care. 
In contrast are "statistical lives" wherein the medical situation involves a group of 
people who are never personalized, which is to say, their individual circumstances are 
never publicized and they never become "real people" to us. Our caring is less. 
Nonetheless statistical lives are the loci of health policy decisions such as whether to 
institute reimbursement coverage for prescription drugs under Medicare or to increase 
the number of reimbursed prenatal care visits for women on Medicaid. The relevant 
difference between identifiable lives and statistical lives here is that the public responds 
more compassionately to the former than to the latter. Yet are not the people whose 
well-being is being considered at the policy level (and so qualify as statistical lives) as 
needy or as deserving as those considered at the local level ( as an identifiable life)? 
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Certainly rationing affects both kinds of lives, but the problem is that rationing at the 
policy level has traditionally remained hidden. Therefore an adequate definition of 
rationing must be able to make sense in terms of refusals to groups of patients as well as 
to individual patients. 
Responding to the problems of inconsistency in definition and masking of its 
meaning, I have argued elsewhere (2002) that rationing's critical features are unmet 
demand, conflicting competition, shared and substantive valuation, and distributive 
control. Based on these features, I proposed that rationing be defined as: rationing is 
someone or some institution's deliberate decision to distribute a scarce good among 
competing persons. Complementing this definition, I proposed use of a description of 
rationing so as to more evocatively reflect the symbolism and experience of rationing. I 
believe the value of this description is that it accords better with what most Americans 
would say rationing is about: 
"Other people, as well as you, have asked us for X But there's not enough 
for everyone. So we will have to decide whether you will either (a) get none 
of X, or (b) get less of X than you wanted." 
It is possible that under a rationing scheme, some people will get all that they 
asked. Yet to my mind, anyone or any group who receives all that she or they want has 
not experienced rationing. The above definition of rationing is meant to underscore the 
experiential in its use of''you." What is personal can apply to both an individual and to a 
specific group because it is still the individual who experiences the absence or shortage. 
The ethical sub-text or symbolism of the above description is exclusion, being ignored, 
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or abandonment, two responses antithetical to medicine's duties to those who are in 
pain, injured, or dying. Again, it is possible to exclude a group as well as an individual 
(e.g., people who are HIV positive as well as Mr. Xwho is waiting for a cadaver liver). 
The growing role of managed care organizations in the structure of the country's 
health system has added to the sense of abandonment. When a patient is told "no" by a 
managed care organization with respect to reimbursement for a particular therapy or 
with respect to getting to access to a sub-specialist, she is being told by an organization. 
This adds, I think, to the sense of isolation because there is no personal relationship 
between herself and the MCO employee. Because it comes from an organization, there 
is a greater weight to the "no;" in other words, the patient sees it as more difficult to 
change an organization's "mind" than the mind of another person. 
"Rationing" is not a new term. The most familiar example of it occurred during 
World War II when the availability of various foodstuffs and consumer goods were 
restricted for private use. I posit that public acceptance of such rationing came from 
benefits continuing to flow to the public (e.g., national security) as well as a sense of 
collective participation. In capitated managed care plans, enrollees do not share a sense 
of equal security. Rather an enrollee who is presently not ill knows that the finite 
resources of the plan are being drawn down today by those who are ill or dying today. 
And by those who will be ill or dying tomorrow. But the pivotal question for him is 
whether when he becomes ill or is dying, will there be anything left to cover his medical 
care? So with managed care, there is a sense of first-come first-served in terms of the 
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associated benefits. Yet the burdens are equally distributed in that all enrollees must pay 
their monthly premiums. Thus the case of WW II rationing is starkly different from 
current health-care rationing and thus public support is commensurably different. 
I suggest that it is the explicitness of the prospective "no's" that has fueled much 
of the current public backlash against managed care. Certainly it has fueled the attendant 
emotions. The American public has rarely been told "no" directly and openly and the 
resulting psychological impact has been immediate, strong, and lasting. An article 
discussing the shortcomings of the British embrace of managed competition evocatively 
illustrates the experience of what rationing feels like when you are one of '~hose 
remaining," obviously and unmistakably left at the curb: 
Inequalities are now more visible and more subtle: instead of an unseen wait 
in bus queues in another area, a taxi now stops and picks up selected people 
from the same queue in full view of those remaining (Powell 1996, 259). 
Moving from the issue of how to best characterize rationing to the issue of how 
to ration, it appears that much of the literature on rationing frames it in terms of justice 
or fairness. Yet this is not the only way to frame the concept. There are numerous 
candidates for a defensible rationing criterion. From an ethical perspective, it is possible 
to conceive of a rationing policy-that is, a public policy that denies people what they 
normally received or obtained-that emphasizes, for instance, compassion or heroism. 
Such informing virtues could translate, I imagine, into strikingly dissimilar policies for 
health-care delivery. A heroic health system would privilege the notion of rescue 
wherein everyone who is facing immediate death or serious injury will be of primary 
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importance. A compassionate health system would provide any person in American 
some basic level of healthcare to alleviate such fundamental human woes as severe pain, 
hopelessness, abandonment, and malnourishment. Use of the word "human" is meant to 
capture what is basic to being a human being or person and thus the examples are meant 
to be different from the physical bias of modem medicine. 
Yet an ethical perspective does not exhaust the field of possible alternatives. 
From a business perspective, a viable candidate for a rationing policy could be efficiency, 
profitability, or even customer satisfaction. This plethora of criteria necessitates 
adequate justification for whatever criterion is finally chosen. Rather than appearing to 
presume that health care must be rationed fairly, arguments are needed as to why 
business considerations alone are not enough. And why justice is the central ethical 
virtue. 
Selecting a criterion is a weighty choice. Bringing "no" to the foreground should 
sharpen our attention as to what limitation or scarcity really means: there is simply not 
enough for everyone and some or all must go without. The implications of saying "no" 
at the individual level ultimately redound to the macro or societal level. Considering first 
the foundations of our entire health system, Fierlbeck cautions us: 
But what is at stake is not merely the future of a healthcare system; it is the 
legitimacy of a set of ideological claims upon which the provision of 
healthcare is structured (1996, 544; italics added). 
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Shifting from the health system to society as a whole, the opening paragraph of Tragic 
Choices speaks of the magnitude and symbolism of our decisions not to help everyone in 
need: 
We cannot know why the world suffers. But we can know how the world 
decides that suffering shall come to some persons and not to others ... For it is 
in the choosing that enduring societies preserve or destroy those values that 
suffering and necessity expose. In this way societies are defined, for it is by 
the values that are foregone no less than by those that are preserved at 
tremendous cost that we know a society's character (Calabresi and Bobbitt 
1978, 17). 
Replacing, not modifying, the U.S. health system 
As mentioned in Chapter I, rationing has always occurred in the American health 
system. It has manifested in the guise of millions of citizens lacking or having insufficient 
access to standard and effective medical care. Yet all other developed nations have 
governmentally-provided health insurance for every citizen. Moreover the health status 
and outcomes in these nations is as good as or superior as that of Americans on certain 
primary indicators (see Table 17 in the Appendix). Yet these countries spend less, and in 
some cases significantly less, each year (Table 16). 
In response to these results, demands made by theorists or by policy makers for 
the American medical system to improve its morality, its medical quality and 
effectiveness, and its productive efficiency have often appealed to the health systems of 
other countries as viable models. Scanning the mainstream academic literature of 
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medicine, bioethics, and medical economics, I found that Britain and Canada are the 
countries most frequently identified as relevant alternatives to, or lessons for, America. 
Although the populations of Britain and Canada are much smaller than that of the 
U.S.A., several attributes are shared among the three nations. The United States was 
founded by British subjects and much of the British political, legal, educational, and 
economic systems were instituted. This is also true of Canada. 15 Canada is commonly 
seen as being most like America in terms of language, culture, and geography. 
Granting such critical similarities, it is rather surprising that each country has 
noticeably different health-care system. Difference here centers not on the level of 
scientific advancement. In all three countries, reproductive technologies, transplant 
surgery, genetic screening, and high-intensity neonate care have become increasingly 
routine. Nor does the countries' differences center on the technological mix of medical 
facilities. All three have primary, secondary, and tertiary care facilities. 16 Instead 
difference centers on how medical resources, be they services or products, are made 
15. I allow that the geographic areas that came to be known as the United States and as Canada 
were not discovered by Caucasians. Numerous aboriginal and Inuit tribes or First Peoples lived 
on the continent for centuries prior to the influx of Caucasians. However the United States and 
Canada became federated countries only with the immigration of white people. 
16. Primary care is provided by a general or family medicine practitioner, typically in her office, 
with a special focus on prevention and long-term relationships. The presence of specialists or the 
need for surgery implies secondary care wherein the setting is usually a clinic or a hospital's 
outpatient wing. And finally, tertiary care implies sub-specialists as well as specialists, 
experimental medicine, emergency wards, and high-tech equipment typically found in acute care 
or teaching hospitals. 
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available and distributed to their citizens. 17 
A brief description of the evolution of the British and Canadian health systems is 
included in the Appendix. I see such descriptions as highly informative in that they 
illustrate how a health system reflects a national ethos. In other words, the design of a 
health system in a country, or lack thereof, reveals societal priorities of what is the good 
life such that all its citizens know that of X, Y, and Z: X and Z are guaranteed to all of 
them and that Y is left to individual preferences and effort. Furthermore these two 
descriptions describe other countries' ongoing struggles with the challenge of ethically 
rationing health care. These struggles underscore that returning to the fundamental 
question that drives this dissertation is a timely exercise because there are no ready 
programmatic "fixes" to the rationing challenge. 
In response to recommendations that the United States adopt the British or 
Canadian health system, I say "no." As one Canadian health economist noted, "'Nations 
do not borrow other nations' institutions"' (Iglehart 1986, 779). As revealed in the 
above descriptions of these two countries' systems, there are critical societal values at 
17. Deber (1993) provides a useful characterization of the differences: 
Financing Delivery 
U.S.A. private private 
modification private/public private/public 
U.K. public public 
Canada public private 
The above modification to Deber's chart is mine. In my opinion, it represents a more accurate 
picture of the American system. Because governmental funds constitute over one-third of all 
health expenditures, some mention of public financing is warranted. 
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stake. In Britain there is national unity around the essentialness of a basic level of health 
care to a good British life. As evidenced by their reconsideration of the privatization and 
competitive changes, I posit that health care represents security over body and mind. 
The importance of such personal security is similar for all Brits: there is consensus that 
all British citizens are reasonably, although not maximally, protected in something so 
fundamental. There is no demand that every technological advance be made available to 
as many as possible. This is compatible with the national image of Britain: stoic, 
reliable, communitarian, and unglamorous. And so I see that paying higher taxes, in 
part, to ensure that all Brits can rely on having a basic but comprehensive level of health 
care to all Brits is justified in their minds because they see themselves as duty-bound to 
provide such security to their fellow citizens. 
Something similar can be said of Canadians. Health care is one of the unifying 
and identity-conferring aspects of Canadian life. This has become even more 
pronounced over the last decade with the recognition of how very different is the 
American system. In other words, for Canadians, their health system is one obvious way 
that they are different from Americans. Since the late 1970s, there has been ongoing 
efforts to try to maintain the national differences so as not to be "swallowed up" 
culturally by the United States. 18 Moreover the health system is a societal, governmental 
program of which Canadians are particularly proud and just like the efforts to remain 
18. In the late 1970s, for example, the federal government passed legislation mandating that a 
certain percentage of programs on television and radio must be Canadian, whether they included 
Canadian actors, directors, producers, or musicians. This legislation was in response to the 
growing incursion of American programming and the concern over the loss of Canadian culture 
and identity. 
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different, the Canadian system is an indicator that Canadians can do some things better 
than the Americans. 
The American system does not have such societal values under girding it. Its 
informing values, I contend, are innovation, autonomy (be it of the patient or the 
physician), and options. Such values are deeply reflective of the United States itself and 
are not at the core of the national identities of the U.K. or Canada in my opinion. Hence 
my claim that it would be misguided for the U.S. to discard its system's structure and 
institute that of one of the other two countries. My claim incorporates much ofWalzer's 
arguments wherein basic values or goods are culturally defined to a large extent. 
Moreover the chosen institutions and systems that govern a societal good reflect various 
communal priorities and commitments. More simply put, the means that are selected 
reflect the worth or urgency of the end being pursued. 
Two concerns about contemporary medicine 
I believe that substantial changes to the health-care system have been elusive in 
part due to a failure to clearly understand the state of medicine today. To help 
evocatively illustrate this failure, I want to characterize contemporary medicine as being 
conflicted and as being totalitarian. 
First, the case of conflicted identity. The notion that American health care has 
successfully remained outside the vagaries and paradoxes of American society--that as a 
science, it is value-neutral and free from political mandates----is convincingly refuted by 
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Paul Starr's much lauded book, The Social Transformation qf American Medicine 
(1982). Especially noteworthy is his choice of the word 'lransformation" to describe 
medicine's progress in this country. If the level of scrutiny is restricted to, for example, 
interactions between caregiver and patient or to a specific disease and treatment 
modality--in essence, micro-level scrutiny-then medicine's progress typifies 
Darwinism; that is, continued segmentation and specialization. However as reflected by 
Starr's work, if scrutiny is directed to health care as a whole--a macro-level 
perspective-then I suggest that the field has been subject to major transformations. 
Current challenges facing American medicine arise in part, I believe, because its 
identity has become unclear which is troubling because resources may be misdirected and 
expectations may be unfulfilled. By "identity," I mean: what is medicine all about? 
What are its defining priorities and commitments? Because medicine taps into human 
possibility and the complexity of human nature, it should be expected that there is more 
than one candidate for its identity. 
In fact, I propose that there are five competing identities. These identities are not 
mere gradations or refinements of each other, but instead differ strikingly in their basic 
values. To help crystallize each of the five, I have included certain personae or familiar 
role models as heuristic devices. As Iris Murdoch contends, greater benefits occur by 
going beyond mere description: "'images should not be resting-places but pointers 
towards higher truth"' (Ramanathan 1990, 226). 
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Hippocrates and the code of conduct attributed to him constitute a clear starting 
point to Western for medicine's evolution. A guiding motive behind the Oath, written in 
approximately 500 B.C.E., was to formally distinguish what was acceptable from what 
was unacceptable in terms of medical treatment, behavior towards a patient, and 
behavior towards other practitioners. Thus the oath specified various kinds of 
obligations owed to a patient, other practitioners, and to the discipline itself In addition, 
written codification implied legitimacy. Accordingly those who complied with the code 
could be considered reliable practitioners while those who did not could be labeled 
charlatans or quacks. 
The Hippocratic Oath is relatively brief and written in a simple, yet direct, style. 
Such simplicity and directness imply, I feel, that there are certain fundamentals or 
minimums below which medicine must not sink. The Oath details such duties as fidelity, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and confidentiality, respectively: 
To him who has taught me this art [I will consider him] as equal to my 
parents ... 
I will keep them [the sick] from harm and injustice ... 
I will come for the benefit of the sick ... 
Whatever I may see or hear in the course of the treatment ... I will keep to 
myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about ... . 
(Edwards and Graber 1988, 40). 
The Hippocratic Oath can be understood as beginning the differentiation among 
and legitimating certain practitioners. Since then, the first shift away from it came in the 
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late 1800s. The new paradigm had two aspects: common-sense care and compassion. 
By "common-sense care," I mean cleanliness and bed rest as ways to minimize the 
external demands on the body so that it could marshal its own natural defenses against 
disease and death. Compassion was shown by not abandoning the suffering or the 
vulnerable. Florence Nightingale saw the practicality and logic in simply washing her 
hands and any medical instruments prior to patient contact. She also demonstrated 
heroic selflessness in putting herself in harm's way due to contagion. And by remaining 
at the bedside, she affirmed the obligation of presence, of being with another person, and 
through vigil, the value of witnessing suffering itself Thus an outcome of this new 
identity for medicine was to move away from concern for public legitimacy and to 
emphasize a selfless caring for, and binding loyalty to, each patient. Furthermore the 
presence of mass media attention on Nightingale helped entrench this purpose among the 
public's expectations. 
About the same time as Nightingale and continuing thereafter, a third paradigm 
appeared: the discipline of science. The promise of recovery through individual and 
local succor was herein replaced by the promise of prevention through science. Praxis 
was overshadowed by theory; trial-and-error by discipline. "Good" science demanded 
repetition, systematization, and control, and its preferred setting was the sterile, 
equipment-laden laboratory. And the guiding objective was a reductionist understanding 
of human physiology and its interactions with the external environment. Accordingly 
focus on this ailing individual was replaced by a focus on cells, chemicals, and micro-
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organisms. In a way, concern for the immediately-present human being changed to a 
concern for the unseen, the atomic, and the formerly hypothetical. Any resulting benefits 
were expected to flow to the general public rather than to an identifiable person. 
Scientists, such as Jonas Salk and Marie Curie, were publicly applauded for the coolness 
of their search for knowledge: impartial, methodical, yet rigorous. 
The next and fourth paradigm that I see as pivotal to medicine's purpose 
incorporates the idea of intervention as first embraced by Hippocrates. But here 
intervention is framed by another development, namely technology. The work in the 
1970s by Drs. Christiaan Barnard and Robert Jarvik typifies this period. Their work 
highlighted the impact of both technology and aggressive intervention into the body's 
workings. Hence the former paradigm of prevention was replaced by dual promises of 
rescue and of cure. The case of the first successful heart transplant in 1968 by Dr. 
Barnard exemplified rescue while the first artificial heart19 in 1969 exemplified cure. At 
this time, breaking through limitations or boundaries was no longer a question of"if," 
but a question of "when." The institution of medicine became the great hope for all 
Americans' well-being, present and future. 
And, finally, since the late l 980s, increasing attention has been on the money side 
of health care. From the demand side, the public's desire for medical treatment and 
services appears unquenchable. From the supply side, financial returns appear to range 
from millions of dollars in profits to bankruptcy. Consequently a debate has arisen as to 
19. The publicity surrounding the Jarvik heart in 1978 has led some people to believe it was the 
first artificial heart. However the first fully mechanical heart was developed in 1969 and kept its 
first recipient alive for sixty-five hours until a human heart could be obtained (Bruno 1997). 
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whether medicine is rightly situated in a capitalistic marketplace and thus not require the 
government to be involved as either a supplier or buyer of health-care services.20 The 
goals of choice, efficiency, and customer satisfaction have meant that patients are best 
understood as consumers and that medical services are best characterized as product 
lines. Similarly a focus on maximizing the returns for each health dollar spent has 
opened discussion as to how to aptly value added years of life or repaired abilities. As 
such the fifth paradigm shift substituted the promises of rescue and of cure with the 
promises of consumerism and competition and the persona informing these dynamics is 
economist Adam Smith. 
In summary, medicine has embraced five different identities as it has progressed: 
(1) the duty-bound practitioner, (2) the devoted and gentle caregiver, (3) the patient, but 
detached, investigator, (4) the action-oriented rescuer, and (5) the entrepreneurial 
producer. But which one is, or ones are, most fitting for medicine as the new century 
begins? The entrepreneur is very different from the duty-bound practitioner and the 
rescuer is very different from the caregiver. Can medicine successfully do it all? Do 
medical schools adequately train physicians about each role and what it requires? My 
greatest concern is with patients. By this I mean that patients may not understand how 
each role involves different, often conflicting, priorities and virtues. More specifically, I 
am concerned that patients are still so trusting and so hopeful that they will presume that 
their welfare is always first and that the physician they have is the kind of physician they 
20. Over the past ten years, roughly 40 % to 45 % of the dollars spent annually on health care in 




The second issue that supports the importance of this dissertation's motivating 
question centers on medicine being totalitarian. What I am pointing to with such a 
characterization is that public health, mental health, and familial care-giving have each 
been eclipsed or marginalized by physical21 medicine in America. Admittedly there is 
nothing inherent in medicine per se that makes totalitarianism inevitable. Nonetheless if 
only mass media reports and personal testimonials are relied upon, an easy conclusion 
would be that "health" and "health care" are exhausted both by what is physical and by 
physical medicine as situated within the institutional and bureaucratic setting of the acute 
care hospital. As a result, both concepts are very narrowly defined. 
Yet human beings are not merely bodies living in isolation from each other. 
Humans are composites of body and mind, living their lives within the bounds of family 
and home and within the bounds of some community or society. Overlooked too much 
by clinicians and governmental agencies alike, public health, mental health, and home 
care are examined below in terms of both their relevance to human health and their 
marginalization within health care. 
Public health differs from medicine in several ways. Its focus is on human 
21. "Physical" medicine contrasts with "behavioral" or "psycho-emotional" medicine such that 
the former type's focus is the physiology of the body while the latter type's focus is the mind or 
personality. 
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behavior, human interactions, and social organization.22 Medicine, on the other hand, 
tends to focus on discrete individuals, its arena is technology, and its primary model is 
the biomedical model of disease. This model is reductionistic and mechanistic in its 
perspective (Brandt and Gardner 2000). A charge of reductionism is detrimental in that 
it is asserting that something has been "stripped down" to a bare minimum and as such, is 
not an adequate representation or characterization. And a charge of mechanism can be 
pejorative when what is being described as mechanistic is actually a living organism. 
Such a description is therefore inaccurate. 
The benefits resulting from public health measures have been dramatic since the 
late 1800s. Sanitation, clean water, and immunizations have prevented more deaths and 
extended Americans' life expectancy far more than mainstream medicine (Sagan 1987; 
McKinley and McKinley 1977). As shown in Figures 1 and 2, below, there is a sizable 
inequity between impact on human health and financial support. The first figure presents 
the varied contributions to health by four areas: (1) the environment, (2) personal 
lifestyle choices, (3) human biology (e.g., heredity), and (4) mainstream medicine (or 
"health-care delivery''). The second figure presents the proportionally differing 
allocations of public funds to each of the four areas. 
22. The following strategies and fields, now part of public health, attest to the breadth of its 
current mandate: "health promotion ... health education, social marketing, epidemiology, 
biostatistics, diagnostic screening, immunisation, community participation, healthy public policy, 
intersectoral [voluntary organizations, governmental departments and agencies, agencies and 
private sector businesses] communities or populations, its arena is political, and its preferred 
model accepts the interdependence of health, environment, collaboration, ecology, health 





Figure 1. Relative contribution to human health 
(Ng and Davis 1981, 15) 
Lifestyle 
Figure 2. Relative financial funding 
(Ng and Davis 1981, 15) 
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According to governmental publications of annual expenditures in America, of the total 
funds spent on health, roughly 1 % is typically funneled to public health while 99 % goes 
to medicine and medical research (Statistical Abstracts of the United States). 
What might account for such a large disparity? Based on the aforementioned 
differences between medicine and public health, many people see medicine as more 
controllable or manageable, reliable, and impartial, which is to say that medicine is an 
efficient, effective, and fair response to pain and illness. In sharp opposition, public 
health is seen as "tainted by politics, advocacy, individual noncompliance, and social 
diversity" (Brandt and Gardner 2000, 711; italics added). 
The different objectives of medicine versus public health also help explain the 
inequity between benefits and funding. As suggested earlier, in recent decades, medicine 
has promised both rescue and cure, which are much more psychologically and 
emotionally gripping in comparison to a promise of prevention. Rescue and cure imply 
heroics, a virtue that resonates strongly with the American psyche, while prevention 
implies avoidance. Thus prevention, depending on how it is framed or the vocabulary 
employed, can reflect tentativeness and even fear. And finally, another boost to 
medicine's allure comes from science and technology. They are now standard 
mechanisms for its advancement, each of which clearly represents possibility and action, 
which, in turn, signal optimism and human ingenuity. 
Public health has focused on sociological and epidemiological studies, few of 
which have caught the public or media's attention. At the same time, effective programs 
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to, say, reduce childhood obesity or dental disease rely upon long-term, incremental 
education initiatives or changes to public utilities ( e.g., adding fluoride to public drinking 
water). No flashy fixes or shiny new machines here. Concurrently the focus on 
communities or "statistical lives"23 means that no compelling individual testimonials are 
relevant. And finally much of public health emphasizes behavioral change for obtaining 
health improvements, something that is very difficult for people to do in comparison to 
taking a pill or having a one-time surgical procedure. Based on these points, I suggest 
that public health does not have the conflict in its identity or guiding purpose that 
medicine does, as posited by the five models. Instead public health has a popular identity 
of the social engineer in terms of monitoring water systems, air systems, and food 
distribution systems, and so on. The issue instead is that public health's role in the 
public's well-being is not adequately appreciated by the most Americans in comparison 
to traditional medicine. 
Turning now to the case of mental illness in America, mental health programs and 
facilities have generally been accorded lower priority in comparison to physical health 
programs and facilities. Insurance plans typically limit the number of annual therapy 
sessions with a psychologist or psychiatrist, require co-payments of 50 % of the billing 
23. "Statistical lives" refers to the aggregate number of people impacted; "identifiable lives" 
refers to particular individuals. For example, debating whether General Motors should provide 
full employee-insurance coverage for the new male birth control pill would involve discussing its 
55,000 male employees (i.e., as statistical lives). Yet GM's coverage could also benefit 
machinist, John Doe, (i.e., an identifiable life) who has personally asked the company for special 
consideration in reimbursing his prescription. 
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fee, and even "carve out" certain psychiatric services from their coverage. 24 These 
restrictions are more severe than those usually applied to physical health coverage. Yet 
it is now acknowledged that a mental illness or disorder affects one in three Americans 
sometime in their lives. At present, one in six citizens has a mental illness which, in tum, 
translates into approximately forty-one million Americans enduring and suffering from 
one or more of these conditions (Boyle and Callahan 1993). 
Several reasons explain society's ongoing disregard of mental illness and mental 
health care. While largely aware of the limited treatment options available, the public is 
not aware of how very beneficial some of the treatments are (e.g., psychotropic drugs). 
Moreover since the 1970s, there has been a 'lrend toward remedicalization" of 
mental health and illness (Barney 1994, 21). Medicalization implies that traditional 
physical medicine can adequately investigate and respond to mental illnesses~ what are 
then minimized are family, culture, and socio-politics. Admittedly some psychiatric 
conditions are organic conditions of the brain or are genetically based. As such, they 
should be addressed by the same disciplines and institutions as conditions such as gastric 
ulcers (i.e., an organic condition of another organ) or some forms of breast cancer (i.e., 
related to the BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 genes). 
But many mental illnesses that are listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (1994), the primary diagnostic reference for American psychiatry, 
are better understood as being social (i.e., a matter of not '1itting in" in a community or 
24. When specific treatments or procedures are overtly excluded from an insurance plan's 
coverage, particularly when the plan is deemed to be comprehensive, it is labeled as a "carve 
out." 
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society) or as being interpersonal (i.e., not '1itting in" in a family or with other people) 
(Szasz 1997; Edwards 1997). As Thomas Szasz contends, if a person who currently 
does not fit in wants to improve his life, medicine may treat only the symptoms and not 
the root problems. To treat the root problems may require adequate education, adequate 
employment, adequate housing, and so forth; in other words, social initiatives. Similarly 
the root problem may be a lack of tolerance for people who behave differently yet pose 
no threat to others; in other words, interpersonal relationships. But the trend towards 
re-medicalization means that some situations that are illegitimately characterized as 
"problems" will be addressed by medicine and some situations that are indeed problems 
will be addressed by medicine which can only tackle the symptoms, not the underlying 
causes. In this way, what is considered to fall under medicine's jurisdiction increases. 
Mental illness is incompatible with the customary paradigm for physical medicine 
for another reason: the former is often judged to be the patient's responsibility to a 
greater degree than a physical illness. Boyle and Callahan insightfully identify a paradox 
in the public's opinion about mental illness: 
Treatment of mental illness is seen as something patients can do without, 
since, on the one hand, remedies for the severe and persistently ill are 
perceived to be almost futile, and on the other, relief for the "worried well" 
is thought to be discretionary (1993, S4). 
More simply put, medical remedies are judged to be either useless or not to be medically 
urgent. Any kind of clinical or societal duty to provide or make such remedies readily 
available therein dissipates: there is not much we either can do or should do. 
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Despite the attention devoted to hospitals and out-patient clinics, care that is 
delivered in the home constitutes approximately 80 % of all care rendered to ill, injured, 
or dying people. The change in 1983 in federal reimbursement formulas (from fee-for-
service to diagnostic-related groups25) encouraged hospitals to discharge patients sooner 
so as to reduce costs. With this impetus to discharge patients earlier, greater importance 
was placed on the home as the preferred site of recovery and routine medical care. 
Between 1987 and 1994, national expenditures for home care rose by an average of27.5 
% each year while total health expenditures rose only 11.5 % (Arno, Bonuck & Padgug 
1994). 
Two ethical concerns emerge from this trend. As a starting point, the home is 
expected to be a place of safety, comfort, and intimacy, and thus discharge from a 
hospital can be welcomed by patient and family alike. But the increased discharge of 
sick or recovering patients has resulted in the "hypermedicalization of the home" ( Arras 
and Dubler 1994, S20). Hypermedicalization occurs because high-tech equipment must 
be in the home for the continued care of the patient and family members must become 
knowledgeable and skilled in using said equipment. The home becomes 
25. A diagnostic-related group, or DRG, designated the amount of money to be charged for a 
particular medical service or product. In the late 1980s when DRGs were instituted as the 
amounts that the U.S. government's Medicare and Medicaid plans would reimburse for any 
medical interventions. The advantage to this system was to cap prices and thus control costs, to 
standardize what physicians in one part of the country charged compared to that charged by 
physicians in another part, and to impose a measure of equity in terms of what a medical 
generalist charged compared to what a specialist or sub-specialist charged for their services. 
Because Medicare and Medicaid are major reimbursers of health-care costs, their imposition of 
DRGS meant that DRGs became the standard for payments for mostl private insurers or 
employers. 
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hypermedicalized as it changes from providing bandages, a cool cloth for a burning 
forehead, and rest in one's own bed to providing TPN-feedings, hemodialysis, and 
confinement to a rented hospital bed. The institutional realm of medicine thus 
encroaches upon the formerly private and idiosyncratic realm of the family. 
As Ruddick comments, illness or injury has a transformative quality. Illness can 
change significantly a patient's self-image and interpersonal relationships: ''the person 
who comes home from the hospital may not be the person who left home for the 
hospital" (1994, S13). Illness can also alter a home to the point that "what was home 
may no longer be home" (Ibid). In fact, a transformed home may actually be less 
supportive and inviting than a hospital, given the burdens and demands that illness or 
dying can place on untrained caregivers and residential facilities. 
The other ethical worry about home care stems from what I characterize as 
technology's oppressiveness. Despite popular anecdotes about "Mr. Mom," care giving 
continues to be provided mostly by women, irrespective of whether the patient is her 
child, her husband, or her parent. Thus women, not men, provide necessary care and 
sustenance and typically must sacrifice to a disproportionate degree their own time, 
energy, and projects in so doing. This injustice is exacerbated by the fact that high-tech 
medical devices can render a woman isolated, disconnected from outside friends and 
colleagues. She must be at the bedside to monitor machine settings ... or to suction ... or 
to clean a central line. And since patients now go home sicker, she is tied to the home 
longer. 
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Reasons for the lack of clinical and public attention to the issue of home care are 
twofold. First, the historical inattention by American society towards women continues 
in terms of their presumably inescapable responsibilities for caring for patients in the 
home. And second, the traditional American view that the family and the home should 
be beyond the government's reach has meant that any internal injustices are not society's 
concern. 
Admittedly traditional medicine has made many important contributions to human 
well-being. But I see it falling victim to its successes and glamour in that it continues to 
promise "more and better things" and to ignore its failures and shortfalls. And in light of 
the general distrust of government and business, the public wants to believe that some 
societal institution cares about them when they are most vulnerable. A candid and public 
discussion of what is the purpose and role of medicine in our society (i.e., clarifying its 
identity) relative to other societal endeavors (i.e., ending its totalitarianism) is overdue. 
Absent such a discussion, hopes and resources will continue to be directed towards 
medicine and it will remain unrestrainable. 
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CHAPTER III 
John Dewey's Theory of the Good 
Introduction 
One objective of this dissertation is to tackle the issue of health-care reform in 
the United States by beginning with a philosophical starting point. Some writers who 
propose ways to make the American system more just start with the premise that health 
care has a specific overarching purpose. In Setting Limits (1987), Callahan holds that 
health-care's purpose is to contribute to a person's ability to live a reasonably full life. 
Daniels states in Just Health Care (1985) that its purpose is to help people pursue 
available opportunities. In contrast, Engelhardt suggests in The Foundations of 
Bioethics (1986) that its purpose is not singular. Instead it is multi-purposed and the 
purposes depend solely on the opinions and priorities of individual citizens: some think 
health-care's focus is easing pain and suffering, others think it should be saving lives, and 
still others point to its ability to overcome the "shortcomings or mistakes" of nature 
(e.g., genetic therapy wherein a person's genetic make-up is manipulated so as to block 
the expression of, say, Huntington's chorea). 
Rather than immediately propose another practical purpose for medicine and then 
consider how it affects distributive justice decisions, I chose a meta-ethical approach 
whereby I examine the nature of the good or of goodness itself Guiding this 
examination is the philosophical work of John Dewey which was chosen for three 
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reasons. First, he has a developed theory about the good. Certainly many philosophers 
have debated different things that do or do not qualify as being good, but many of these 
discussions are relatively brief or cursory. I sought a sustained and carefully thought out 
theory, expecting that it would offer more content to work with when applying it to the 
specific case of health care at the macro-allocation level and at the meso-allocation level. 
John Dewey is among the very few philosophers who developed a robust theory of the 
good. 
Another reason to adopt a different approach is that there is a critical difference 
between knowing which things are and are not good and knowing what the good is. This 
difference is nicely illustrated in one of Plato's dialogues, namely Euthyphro. In this 
story, Euthyphro is confident that turning his father over to the police for the death of a 
servant is a morally right--and thus required-act. In conversation with Socrates, he is 
eager to justify his confidence in light of such a seemingly unloving act. He appeals to 
the virtue of piety and what it demands of human conduct. Assuming his customary 
position of knowing nothing himself, Socrates asks to be enlightened as to what are the 
definitive distinctions between the holy and the unholy. Despite Euthyphro's sincere 
efforts to answer, Socrates eventually chastises him: 
Bear in mind that I did not bid you tell me one or two out of all the many 
pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you 
agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious 
through one form (Euthyphro 6d). 
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What Socrates is seeking is the nature of holiness itself or the definitive criteria by 
which to correctly label something as either being holy or unholy. 
Third, Dewey is well known for his work on pragmatism, a philosophical 
theory about human behavior and interactions ( a further description appears in the 
next section). Pragmatism seems to be a fitting way to approach the question of 
health-care reform. It has a strong practical focus: it deals with ends and means, 
strives for incremental progress over the long-run, and accepts compromises ( as 
opposed to maximums or absolutes). One lesson to be learned from the failure to 
legislate the Clinton health plan in 1994 may be that achieving sweeping reform of 
a program of such large dimensions may be impossible. As discussed earlier, 
health care is an immense economic institution in this country. And being ill, 
seriously injured, or dying has just as significant import to a person. Thus an 
approach that embraces incremental progress promises to be useful in the ongoing 
debate on reforming the health system. 
Background notes 
John Dewey (1859-1952) wrote prodigiously: more than fifty books, over seven 
hundred journal articles, and more than two hundred entries to encyclopedias (Dewey 
1977). He lectured often in other countries and was invited to teach at foreign 
universities. During the decades when his career was at its peak, Dewey was not only 
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well-known by other academics, but also by the American public. In addition to his 
work in philosophy, he was actively involved in education and social reform. 
In his academic career, he completed a Ph.D. degree in 1884 at Johns Hopkins 
University. His doctoral dissertation focused on Kant's psychology. Upon graduation, 
Dewey joined the philosophy department at the University of Michigan where he 
remained for ten years. From 1894 to 1904, he chaired the department of philosophy at 
the University of Chicago. During this period, he became active in Hull House, a center 
for social activism, and began the Dewey School, a center for studying education and 
psychology. In 1904, he left Chicago to go to Columbia University's department of 
philosophy where he remained for twenty-six years. While at Columbia, Dewey began 
Teachers' College so as to research methods of teaching. 
While he was at Johns Hopkins, three professors were especially influential to 
Dewey's development. First, he studied under C.S. Peirce, who is credited as originating 
the theory of pragmatism. Next, he studied under G.S. Hall, an experimental 
psychologist, interested in scientifically investigating human behavior and motivation. 
And lastly, G.S. Morris was one of Dewey's professors and he was interested in Hegel 
and idealism. In an autobiographical article, Dewey explains that he was drawn to 
Hegel's work because of its abilities to progressively synthesize, to unify, and to include 
cultures and communities (1930a). In my reading of various works by Dewey, the 
appeal of these abilities can be explained as follows: progressive synthesis is valued 
because it denotes activity, improvement, and harmonious integration. The ability to 
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unify is worthwhile because in comparison to traditional philosophy's penchant for 
identifying mutually exclusive dualities, 26 unification more accurately captures what life is 
really like. And in comparison to the view that people are detached, ahistorical 
individuals, Dewey considers it is more realistic to acknowledge the role of context when 
studying human development and behavior. Also at this time, Charles Darwin's The 
Origin of Species (1910), which described the intricate interactions between organisms 
and their environments, was challenging traditional positions within the sciences. 
When he moved to the University of Chicago, Dewey's interest in human 
behavior vis-a-vis its organic, interactive nature deepened. At the same time, he became 
increasingly disenchanted with Hegelianism's privileging of a transcendental state (i.e., 
the One) for three reasons. Holding the One as the pre-destined ideal marginalized the 
importance of daily life and daily struggles. The ontological "distance" between daily life 
and the One meant that they were so different from each other as to be irrelevant to each 
other. And perfection constituted an unreachable goal. 
In addition to his work on the philosophy of education, Dewey is best known for 
his work on pragmatism. This philosophical theory was very influential in the United 
States during the first part of the 1900s. More than one philosopher was involved in 
developing and expanding the theory: Peirce, William James, Dewey, and Schiller. In 
26. Throughout Dewey's work, he rejects standard dualisms found in philosophical inquiry: 
mind-body, reality-appearance, subjective-objective, the knower-the known, idea-experience, 
theory-practice, cognition-sensation, thinking-activity, and individual-society. His rejection is 
based on what results: one part of each pair is considered superior to and dominant over the 
other. In contrast, Dewey wants to allow for the presence of both parts of each pair: ''nature 
induces and partially sustains meanings and goods, and at critical junctures withdraws assistance 
and flouts its own creatures" (1929a, 341). 
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Philosophy and Civilization ( 1931 ), Dewey offers an overview of pragmatism as it 
developed under Peirce, James, and himself He rejects the common description of 
pragmatism wherein it emphasizes ends over means. He also rejects the claim that it 
"gloritlies] action for its own sake" (1931a, 16). Instead means are as important as ends 
and the role of action is to assign meanings to ideas. Dewey's own version of 
pragmatism, which he labeled instrumentalism, advocates logical inquiry into all aspects 
of the world, humans, and life: 
Logic, therefore, leads to a realistic metaphysics in so far as it accepts things 
and events for what they are independently of thought, and to an idealistic 
metaphysics in so far as it contends that thought gives birth to distinctive 
acts which modify future facts and events in such as way as to render them 
more reasonable, that is to say, more adequate to the ends which we propose 
for ourselves. This ideal element is more and more accentuated by the 
inclusion progressively of social factors in human environment over and 
above natural factors~ so that the needs which are fulfilled, the ends which 
are attained are no longer of a merely biological or particular character, but 
include also the ends and activities of other members of society (Dewey 
1931a, 31-2). 
In this definition are words that repeatedly appear in Dewey's writings: realistic, 
act[ion], future, reasonable, social, members, environment, and fulfilled. 
Foundations to Dewey's philosophy 
It is necessary to explain four foundational positions within Dewey's work as 
they help justify his particular theory of the good, which will be explained in the 
following section of this chapter. These positions are: (1) philosophy's purpose, (2) the 
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relationship between science and philosophy, including ethics, (3) human experience and 
its importance, and (4) the nature of being human or the "human condition." 
An impetus to philosophy since the ancient Greek Stoics has been a search for 
reality, truth, and certainty. Dewey sees this as largely misguided: 
I find that the retention by philosophy of the notion of a Reality feudally 
superior to the events of everyday occurrence is the chief source of the 
increasing isolation of philosophy from common sense and science ( 1917, 
59). 
Admitting that people live in "a world of hazards," Dewey posits two possible avenues 
for their guidance: relying on an external power and authority or changing the world 
through their own actions (1929a, 3). The former avenue is well-represented by religion, 
which Dewey claims has been a major part of philosophy. And so in earlier times, 
philosophy was looked to for answers to people's worries and fears. But no longer. 
Dewey provocatively states that when the sciences became a systematized, communal 
effort (as opposed to an idiosyncratic and individual effort), they constituted a crisis for 
philosophy ( 1931 a, 29). He applauds the sciences for their effectiveness in solving 
people's ordinary problems in living. 
Furthermore Dewey criticizes modem philosophy as having a "deplorable 
deadness of imagination" in that problems that originated in ancient Greece or during the 
Middle Ages continue to be examined (1930a, 18). Moreover philosophers should not 
be content to talk only to each other, challenging and refining one another's arguments, 
he argues. In place of such "academics," "philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be 
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a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method cultivated 
by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men" (Dewey 1917, 66-7). Philosophy 
should be "a study, by means of philosophy, oflife-experience"' (1929a, 34). With 
experience as foundational, philosophy becomes useful when it explores '1:he interaction 
of our judgments about ends to be sought with knowledge of the means for achieving 
them" (193 la, 37). 
In recapturing philosophy's relevance, Dewey dismisses the idea that the sciences 
are antithetical to philosophy. Rather they are similar in important ways: they explore 
the world and life as they are experienced: temporal, situational, problematic, and 
changing. Science recognizes that some areas of nature are determined and thus 
establish boundaries or impose constraints. It also recognizes that many areas can be 
controlled and manipulated to make human life better. 
So too for philosophy, says Dewey. In this light, he describes his overall 
philosophical stance as empirical naturalism. He recommends that philosophy adopt a 
methodology similar to that of science. This methodology forms the basis of his version 
of pragmatism, namely instrumentalism, as described earlier. Accordingly philosophy, 
including moral philosophy, changes from a discipline focused on only affirming 
antecedent, fixed beliefs and refining "antecedent existences and essences" to a discipline 
focused on future possibilities and experimentation (Dewey 1929a, 71): 
In experiment, everything takes place above-board, in the open. Every step 
is overt and capable of being observed. There is a specified antecedent state 
of things; a specified operation using means, both physical and symbolic, by 
which the conclusion is reached that such and such a judgment of an object 
is valid is overt. It can be repeated step by step by any one ( 1931 a, 289). 
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Ethical theorists are expected to explore hypotheses about the kinds of behavior 
and interactions that achieve desired outcomes in specific circumstances. Recognizing 
that behavior and interactions are inherently particular and historical, what is sought is 
specificity and timeliness. Ethical rules and principles can serve, at most, only as general 
guidelines as to what has been effective in the past in similar situations. Rules are 
retrospective and so are typically not definitively applicable to most prospective ethical 
problems ( e.g., ''What do I do in this situation right now?"). 
Dewey dismisses the notion that decisions of what to do can be made based on 
moral intuition, since he concludes that no such capacity exists. Instead people rely, 
consciously or unconsciously, on analysis, memory, and imagination. They scrutinize the 
presenting problem, recall what worked in the past, and imagine different possible 
responses and their consequences. And then based on what will bring about the most 
preferred outcome, a judgment is made and an action taken. This is reminiscent ofMill's 
utilitarianism in terms of calculating utility over disutility. But Dewey does not demand 
calculating the maximum net balance or an exclusive focus on consequences. Instead he 
includes consideration of the kind of person the agent will be when making a decision 
and thereafter. 
Traditional philosophy has typically offered people a kind of knowledge that 
Dewey labels as "spectator knowledge" wherein ''the real object is the object so fixed in 
its integral aloofness that it is a kind to any beholding mind that may gaze upon it" 
(1929a, 23). Spectator knowledge involves claims that the external world eX;ists 
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completely independent of people and so their epistemological worry is how accurately 
their sense perceptions and ideas represent the world. Truth therefore depends 
ultimately on the world's reality. Rejecting such intellectualism, Dewey sees experience 
as the ground or foundation of everything. Dewey cautions that "experience is not 
slipping along a path fixed by inner consciousness;" in other words, experience is not just 
knowing (1917, 25). In saying this, he rejects the atomistic or reductionistic view of 
humans found in much of traditional philosophy. More specifically, philosophers have 
emphasized cognition and reflection and minimized other human activities such as 
enjoyment, suffering, and doing. As Boisvert suggests, "experience is always wider than 
knowledge" (1998, 26). 
When he writes about experience, Dewey consistently refers to its embeddedness 
in nature, interactions between human qua organism and environment, and society as 
part of the environment. To be embedded is to be inextricably living within a family, a 
community, society, and a time in history. For example, experience is described by 
Dewey as ''the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment" 
(1917, 23). Or, 
Experience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is 
experienced, but nature-stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, 
temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are 
experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with 
another natural object-the human organism-they are how things are 
experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. 
It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches ... 
(Dewey 1929a, 4). 
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Phrased differently, but making the same points, experience is "an undergoing of an 
environment and a striving for its centre in new directions [ which are] pregnant with 
connections" (Dewey 1917, 23). 
The word "connections" implies relationships. Dewey's portrayal of human 
beings begins with the fact that they are necessarily situated in relationships, be they with 
specific individuals or with a community. This relatedness involves benevolent 
reciprocity wherein a person has concern for the welfare of his community as well as his 
own welfare. Further the community is concerned with its members' welfare as well as 
its own. People need each other just as they need the traditions of a community and its 
cooperation: 
Right, law, duty, arise from the relations which human beings intimately 
sustain to one another, and that their authoritative force springs from the 
very nature of the relation that binds people together (Dewey 1938, 238). 
Dewey sees the positive mutuality between the collective and the individual as both 
a factual claim and a normative statement. Admittedly a society or an individual could 
benefit greatly by exploiting or undermining each other in the short run. But Dewey's 
focus is on the life of a person, as opposed to only a particular episode, and on the 
continuance of a society, as opposed to a brief period ofluxury. He values progress and 
endurance. When a society flourishes over the long-term, Dewey contends that this is 
due to a large extent to the collective's concern for its members. And when an individual 
flourishes over the long-term, he is usually concerned about his community as well as 
himself 
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Dewey sees democracy as the most appropriate form of governance for most of 
our interactions. Democracy recognizes that citizens are both individuals and members 
and supports collective inquiry as per pluralism. In a sense, pluralism mirrors Darwinism 
in that diversity is advantageous to a species' survival. 
The image of the human condition is very dynamic. At its core is activity which 
Dewey asserts is the object of every desire. "Self-conscious creatures ... know that they 
act and know that their capacities are realized through their activities" (Welchman 1995, 
79). This emphasis on activity helps explain Dewey's frequent characterization of a 
person as an organism: an animated, responsive, and responsible entity interacting with 
its particular environment on a variety oflevels such as the physiological, psychological, 
and social. "'Life' is an interpenetration of organism and environment" (Boisvert 1998, 
17). Being an organism, humans are as much a part of nature as are other mammals; 
they only exhibit different behavior patterns. 
For centuries, traditional philosophy has debated the operations, purpose, and 
nature of the human mind and will. Dewey sees both as ultimately related to activity. 
The role of the mind is 'lo project new and more complex ends-to free experience from 
routine and from caprice ... to liberate and liberalize action" (Dewey 1917, 65). Dewey 
argues that the more one is involved with and in one's surroundings, the more attention 
one devotes to what is happening and what are possible alternatives, then the greater is 
one's freedom. On his behalf, Welchman describes the will as actively directing one's 
attention, emotions, and energies to a course of action and by so doing "we effectually 
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identify ourselves with the modified self that wills the outcome" (Welchman 1995, 80). 
Similarly means are just as revelatory as ends for Dewey. What one chooses to pursue 
will be influenced in part by the means available. One thus assumes responsibility for 
'1:he what" and '1:he how" of action. As a result of making a decision and acting, a 
person invariably affects her surroundings which, in tum, affect her. This ongoing back-
and-forth explains why there is no reified or fixed self, just as there is no static reality. 
Just as nature is always in process, so too are human beings because they are of and in 
nature. 
To summarize these four issues or topics, Dewey is a realist, a moderate, and an 
optimist. The four issues are: (I) philosophy's purpose, (2) the relationship between 
science and philosophy, including ethics, (3) human experience and its importance, and 
(4) the nature of being human or the "human condition." All aspects of life warrant 
equal consideration at the outset because everything is part of nature. Nothing is 
privileged or deemed superior. Everything that is living strives to flourish. In the case of 
human beings, their intellect is one instrument by which to live a fulfilling life as a 
participant in multiple relationships and in a community. Human beings are not simply 
creatures with superior intellects and reasoning capacities; that is not how a person 
understands herself or others. Instead human beings are about living in the form of 
experiences: joys, challenges, frustrations, dreams, losses, and so on. Thus Dewey's 
philosophy centers on investigating how life is actually lived, reflecting on the 
possibilities for beneficial change, and actuating opportunities for self-expression and 
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development. Philosophy, in the guise ofinstrumentalism, offers people an ongoing 
methodology to continuously examine life critically and carefully, to act imaginatively 
and wisely, and to achieve harmony within natural and social ecosystems. 
Dewey's theory of the good 
Prior to explaining Dewey's theory of the good, I think it is informative to 
highlight his comments about three significant ethical theories: hedonism, Mill's version 
of consequentialism, and Kant's version of deontology. Dewey frequently refers to them 
while explaining and defending his own ethical theory. Examining what he sees as 
correct and incorrect in these alternative theories will provide further and deeper insights 
as to why he felt it necessary to develop his own theory. 
Hedonism holds that what is good or of value is my pleasure and so what is 
morally right for me to choose or do is whatever brings me pleasure. As a guide for 
someone else, hedonism holds that she is ethically justified in choosing whatever brings 
her pleasure according to her own standards. Hedonism begins with a factual claim that 
every desire experienced and every action chosen is ultimately about bringing pleasure to 
the agent. Pleasure thus is good and as such constitutes a good or desirable life. 
Dewey criticizes valuing pleasure on two counts. First, Dewey dismisses the 
notion of pleasure and pain per se. Instead what can be examined is only a specific 
pleasure or pain felt as a result of a certain end obtaining at a certain time and in a certain 
set of circumstances. Each pleasure or pain is particular and thus must be critiqued 
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accordingly. Dewey also rejects the claim that every pleasure is valuable, though he 
allows that any pleasure may be valued. To be valued is to be desired. This is a 
statement about someone's wants or wishes. But to be valuable is to be judged worthy 
or something that is acceptable to desire. A vicious person will see lying or cheating as 
pleasant: "pleasantness and unpleasantness are accordingly signs and symptoms of the 
things which at a particular time are congenial to a[ n] ... organism" (Dewey 193 8, 213 ). 
It is one thing to be pleased with breaking a promise to a friend in order to obstruct his 
success. It is another thing to be pleased with breaking a promise so that the friend 
learns the value of thriftiness. So the pleasures experienced here are not the key issue, 
according to Dewey. Instead '\ve have set the man's existing character as the criterion" 
(Dewey 1938, 208). What we should instead be interested in is the person's character in 
terms of what he approves and disapproves of If he approves of not keeping 
commitments, what he should be criticized most harshly for is being the wrong kind of 
person, not that the pleasure he feels is inappropriate. Consequently what is ethically 
salient here is a person's character and not the pleasures he enjoys. 
Second, pleasures and pains just "happen to us," notes Dewey (Ibid, 213). They 
come and go without careful reflection, conscientious judgment, or purposeful action. 
Dewey views pleasure as a brute or immediate response to some object of experience. 
Given his emphasis on investigation, criticism, and chosen action, it is understandable 
why he deems brute responses as not important in human behavior and interactions. 
The situation is different when Dewey critiques happiness being deemed the good as per 
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a common rendering of Mill's consequentialism.27 This version ofMill's theory, as 
presented in Utilitarianism (1861 ), holds that what is good is happiness and what is evil 
is unhappiness. The morally prescribed decision or action is then the one that produces 
the greatest net balance of happiness over unhappiness for all those affected. Dewey 
rejects Mill's theory when happiness is nothing more than pleasure as described above. 
Mill's theory is more acceptable if happiness is defined as Dewey suggests: 
Happiness is not to be sought for, but is something now attained, even in the 
midst of pain and trouble, whenever recognition of our ties with nature and 
with fellowmen releases and informs our natures (Dewey 1930c, 265), and 
Happiness is a stable condition because it is dependent upon the standing 
disposition of the self (1938, 213). 
These two quotations hold that my happiness is ultimately about my character and my 
relations with my surroundings, which include my physical environment and other 
people. It is also not a transitory experience, but is stable as reflective of my character. 
But Mill does not propose such descriptions of happiness, says Dewey. He 
comments that Mill's theory "seems to find good from a result which is not in organic 
relation with anything in the agent" (1900, 19). Since "individual judgment is an act, an 
expression of interest, habit, and ultimately of individual character," acceptable moral 
guidance must consider personal integrity and commitments (Koch 1991, xvii). Dewey 
grants weight to happiness only because it connects to individual character and to certain 
non-agent relative values. For instance, ifl master a complex piano piece and such 
27. Other renderings or interpretations of Mill's theory describe the good and the evil as pleasure 
and pain, utility and disutility, or satisfaction and dissatisfaction. 
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mastery and artistry are valued in my community, then my happiness says something very 
different about me than if I am happy about saving money by cheating on my income 
taxes. In the former instance, the happiness is laudable because it reflects my sharing of 
communal values and my concern for the state ofmy character. In the latter instance, 
the happiness reflects non-social values and likely no consideration of my character. And 
so Dewey contends that morally required action must illustrate something about the 
person and how she sees or interprets her life in a communal setting. In this way, natural 
goods are prudentially valuable but included in prudent considerations are her welfare 
within an interactive community, her understanding of herself, and her image that she 
wishes to project to others. 
Yet to be fair to Mill, he does countenance different kinds of happiness and 
unhappiness. One way that he proposes for making such a distinction is in terms of the 
quality of happiness. For example, Mill would agree that the happiness felt from learning 
to overcome one's fear of heights is qualitatively greater than the happiness felt from 
winning a $10 grocery gift certificate. Bentham proposed a "calculus"28 for 
utilitarianism. Mill commended this careful scrutiny of what is relevant to comparing 
outcomes or consequences. Concerned that cultural pleasures would not be weighted 
more heavily than base pleasures, Mill held that the pleasure experienced from a high 
28. Mill adopts Jeremy Betham's original version of consequentialism which included a kind of 
"calculus." Bentham suggests using seven factors characterize happiness. The seven factors can 
be used to then compare strikingly dissimilar causes of happiness such as spending forty dollars 
for a lobster dinner versus donating forty dollars to Save the Children's Fund. The factors that 
Bentham appeals to are: duration, intensity, extent, purity, fecundity, probability, and timeliness. 
(Bentham 1838). 
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quality activity (e.g., reading a Shakespearean play or listening to the opera La Boheme) 
translates into greater happiness which, in turn, translates into greater ethical weight in 
comparison to the pleasure experienced from a baser quality activity (e.g., drinking 
alcohol). I think on further reflection, Dewey would applaud Mill in making such a 
distinction which could allow that a person's relationships with family and his self-
respect count more than his enjoyment of a practical joke. 
Dewey also offers a common criticism against happiness being deemed the 
primary end. Happiness is experienced because of other events obtaining. In other 
words, happiness is a by-product of, say, being honest or being adventuresome. A 
person does not experience happiness pursuing happiness itself, but in pursuing 
something else. And so happiness itself cannot be an end; it is simply a desirable 
"accompaniment" to the kind of action and character Dewey extols. ''Man would never 
have happiness, satisfaction, unless he could feel his activity" (Dewey 1900, 31 ). 
Kant's ethical theory seeks an objective process which can provide firm 
guidelines as to what is and is not ethical behavior. By being objective, it will 
consistently and equally guide human decisions. In The Foundations of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (1785), Kant develops what is known as the categorical imperative. Such an 
imperative imposes binding duties on people and thus is deontological. This theory is 
starkly different from a consequentialist theory such as Mill's because in using the 
imperative, possible outcomes are of utmost central importance. Kant contends that 
what is morally right and wrong does not depend on contingencies or particularities such 
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as outcomes. This underscores that his standards for a valid moral theory are that it 
apply equally and consistently to all people in similar situations. 
Three formulations of the imperative are said to be presented in Foundations, but 
the most important two are: (1) act only by that maxim which, at the same time, you can 
will to be universalized so as to apply to all people, and (2) act only in a way that treats 
humans, other people as well as oneself, as ends and not as means only. As a result of 
these two formulations, Kant's theory holds that "You must always keep your promises" 
and ''You must develop your innate abilities and skills" are duties imposed on every 
person. 
Kant's version of deontology is rejected by Dewey for two reasons. First, 
Dewey does think that human reason and choice are important morally. But he sees Kant 
as overemphasizing reason and will over all other aspects of experience and human 
nature. Cognition and will are only as important, not more important, as caring, 
ambition, fidelity, flexibility, and so on. Moreover reductionism, wherein two attributes 
are most special in humans, distorts the human persona because it discounts the innate 
complexity of people. 
Second, Kant ignores context and embraces abstraction in order to derive an 
objective methodology for ethical decisions and actions. "It is [a] fallacy [to suppose] 
that because something can be derived from experience that it is in itself real apart from 
the circumstances with which it goes" (Dewey 1900, 27). Dewey doubts the 
applicability of an abstract rule to the peculiarities of any real situation. In my reading of 
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Dewey, he believes that responding ethically to the nuances and subtleties of any 
situation is the ethical challenge. To set aside such actual particularities as specific 
relationships ( e.g., my mother and I are not getting along right now), feelings ( e.g., I 
resent my sister's recent promotion), and self-images (e.g., I see myself as a generous 
person) is to distort the situation, at a minimum, or to "empty'' the situation of its 
content, at a maximum. 
Further, Dewey sees character and consequences as mutually bound up in any 
situation; more simply put, character does matter morally as do consequences: 'lhe self 
is not a mere means to producing consequences because the consequences, when of a 
moral kind, enter into the formation of the self and the self enters into them" ( 193 8, 
316). A human is not just an agent who has no responsibility for the outcomes she 
purposively brings about. Dewey holds people responsible for their ability to imagine 
alternatives, predict outcomes based on past experience, reason, use their bodies, to 
choose effective means, and so on. Certainly there may be factors that people are not 
responsible for and they can be carved out so as to be fair and accurate in evaluating 
characters. 
In conclusion, Dewey finds hedonism, Mill's utilitarianism, and Kant's 
categorical imperative unsatisfactory as compasses for moral human conduct. Dewey 
looks for moral ascriptions of goodness to connect in some way with a person's self-
identity and to be connected with the ordinary demands and opportunities of daily living. 
In this vein, his ethical philosophy is less about the correctness or incorrectness of 
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discrete decisions and more about people as both unique individuals and as social 
creatures. From this position, I now tum to his theory of the good and relevant features 
of his general ethical theory. 
In his Lectures on Ethics ( 1900-1 ), Dewey proposes three categories of good: 
(1) natural, (2) ideal, and (3) moral. These three goods connect to ordinary experience 
in that a natural good relates to immediately-desired states of affairs, ideal goods relate 
to long-term states of affairs, and moral goods involve changes that must be made. 
Described another way, these three goods relate to different kinds of transactions or 
interactions that Dewey sees as natural to our world: the physio-chemical, the psycho-
emotional, and the social. The relationship with the natural world is central. All of these 
goods arise or occur within the dynamics of living. They are not merely linguistic 
conventions (i.e., a way to denote my approval or liking of something) or entities that are 
part of some transcendental or immaterial realm (e.g., as in Hegel's the One or in Plato's 
Form of the Good). Dewey also develops a conception of the good which unifies and 
harmonizes the three kinds of good. 
Natural goods are 'lhose [goods] which appeal to immediate desire" (Dewey 
1938, 224). Natural goods are also labeled as "immediate goods" and as "material 
goods" by Dewey. They are material in the sense that what is desired is a discrete object 
or idea. Desire signals a lack or shortcoming in my present circumstances: 'lhere is no 
desire except there is obstacle ... and conditions of effort" ( 1901 a, 170). Desire and 
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prospective effort both occur in what is experienced. The stimulus of a particular desire 
is a particular object or idea. 
In the Psychology of Ethics ( 1901 a), Dewey uses the example of a child and a 
bowl of sugar to illustrate what are natural goods. When the child sees the sugar, she 
recalls a past experience of tasting its sweetness. She realizes that she lacks having such 
an experience at this moment; the obstacle is that she does not have something sweet 
immediately at hand. 30 Also experienced, in terms of the conditions of effort, is the 
motivation to go to the sugar and dip in her finger. 
Dewey contends that every experience, no matter how simple or how complex, 
involves a judgment. ''The sensation of pleasure or pain is a sign by which we Oudge] 
the value of experience" (1938, 178). When I experience shooting pain from an 
abscessed tooth, I judge the situation as one that I should to try to end. When I 
experience relief as I mail my annual income tax papers just thirty minutes before the 
filing deadline, I judge that I should not repeat my actions next year. Judgment involves 
valuation, says Dewey; that is, we continually estimate, appraise, and assign value: 
We do not content ourselves with a purely external statement about the 
weather as it is measured scientifically by the thermometer or barometer. 
We term it fine or nasty: epithets of value. Articles of furniture are judged 
useful, comfortable, or the reverse (1938, 290). 
Importantly, Dewey makes a distinction between noting that ''I want Xbecause I like 
painting" and ''I want X because it helps me display my artistic abilities." As will be seen 
30. If she was eating a sweet candy at the time of seeing the sugar, she would probably not 
desire the sugar because she experiences no absence of sweetness. 
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shortly, the concept of judgment is central to Dewey's view of humans being as active 
participants vis-a-vis their surroundings and their social groupings and the importance of 
being responsive and responsible. 
Returning to the situation with the child and the bowl of sugar, the natural good 
is the sugar. It can effectively satisfy the immediate desire for sweetness. But once the 
sugar is tasted several times, the child no longer experiences a ''lack" and so she removes 
her finger. Her immediate circumstances, all other things being the same, have returned 
to a kind of harmonious equilibrium. At the same time, the sugar at issue no longer 
qualifies as a natural good since it is not desired by anyone; it is no longer an end-in-
vtew. 
In the case of a Deweyan natural good, there is no accompanying doubt or 
confusion in the child. The child acts deliberately and confidently: seeing the sugar 
reminds her of the experience of sweetness, she knows she lacks this experience at that 
moment, she judges that that particular sugar can eliminate the lack, and she judges that 
she is able to get to the sugar. But what if the sugar is actually cornstarch and so her 
desire will not be fulfilled? She will still act deliberately, but since her desire will not 
end, the cornstarch does not qualify as a natural good. And what if she is unsure as to 
whether the substance in the bowl is sugar or cornstarch; won't she be confused? When 
she thinks that it is sugar, it will prompt the desire for sweetness as she remembers the 
last time she tasted sugar. But when she thinks it might be cornstarch, which she recalls 
tastes like flour, no immediate desire for that taste arises. With such competing 
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judgments (i.e., sugar promises sweetness, cornstarch promises an uninteresting flavor), 
she approaches the bowl not in a confused frame of mind. Instead of just dipping her 
finger into the bowl and putting her finger immediately into her mouth, she acts 
differently. She first looks carefully at the texture of the white substance because she 
remembers that sugar is usually granular while cornstarch is powdery. Thus her behavior 
is appropriate for intelligently fulfilling her desire for sweetness. In realizing that the two 
past experiences are relevant to the situation at hand, there is no confusion. 
When Dewey says that a natural good can be an idea, a practical example might 
be: a man works the night shift and so must sleep during the daytime. He remembers 
that it is hard for him to sleep when the bedroom has too much light. The sun shines 
directly into his bedroom window in the afternoons. The idea that prompts a desire for 
thick curtains is the wish to be rested. But what can be said if the curtains do not help 
him to actually sleep soundly? Certainly he will continue to desire rest. Armed with the 
new knowledge that it is not only daylight that prevents him from sleeping, he 
remembers that he cannot abide outside or street noises. The desire for rest now 
prompts him to purchase ear plugs. And so ''thick-curtains-and-ear-plugs" constitutes a 
natural good for him because with them, his desire for rest will be satisfied. 
Can we say that he was confused in the beginning? No, because he was clear on 
what he desired. Can we say he was mistaken? Yes, because the curtains were a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition. A person will not be confused about his desires 
as immediately experienced, according to Dewey. So too for not being doubtful about 
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his desires as they are experienced. In other words, the man was not confused about 
wanting rest. And at the time, he was not doubtful about the benefit of the curtains prior 
to hanging them nor about the benefit of the ear plugs prior to buying them. If he had 
been doubtful about the curtains, his thinking would have been: "Now they will help but 
not completely. What else do I need so that I can sleep?" 
''Only a self of complete rigidity in nature, plus a purely stable world, could 
possibly yield ready-made and unalterable goods" (Crissman 1928, 630-4). Since a 
natural good is the content of this child's or that man's action, which is in response to 
her or his desire, each natural good is unique. The irreducible connection to actual 
desire means that this kind of goods is particular, circumstantial, and contingent. 
Similarly there is no set or correct hierarchy of natural goods; no summum bonum. And 
because of the uniqueness of each agent-situation, rules and principles are unhelpful. For 
instance, sugar can be infested with insects or can require too much effort to obtain (e.g., 
in the case of the child, if the sugar bowl is stored far out of reach though still in sight) 
and so she cannot always act on a general rule such as "Eat sugar." 
The second type of good is labeled as an ideal good: 
The ideal must be the projection or anticipation of a unified experience 
which contains in its unity what we have already presented to us in scattered 
and more or less opposed forms. What we have got is particulars and they 
are made particulars by the fact that they do not organize. In that very 
consciousness of discrepancy there is a vague, undefined consciousness of a 
possible unity or harmony. And that conception is what we mean by the 
ideal (Dewey 1900, 59). 
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Dewey notes that an ideal good has a ''beyond-ness" in that it is "an instance in 
which a man throws himself ahead" (Dewey 1900, 60). In contrast, a natural good is 
about here-and-now with a specific means identified. An ideal good has three functions: 
it is a process for "illuminating actual existing conditions," it is a process for unifying 
experiences, and it is transformative (Ibid). An example is timely here. Dewey offers the 
case of social justice as an ideal good and the specific experience I will use is submitting 
my annual income taxes to the federal government. The ideal "illuminates" or brings to 
the foreground of my thoughts what I know other people pay in taxes and their incomes, 
what public programs I use and do not use, and what programs other people use and do 
not use. These separate conditions are brought together and unified into my experience 
of social justice in America. Suppose that social justice means proportional distribution 
of benefits and burdens among the members ofa community or society. In examining 
the actual conditions, I find that there is a lack of proportionality. One factor that 
obstructs fairness from manifesting is my preference to be independent and as a result, 
my use of public programs is minimal. I can change this personal propensity into a 
means if I begin writing my elected representatives to modify the tax rules so as to 
reward independence. In this way, "obstacles [are transformed] into means" (1900, 43). 
An ideal good must be attainable at some point in time, says Dewey repeatedly. 
Ideals that demand human perfection are unattainable because humans are fallible, finite 
creatures. If recognized as unattainable, a particular ideal good will not adequately 
motivate a person and then his striving towards a particular end will cease. For instance, 
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if an ideal good is suggested to be making no mistakes on examinations (i.e., to earn a 
perfect score) then it will not motivate most students. In place of that ideal good, the 
ideal good that students should perform to the best of their abilities and talents is what 
motivates students to try to attain the highest score possible. This second ideal good is 
effective in unifying the various "actual conditions" ( e.g., students studying hard, trying 
sample questions, and getting enough sleep the night before) to explain the experience of 
taking a major examination. It is important to note that Dewey sees ideal goods as 
socially bound which is to say that an ideal good is not a private or idiosyncratic good. 
Ideal goods relate to the psycho-emotional level of transactions between the human 
organism and its environment. The psycho-emotional parts of life always involve mutual 
interactions and connections with other people, whether they are family members, 
friends, or strangers in special roles (e.g., my bank's loan officer or my own clients). 
''Doing the best one can" is a shared value in American society; ''making no errors on an 
exam" is not. 
Unlike natural desire and natural goods, there are no definitive criteria as to what 
constitutes a specific ideal good. Though not phrased in the language of good by 
Dewey, his notion of a standard is relevant to further delineate the content of an ideal 
good. The major difference between a standard and an ideal good is "a difference of the 
degree of consciousness in use" (Dewey 1900, 69). A standard is a: 
Valid ideal, or the ideal which has been consciously conceived as ideal with 
reference to its capacity to [ act as a principle of interpretation on the 
psychological side, and as a method of control or direction on the practical 
side] is the standard (Ibid). 
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In the example above, the standard of social justice is the definition given. 
Admittedly there are other definitions. But the notion of validity means 'whether the 
ideal will work" (1900, 70) in the present circumstances: does it unify? Does it help 
change obstacles into means? Dewey acknowledges that there can be some ambiguity or 
flexibility in an ideal good in terms of what standard is legitimately applicable to the 
situation under consideration. In seeing the actual consequences of using a certain 
standard, a person may modify how important the ideal is. If seeking proportionality 
repeatedly results in strife within the community I live in, then I may judge social justice 
to be of less value. Or I may find that the specific standard I have been applying fails to 
capture all that I think is reflective of justice, and so I will adopt a different definition. 
"The particular ideal of good at a given time and what we take as our standard of 
good need not ... coincide with each other. They are always modifying each other" 
(1901a, 186). What is noteworthy in this claim about mutual modification is that Dewey 
is once again underscoring the contingent dynamics or give-and-take of a complex 
organism (i.e., a human being) living within complex systems (e.g., a society and the 
natural world). Accordingly no ideal can ever be considered absolute and no standard 
can ever be considered definitive. 
A moral good "exist[ s] only when something has to be done. The fact that 
something has to be done proves that there are deficiencies, evils in the existent 
situation" (Dewey 1920, 169). Key here is the obligatoriness of action: of identifying 
the end to bring about and the means to be successful. A natural good creates no duties; 
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neither does an ideal good. But a moral good has a sense of urgency associated with it: 
the current situation cannot continue. But the ensuring question is how does a person or 
a group of people know when something must change. This is the function of the good 
itself When the good is being undermined, then a person must act. 
Dewey defines the good as: 
a system, an organism, something which pervades a variety of different 
forms of value and which holds them together in such a way that the good 
cannot be realized except as these goods can be realized ... the idea of a 
harmonious and harmonized, inclusive unity is necessary to the good (1900, 
49). 
Dewey also offers a more condensed characterization of the good: it is growth 
which involves increasing (1) one's abilities for adaptive living and (2) the 
meaningfulness of one's experiences. Growth fits with Darwin's emphasis on the mutual 
interactions between organism and environment. For Dewey, a human being does not 
have a static essence that must be perfected. Kanne notes, ''There are no fixed self-
enclosed finalities ... life is interruptions and recoveries" (1988, 217). And Dewey also 
holds that humans are not reducible to a handful of special abilities. And finally a human 
being is not an isolated, self-determining creature. Instead he sees humans as 
multifaceted, living as multifaceted, nature as multifaceted, and society as multifaceted. 
Moreover humans, nature, and society change and evolve and as a result, living changes. 
These dynamics are underscored in the concept of growth: 
the process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static 
outcome and result, becomes the significant thing ... The end is no longer a 
terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the 
100 
existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring 
process .. .is the aim of life (Dewey 1920, 176), and 
the rectifying of present troubles, the harmonizing of present 
incompatibilities by projecting a course of action which gathers into itself the 
meaning of them all (1930c, 210). 
When Dewey describes growth as ''the consummatory value," he is not claiming that it is 
the highest good (1901b, 370). Instead he is saying that it integrates and harmonizes 
diverse but critical elements oflife. Crissman explains this point by noting that the "good 
becomes coextensive with all oflife's significant concerns" (1928, 598). 
A very evocative characterization of the Deweyan good comes from Gouinlock 
in his book, John Dewey's Philosophy of Value (1972). He sees the good as ultimately 
artistic in that its meaning or significance exceeds itself 
Intelligent and imaginative concentration on resolution of the existing 
problematic situation augments the forces of growth by deliberately 
converting agencies of conflict and frustration into effective powers. When 
conduct is art, the problematic situation is resolved by discerning its active 
tendencies and anticipating its possible outcomes, and also by drawing 
liberally on the past. If there is successful resolution, and consummatory 
experience ensues, it is clear that such experience is at the same time a 
fulfillment of the past and portentous of the future .... the situation becomes 
consummatory by the organic and functional interaction of its constituents 
(1972, 250). 
The aesthetic here is the balanced integration of the actual and the possible, the past and 
the future. 
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The iterative dynamic between oneself and the environment has two very 
significant outcomes. First, the self becomes more defined and refined in terms of 
successful habits for living. This involves the idea of being more responsive to one's 
surroundings; in Darwin's terminology, more adaptable. To be more adaptable is to 
have increased abilities, habits, relationships, resources, and knowledge. 
This increase, however, is not meant to mirror the adage "more is better." Recall 
that growth is directed towards attaining a harmonious unity in one's life. So greater 
abilities are not desirable because they allow for greater power with which to conquer or 
oppress others. It is pivotal to note that Dewey believes that a good life involves 
cooperation with other individuals and the community-at-large over the long-run. 
People must rely on each other and so cooperation is necessary. 
But imagine that someone suggested that having three cars contributed to 
adaptability more than having one car just as having an immense hard-drive on a personal 
computer is superior to having a moderately-sized hard-drive. The concern here is that if 
Dewey agrees that these do contribute to adaptability, and thus qualify as good, then 
consumerism will be embraced which, in tum, places pressure on health care producing 
more and more and more. I believe that Dewey would criticize rampant consumerism on 
the grounds that it does not promote cooperation. Much of the energy within 
consumerism is, I suggest, competition; that is, to have "bigger, newer, faster'' when 
other people do not. Materialism can also be an outcome of ego wherein a person finds 
self-worth in possessions. Dewey would reject such a source of self-value and in its 
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place recommend self-worth based on mutual, long-term relationships with others plus a 
feeling of resiliency and agency because of living in a complex, dynamic environment. 
Even more importantly, Dewey posits that "'apart from the social medium ... the 
individual would never "know himself," he would never become acquainted with his own 
needs and capacities"' (Welchman, 1995, 165). In this vein, it is imperative that a person 
maintain a place for herself in society in which she can be the kind of person she is and 
the kind of person that the community can allow. Dewey rejects egoism on a factual 
basis in that no person, or very few, can do well in society if concerned only with self-
interests. Similarly he rejects the idea of radical self-creation wherein everything one 
values and chooses is created by the individual herself Dewey claims that facts support 
his statement that peoples' behaviors are socially conditioned. The ''facts" of which he is 
thinking are: 
others do take account of what we do, and they respond accordingly to our 
acts. Their responses do affect the meaning of what we do ... All the actions 
of an individual bear the stamp of his community as assuredly as does the 
language he speaks (Dewey 1930c, 317). 
As a consequence, Dewey considers it to be obvious that every citizen, if 
intelligent, will act in ways that are compatible with society just as society will 
structure itself so that growth in every citizen is possible. This still leaves room for 
progressive change as both citizens and society evolve in concert. 
A second outcome is that experiences themselves become increasingly 
meaningful. What does Dewey mean by this claim? As a starting point, in Experience 
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and Nature ( 1929b ), Dewey defines meaningfulness as '1:hings in their immediacy are 
subordinated to what they portend and give evidence of' (108). And "meaningfulness" 
is not simply symbolism or importance, but rather is '1:he acquisition of significance by 
things in their status in making possible and fulfilling shared cooperation" (Ibid, 149). 
It is critical to note that such cooperation is reflective of shared understandings, 
values, identities, and commitments. This is the source or basis of a claim that 
meaningfulness occurs in the form of cooperation. Cooperation therefore is not just 
about congenial exchanges of objects or information. And the notion of cooperation is 
important for Dewey because he does not wish to privilege or allow for exclusive self-
advantage being the criterion for goodness. He contends that each person is inextricably 
linked to other people in intimate, highly significant relationships and that both parties 
benefit by maintaining strong relationships. Moreover my opinion of myself is not 
"private" by which I mean that, for Dewey, my self-image is in part dependent on others' 
opinions of me. 
An example of meaningfulness is my donation of one hundred dollars to a non-
profit organization with a mission of reducing illiteracy by offering reading programs. 
My donation increases the meaningfulness of my life because I am connecting myself to 
those who are less fortunate than I. 
There is one passage in The Psychology of Ethics (1900) in which Dewey seems to 
say that experience is greater than growth: 
The whole process of experience is more of a good, and a deeper good than 
the good itself. That which we formulate as the good is a phase of the whole 
process of the development of experience itself. And it is the good which it 
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is simply because of the part which it plays in this experience (Dewey 1900, 
25). 
Is Dewey saying here that it is experience that qualifies as the good, not growth? A 
straightforward answer is not evident so I will begin with an analogy using the case of 
justice. If I said that trial by jury was more just and a deeper justice than justice itself, 
what am I saying? I am pointing out that a real trial actualizes or operationalizes the 
concept of trial. From this, I suggest that an actual instantiation of something surpasses 
the associated concept in terms of reality. In the instance of the trial, what it "looks like 
and feels like" is richer than its associated concept. In being "richer," there are more 
details involved than could ever be captured in a concept's definition. In other words, to 
see and hold a kitten is much different experientially and epistemologically than 
memorizing the definition of kitten. 
Returning to Dewey's quote about experience and the good, I interpret him to 
say that experience is the phenomenological foundation of everything connected to 
humans. Growth is not a foundation of all that exists, but rather it directs us to what we 
should pursue, given the kind of creatures we are, the kind of context we are in, and the 
kind of interactions we rely upon. 
Conclusion 
This chapter's over-arching goal is to identify what John Dewey considers to be 
the good in his moral philosophy. The Deweyan good is growth which has two 
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components: adaptability and meaningfulness. This concept will be applied in the next 
chapter to the practical biomedical ethics case of the health-care system in America to 
ascertain in what ways, if any, does health care qualify as good. 
Dewey's moral psychology is heavily infused with his pragmatism. He does not 
seek perfection of human nature or some glorious transcendent realm. Instead his theory 
incorporates the past, the present, and the future. The past is relevant because we have 
knowledge of the consequences of prior decisions. For Dewey, knowledge involves not 
just reasoning abilities. It involves reflecting, remembering, weighing, analyzing, and so: 
aspects of what can be labeled as "critical thinking." It is, however, just as important 
that such knowledge informs action. Knowledge that has no effect on an agent's 
decisions and actions is of no interest to Dewey. 
The present is relevant because of the kind of person the agent believes himself to 
be. The present is also salient because a problem has been identified such that action is 
needed. And the future matters because of the possibilities for improvement, for solving 
the problem, and for re-establishing a harmonious balance. 
Just as he embraces this 'fullness of time," Dewey emphasizes the complex 
richness and diversity of human life as well as its interconnectedness. Growth is not a 
definitive term that sets rigid criteria for everyone. It is to be thought of as a process 
that accommodates the heterogeneity of characters, talents, and circumstances. 
Admittedly Dewey's moral theory does not sanction everything and anything a 
human might do at a particular moment. An individual is not a supreme sovereign. 
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Instead Dewey holds that a person lives deeply connected to other people, to a 
community-at-large, and to his physical environment. As such, he has responsibilities to 
others as well as to himself which demand nurturing and moderation if they are to endure 
over the long-run. This emphasis on the ethical significance of context reflects the 
organic naturalism of Dewey's moral theory. 
Dewey's pragmatism is a provocative contrast to other philosophical theories 
that privilege the individual, the faculty of cognition, consequences, or that establish 
absolute rules, or that strive to find ''Truth and Reality." His inquiry into the natural 
world, human beings, and their interactions seems much more realistic and humble. He 
seeks to accept humans as complex social creatures that care about relationships and 
character. Moreover these creatures strive to be intelligently attentive and responsive 
and in so doing, accept responsibility for the practical means they utilize to bring about 
the ends they choose. The concept of the good encompasses all these points and 
accordingly promises to be a very useful mechanism with which to evaluate the goodness 
of health care, a societal endeavor focused on improving the lives that Americans lead. 
Similarly, the fact that Dewey's theory can be described as empirical naturalism affirms 
its synergies with health care which relies heavily upon the sciences' investigation of 
human physiology. In other words, Dewey's theoretical work can shed light on the 
practical case of the health-care system. 
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CHAPTERIV 
Dewey's Theory of the Good, Health, and Health Care 
Introduction 
This chapter represents this dissertation's shift from theory to praxis or, more 
specifically, the application of theory to practical problems. There are many problems 
and challenges in reforming the U.S. health system. However the practical problems to 
be addressed herein are of two kinds. One problem is how to ethically allocate scarce 
resources among competing social programs. The resources under examination here are 
funds obtained by the government through taxation. These resources are scarce in that 
there has been, and continues to be, inadequate funding to cover the costs of assisting all 
citizens who need the help of others so as to have a reasonably good life. Articles and 
reports in the press are frequently about a government's budgetary woes, whether it is a 
reluctance of politicians to support new or increased taxes or a looming shortfall in funds 
to cover promised services. 
"Social programs" means programs accepted through legislative action to be the 
government's responsibility, such as sanitation, income protection, utilities, education, 
the military, police and fire departments, and so on. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, "government" includes federal, state, and civic governments. Some social 
programs are the exclusive responsibility of the federal government (e.g.,' Social Security 
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and the military) and others will involve shared responsibility with states or cities (e.g., 
highways and education). 
The division of responsibility is not critical here. What is important is that these 
programs rely on tax dollars to cover most or all of their operating expenses. When a 
program is funded through taxation, this means that the costs are borne by the general 
public. Another way to phrase this is that the associated burdens are borne by the public. 
What follows from this is the ethical claim that the public should then have some 
measure of involvement in the decision of how the funds will be distributed. In other 
words, this is the decision of who will benefit and how much. 
The second problem is distributive, too. It is how to ethically allocate scarce 
resources among competing medical interventions. This decision is "closer to the 
patient" in that the kinds of choices to be made are the level of funds directed into, for 
example, cancer treatments, well-child check-ups, and psychological counseling. As 
such, these are meso-allocation decisions.30 Again, insufficient tax dollars are available 
to cover the costs of researching, manufacturing, and providing all therapies that 
Americans who are ailing, injured, or dying could use. Of the 1. 4 trillion dollars spent on 
health care in the U.S. in 2002, 44 % came from public coffers (e.g., tax funds) and 56 % 
from private coffers (e.g., employer insurance plans or individual savings) 
30. "Micro-allocation" is sometimes used to refer to decisions relative to individual patients; for 
instance, a physician choosing whether to treat, and then to what extent, a woman with gastric 
reflux disease versus a man with a peptic ulcer. Both patients "use" the physician's billable time. 
And if both patients belong to a managed care insurance plan, the physician knows that there is a 
definite limit on available resources to be shared by all enrollees of that particular plan. The term 
"meso-allocation" is being used in this dissertation to reflect distributive decisions among groups 
of patients, not between individual patients. 
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(Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001). It is worth noting that the private 
contributions are overstated because the government allows corporations to shield health 
benefits from taxation. In this way, the government underwrites private insurance. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine how Dewey's theory informs public 
policy decisions that involve rationing. Prior to exploring this dissertation's two 
allocation problems, a discussion as to what constitutes health is needed for two reasons. 
First, there has been a debate in the biomedical ethics literature concerning how to 
accurately define "health." Second, we are not interested in health care, whether it is in 
the form of medical or public health measures, just so as to have health care. Rather, 
health care is considered valuable because it contributes to human health. Its value is 
derivative to that of health itself And so before tackling the practical side of health care, 
it is necessary to understand what constitutes health or being healthy by means of 
scrutinizing definitions of health and deciding which is most persuasive or strongest. 
Then Dewey's notion of the good will be applied to health itself to affirm that it is indeed 
a good thing after which will follow a comparison of health as defined and evaluated in 
this dissertation to health as defined by Daniels and Callahan. The objective of this 
comparison is to underscore the impact of Dewey's philosophical work to the practical 
issue of health-care reform. In other words, what might Dewey say in examining 
Daniels' and Callahan's recommendations for rationing health care? 
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Defining health 
The debate as to what is health revolves around two basically opposed 
viewpoints: health is a biological notion (which includes body and mind) and health is a 
sociological notion. Phrased differently, what is at issue is objective fact versus 
subjective value. To say it is sociological or subjective means that being healthy is 
determined by what a society decides it needs its population to be able to do and to be 
permitted to do and to what extent. For instance, if a society's economy depends heavily 
on taxation, then the longer people can work and pay income taxes, the better. A 
healthy citizen would then be someone who works until age 80 or so and is not absent 
more than the average employee who is in his 30's or 40's. 
Resolving the debate about the nature of health has two advantages. Discussions 
are more productive when there is agreement about terminology. And responsibilities 
for improving or preserving health can be appropriately assigned once we are clear on 
what health involves. If health is biologically based, then medicine and public health 
should be involved because they can more readily affect what a person's body and mind 
can do. They are based heavily on empirical studies and human physiology. But if health 
is sociologically based, then other agencies, disciplines, or enterprises must be involved 
( e.g., schools, public transportation) because they can affect what opportunities and roles 
a person can fulfill. 
Let me begin with Christopher Boorse's classic biological characterization of 
health (1975). He first notes that "organisms are vast assemblages of systems and 
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subsystems which ... work together harmoniously in such away as to achieve a hierarchy 
of goals" (Boorse 1975, 551 ). This hierarchy of goals starts at the cellular level and 
progresses to the level of organs and eventually to the entire organism itself Boorse 
continues on to define health in a simple way: it is the absence of disease. Disease, in 
turn, is "deficiencies in the functional efficiency of the body ... when they are unnatural, 
and they may be unnatural either by being atypical or by being attributable mainly to the 
action of a hostile environment" (Ibid, 552-3). Although the definition does not 
specifically mention the mind, the references to functional efficiency and the body can be 
interpreted as covering mental abilities in that the brain is a part of the physical body 
whose functions are cognitive. 
To illustrate this definition, a person is not healthy if, for instance, she has 
endometriosis, paranoid schizophrenia, melanoma, or the flu. Endometriosis and 
paranoid schizophrenia qualify as diseases because they are not statistically normal for 
the human species. Skin melanoma and the flu qualify as diseases because they are 
caused by "a hostile environment." Boorse adds that the value of health comes from 
"nothing but the value of conformity to a general excellent species design" (Ibid, 560). 
Since his explanation of health refers to functions, efficiency, statistics, and the species, it 
is considered a biological or objective characterization of health. And given this 
perspective, medicine and public health would be assigned responsibility to intervene. 
Yet by Boorse's lights, medicine and public health's goal is thus not to maximize or 
optimize individual capabilities beyond what is normal for the species. 
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Boorse suggests that the value neutrality of his definition is a positive feature. In 
this case, being value neutral means the definition does not include any particular 
prescription as to the kind of lives humans should lead or the goals they should pursue. 
No mention is made of promoting happiness, preserving a self-image, or even ending 
suffering. Neutrality is considered advantageous because it promotes the likelihood of 
people agreeing as to what is and is not a disease. 
Boorse describes illness as also being free of values. Illness is the presence of a 
disease that is unwanted or undesired by the afflicted person and that provides "a valid 
excuse for normally criticizable behavior" (Boorse 1975, 555). The kind of behavior he 
means is not fulfilling one's responsibilities, poorer personal hygiene, being less 
communicative, and so on. If someone carries the HIV virus, he would be deemed to 
have a disease and not healthy because the virus is atypical. Yet if he continues to follow 
his daily routine and discharge his normal duties, he is not ill. But when his body 
weakens to the point of having to perhaps work only on a part-time basis, then he 
qualifies as being ill. 
This definition of health is unacceptable because it does not countenance 
problems in a person's psychology, emotions, or behavior. A depressed person, 
suffering from organic depression as opposed to situational depression,31 would not be 
considered ill or unhealthy and neither would a person who is addicted to shopping. And 
confusion surrounds the claim of value neutrality and the claim that goals are organic. 
31. Depression is considered to have two causes. One is a biological dysfunction of the brain. 
The other is dysfunction in inteipersonal relationships. 
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To illustrate my point, consider the fingers which are part of the "system" known as a 
hand. The fingers' purpose is for holding, manipulating, or picking up objects. Yet it is 
not just any object that a person desires to hold or pick up; it is certain objects. For 
instance, I want to hold a writing instrument so that I can write notes during my 
university class lectures, be subsequently more likely to earn a university degree, and 
then be more employable. It is not enough to say that holding itself is important because 
the subsequent question is ''What do you need or want to hold?" so as to determine the 
range of movement and strength of the fingers. The reason I want the dexterity to hold a 
pen or pencil rather than a fire hose is my career aspirations. Thus a discussion of values 
is necessary. 
Daniels ( 1985) begins just as Boorse does: health is the absence of disease. 
Daniels defines disease as deviations in natural functions, mental or physical, that are 
normal for a member of our species. The inclusion of "normalcy" means a rejection of 
maximizing or perfecting human abilities. By Daniels' definition, exceptional intelligence 
is not considered a disease because it does not prevent an organism from functioning 
normally. A person with a "genius IQ" is still able to make coherent choices, look after 
his physical well-being, and interact effectively with other people. However infertility 
counts as a disease because reproduction is a normal function of any species. 
Daniels' evaluative move occurs when he argues that the value of being healthy is 
to take advantage of opportunities. He notes that he has been influenced by John Rawls' 
seminal work on social justice (Daniels 1985, 40). Opportunities are valuable for self-
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expression, agency, happiness, or whatever the agent desires for himself Daniels 
constrains opportunities by adding a "normal range" of opportunities to the definition. 
Daniels defines this range as 'lhe array of life plans reasonable persons ... are likely to 
construct for themselves" (1985, 33). The constraints are in two forms: societal and 
innate talents (as opposed to learned abilities). In other words, a healthy person can 
pursue a set of opportunities that are delimited by the society or community she lives in 
and by her skills and talents. So if a woman lives in a highly patriarchal society, the 
responsibilities and activities deemed "normal" for her will be very different from those 
expected of her in a liberal or egalitarian society. Similarly the normal roles and 
activities that can be pursued will be very different for a woman who is mentally 
handicapped or is 70 years old compared to those for a woman who is athletically-skilled 
or is 22 years old. 
From this characterization of health, the purpose of medicine is limited by 
species' functioning, societal expectations and ''permissions" (in terms of what a person 
is expected and permitted to do), and innate abilities. This counters contemporary 
medicine's focus on the individual as unique, autonomous, and self-creating. Most 
physicians today continue to see themselves as devoted advocates for each of their 
patients. Thus they are expected to fight tenaciously for each of their patients' best 
interests, exclusive of all their other patients. 32 
32. The advent of managed care challenges the primacy of the individual patient as discussed in 
Chapter I. There is growing pressure on physicians now to try to balance the competing interests 
of multiple patients. 
Daniels' position mirrors the definition developed by renowned functionalist 
sociologist Talcott Parsons: 
the state of optimum capacity of an individual for the effective performance 
of the roles and tasks for which he has been socialized (Parsons 1958, 69). 
Parsons' focus here moves to the individual but the invocation of what socialization 
demands of him means that the individual is not free to do or pursue whatever he wishes. 
Just as Daniels limits health to what is normal within a particular society, Parsons limits 
the range of activities also to what a particular society expects of its members. 
I reject Daniels' and Parsons' definitions on the grounds that they place excessive 
authority on society for setting boundaries as to what is normal. Imagine a 
country that oppresses its women. As a consequence, women would have a highly 
restricted range of opportunities to them. What is then deemed worthy of medical 
intervention would likewise be limited. Afghanistan under Taliban rule is a ready 
example. Afghani women who experienced serious eye strain due to reading would be 
denied corrective eyeglasses but not if the eye strain is caused by close needlework. 
An example "closer to home" illustrates the point further. Writers on feminism 
have vigorously debated research in and techniques for assisted reproduction. Case in 
point: processes such as in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian transfer 
(GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), and intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
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(ICSI) are now familiar clinical interventions to overcome infertility.33 Yet an ethical 
concern with their development is that such ordinariness can mean that an infertile 
woman feels pressured to pursue such interventions so as to become pregnant. Yet if a 
woman is not willing to do "whatever it takes" to be pregnant, then she may be judged 
selfish or judged a weak-willed mother. 
Many feminist writers worry that assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) 
reinforce the enduring social stereotype that motherhood is not only natural to a 
woman but also largely defining of womanhood (Warren 1988). Referring back to 
Daniels' and Parsons' perspectives, ARTs would be readily available because 
motherhood continues to be a socially-prescribed role for women, irrespective of 
individual priorities. The further point here is that fatherhood is not as consuming 
a definition for men and hence there is an unjust reproductive double standard. 
And so Daniels' and Parsons' positions are unable to obviate societal or cultural 
discrimination, which is an unacceptable limitation. 
Other definitions of health have been developed which place a greater focus 
on the personal: 
a person's psychophysical capacity to act or respond appropriately (in a way 
33. IVF involves adding sperm to a Petri dish that has unfertilized ova and then several fertilized 
eggs are placed inside the woman's uterus. GIFT involves placing an egg and sperm in the 
fallopian tube with the expectation that fertilization will occur there. ZIFT combines IVF and 
GIFT: an externally fertilized egg or zygote is placed in the fallopian tube. ICSI is the process 
of manually injecting a sperm into the center of an egg. GIFT, ZIFT, and ICSI are viewed 
scientifically as improvements over IVF because of increased control over various natural steps 
in the reproductive process. The presumption is that the greater control, the greater the likelihood 
of a pregnancy (this presumption has not yet borne out). 
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that is supportive of the person's goals, projects, and aspirations) in a wide 
variety of situations (Whitbeck 1981, 620), 
a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity (World Health Organization 1942, 83), and 
the experience of well-being and integrity of mind and body (The Study 
Group34 1996, S9). 
The definition proposed by Whitbeck includes the psychological condition of 
humans as well as the physical and references dreams and priorities. Thus this 
definition is more holistic in its conception of health and its purposes. Whitbeck 
also stops short of demanding success in whatever a person attempts (hence its use 
of only "capacity") or in every situation. Health relates to available capacities. It 
does not relate to the outcomes of using said capacities or to a demand that the 
person does use them. 
The World Health Organization's (WHO) definition is frequently 
referenced in the bioethics literature because of its clear invocation of the mental 
and social in addition to physical aspects of human life. Moreover it often praised 
because it is seen as acting on behalf of people everywhere and their interests. 
With its political power, it represents a voice against governments that do not put 
their citizens' welfare first and it represents a voice of support for governments 
that struggle to care about their citizens' welfare. 
I see the definitions proposed by WHO and the Hastings Center Study 
34. "The Study Group" was a group of philosophers and bioethicists at a premier 
bioethics think tank in America, the Hastings Center, who developed a position paper on 
the contemporary goals of medicine (1996). 
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Group as being standards that are impractical, unrealistic, and excessive. I doubt 
whether complete well-being is ever possible for a sustained period of time. And 
•~ell-being" is much more than health in that I believe that it includes feeling safe, 
happy, respected, loved, and challenged. Accordingly, neither definition is likely to 
actually effect positive change. So they remain conceptually intriguing at best. 
Of the above list of candidate definitions, Whitbeck's definition is preferred, but 
with some modification. As a reminder, Whitbeck posits that health is: 
a person's psychophysical capacity to act or respond appropriately (in a way 
that is supportive of the person's goals, projects, and aspirations) in a wide 
variety of situations (1981, 620). 
A concern with this definition is the person whose goals or hopes are deemed 
unethical. For instance, think of the woman who seeks revenge on a colleague by 
sabotaging her work over a two month period. If she has the physical stamina and the 
mental acuity to work sixteen hours days and to keep track of a myriad of small details 
so as not to get caught, do we want to say she is healthy? We would likely say she is 
healthy if her goal was to raise money for survivors of a tornado. Stamina and acuity are 
desirable for most people. It is a separate issue as to what a person decides to do with 
her body and her mind. Someone can be healthy yet a morally praiseworthy person just 
as someone can be healthy and blameworthy. Health is about physical, emotional, 
cognitive, and psychological capacities. Therefore I propose modifying Whitbeck's 
definition to: 
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a person's psychological, emotional, cognitive, and physical capacities to act 
or respond intelligibly in a wide variety of situations. 
What is implied by the word ''intelligibly"? Inclusion of this qualifier ensures that a 
marginal or minimal ability to act or respond is insufficient to denote being healthy. 
Similarly it ensures that the kind of action or response matters. For instance, if during a 
conversation a casual acquaintance asks me ''Would you like to get a cup of coffee?" and 
I respond by turning and running away, this is unintelligible at first sight. If I do not 
want to go, simply saying ''No, thank you" is an intelligible response. If running away is 
explainable because of paranoia and as such, I am unhealthy. But if running away is due 
to an error in translation because the other person speaks a different language, then I am 
not unhealthy. What is intelligible will depend on the particular situation and the 
explanation provided. Inclusion of intelligibility in the definition is warranted so as to 
disallow just any action or behavior being indicative of health. 
A possible challenge to "intelligibly" is that it is redundant to Whitbeck's inclusion 
of goals and aspirations but I disagree. "Goals, projects, and aspirations" tend to imply 
the long-term and the significant and thus not able to consider an immediate, simple 
desire not to have coffee with an acquaintance at this. To say "It is my goal or my 
project or my aspiration not to have coffee with X" seems arrogant. The definition does 
not guarantee that a desired outcome will happen. Factors outside a person's control, 
and thus not responsible for, help determine actual consequences. A conception of 
· health should not include accidental factors or independent factors. 
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Health and Dewey's concept of the good 
For the purposes ofthis dissertation, health is "person's psychological, 
emotional, cognitive, and physical capacities to act or respond intelligibly in a wide 
variety of situations." Definitions are highly condensed summaries of what something is. 
Yet to ensure understanding, an explanation is often needed in order to describe the 
nature of something more fully. I see this being the case relative to the chosen definition 
of health. 
With this said, I begin explaining what health is by noting that people are not one 
dimensional. They interact and respond on many levels. Therefore being healthy involves 
mental, emotional, psychological, and social capacities of a person. Further, people live 
in a complex environment or in complicated situations that change. So to be healthy, it is 
not enough to be able to respond intelligibly to a handful of situations or to only a few 
kinds of situations. However in being healthy, there is no accompanying guarantee that a 
particular goal will actually be realized, that happiness will be found, or misfortune 
always avoided. Health is a means to reaching various, not all, ends. 
Based on this expansion of the concept of health, does it qualify as a good thing 
by Dewey's concept of the good? The Deweyan good is growth so whatever supports 
growth will be judged to be a good thing. Growth is defined as that which adapts to 
these surroundings and that which finds meaningfulness in its surroundings on an 
ongoing basis and over the long-term. More simply put, the greater the adaptability and 
the greater the meaningfulness, the better. So based on the earlier explanation of healthy 
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or being healthy, it does indeed qualify as a good thing according to Dewey's work 
because it contributes to both adaptability and meaningfulness. 
In more general terms, Dewey would accept this definition of health for several 
reasons. A person is conceptualized holistically rather than reduced to a few special 
traits and is realistically accurate. Emphasis is on responding and acting, which accords 
closely with Dewey's focus on activity. He believes that experience always involves 
activity, either as response or as action. Our activity in the world and in our 
communities confirms our existence and agency. Appropriateness means that there are 
standards and rules. Not every response or action is valuable or good. 
Just as we ''fit" in the natural world, so we "fit" in our society and in our 
communities. Moreover appropriateness means fitting for the intended purpose which, 
in turn, requires knowledge. Dewey wrote repeatedly about thinking in activity. And 
lastly, everything is situational because humans are situated in a particular society at a 
particular point in time. The definition of health does not demand perfection in terms of 
being able to act in all situations. Dewey would accept this on the basis that nothing is 
perfect and to set a standard at perfection is to produce negativity and pessimism. His 
theoretical outlook is very optimistic as shown in his pragmatics: progress, endurance, 
and cooperation. 
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Competing views of health as good 
Just Health Care (1985) presents Daniels' development of an ethically-justified 
health system. He acknowledges that financial funding remains insufficient to help all 
Americans in need of health care. His criterion for judging whether a specific individual 
is healthy or is unhealthy incorporates the concept of species-typical functioning, a range 
of life plans qua opportunities, parameters of what the individual's society or community 
supports and sanctions in terms of life plan, and the individual's innate skills. For a man 
who is talented in the industrial arts (e.g., carpentry, metal working) and who lives in a 
society that wants beautiful furniture or highly efficient machinery, the range of 
opportunities that he will be supported in pursuing would include being a carpenter or 
machinist, or teaching carpentry or metal working. But consider another man who lives 
in the same society, but who has no special skills in working with his hands. Although he 
is eager to learn, he would not be medically supported in the same way as the man with 
the natural skills, according to Daniels. This would then result in a rationing decision 
wherein if both men's hands are badly damaged in an accident, the medical therapies 
offered to the first man would be much more extensive than those offered to the second 
man. The amount of coordination and dexterity in the first man's fingers will need to be 
much greater than in the case of the second man. 
If Daniels focused on species-typical functions exclusively, I think that Dewey 
would find his position very problematic. Dewey privileges experience as being 
foundational to all that exists and is known in human life. It is individuals who have 
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experience although since human life is inescapably communal-i.e., there are no private 
interpretations, languages, or symbols, according to Dewey-experience connects a 
person to one or more communities. But experience is only "had" by a person, not by a 
community. I think Dewey would also point out that there is a salient difference 
between people and Homo sapiens. What I mean by this is that I rarely relate to other 
people as being fellow members of the same species to which I belong. Instead I relate 
to them as, perhaps, fellow sufferers of pain or searchers for self-fulfillment. Thus 
Dewey would judge the importance that Daniels places on species to be excessive. 
Dewey would concur, however, with Daniels' recognition that humans are social 
creatures. People need other people, whether it is for such obvious reasons as being 
raised from infancy, exchanging products and services, or learning in school. At a 
deeper level, a person needs others for her personal identity in terms of her heritage, 
values, beliefs, language, and membership. Additionally relationships are valued for the 
feelings they generate (e.g., love, tenderness) as well as the benefits that accrue. And 
lastly, relationships are a medium of self-expression: I can manifest or realize my virtues 
of patience and creativity respectively by actually being patient with someone else and by 
hosting a Murder Mystery dinner party, for example. The same applies for some kind of 
affirmation of my existence and who I am. By this I mean that we value family members 
and longstanding friendships partially because these people know the person we have 
been over time; they can testify to our triumphs, struggles, and endurance. 
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Daniels is also "correct" in that he conceives of people living according to life 
plans. This avoids any tendency to represent people as decision makers wherein 
decisions are discrete activities. A "life plan" signals integration of the past, present, and 
future and an image of oneself (e.g., as a parent or a good Catholic). Thus Daniels' 
position has a robust view of human beings and so would be praised by Dewey. 
Initially, it would seem that Dewey would challenge Daniels on his use of species 
typical functioning. Each person has only a handful of innate skills or talents and Daniels 
does not make much room for skills learned through years of practice. It seems that if I 
believed I was a competent bookkeeper, though admittedly not an expert bookkeeper, 
this would not matter. The chosen standard for evaluating my bookkeeping abilities, as 
with most of our abilities, will be our species' functions. The fact that someone derives 
great pleasure from downhill skiing is irrelevant with respect to the question of whether 
the government should reimburse medically-needed orthopedic surgery expenses. The 
reason is that skiing is not a standard activity nor can it be deemed a function of our 
bodies. Yet surgery would be paid by the government so that a person could walk 
without assistance because mobility is a normal function of our natural physiology. 
Dewey's emphasis on the organism could imply that individual organisms matter hence 
his criticism of Daniels' focus on species. 
Yet I think Dewey would agree that an inability to ski is not reflective of poor 
health, but his reasoning would be that it does not really impact the city dweller's ability 
to respond to her environment nor does it harm cooperation. Imagine that the concern is 
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not the ability to ski, but a desire to prevent another pregnancy because of an inability to 
adequately look after all her responsibilities as well as herself Here again Dewey and 
Daniels would concur, albeit for different reasons: Dewey on the grounds that birth 
control pills increase the ability to manage her environment; Daniels on the grounds that 
it is typical for our species to care for its offspring. 
As discussed earlier, the delineation of what qualifies as a "normal" range of 
opportunities is troubling in terms of possible societal prejudices and injustices. Dewey's 
focus is admittedly on the individual as being deeply situated in a society or in 
communities. I'll use the example of a thirty-year old Afiican American man who lives 
in the United States in the early 1900s, when segregation was still in force. For Daniels, 
this man's normal opportunities would exclude being a mathematician in an academic or 
research setting, even though he is a math whiz. Imagine that he develops a brain tumor 
that obstructs his calculative and conceptual skills, but he can still adequately perform an 
unskilled laboring job. Based on Daniels' position, he does not have a disease because 
the basic calculative functions typical for the human species are still present. 
Dewey would reply that if the tumor is removed and his math skills restored, he 
will be more adaptable in terms of being able to handle financial matters better, for 
instance. Will meaningfulness also increase? Likely not, except in the rare situation that 
he teaches children who struggle with mathematics because this prompts shared 
cooperation. Based just on Dewey's statements about adaptability, making surgery 
available would be ethically justified. Thus similarities do exist between Daniels' and 
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Dewey's views about health as a good and the consequences that flow from them. Yet 
the issue about society's standards is a serious disagreement between them. 
I tum now to Callahan's characterization of health, as presented in greatest detail 
in Setting Limits (1987), to consider how Dewey might respond. Callahan holds that 
health is important because with it, we can achieve a reasonably good life. A good life 
includes such major accomplishments as being educated, having a family and friends, 
working to provide for one's needs and for self-fulfillment, and enjoying some leisurely 
pleasures. When a person successfully accomplishes such goals, then continued life or 
more time no longer matters as much. 
Callahan suggests that the appropriate role for elderly people is to share their 
knowledge and experience with the young so that the young are more likely to have a 
good life. In other words, the more people who live long and skillfully enough to 
achieve these major goals, the better. If an elderly person fulfills this advisory and 
pedagogical role, Callahan recommends reimbursing health-care costs for him. But if the 
elderly person chooses to live a different kind of life or fill other roles, then the 
governmental does not have a duty to offer life-extending medical interventions ( e.g., 
chemotherapy or trauma care). At most, the government's responsibility is to offer him 
only quality oflife care (e.g., pain management, maintenance of organic process such as 
digestion and respiration) on the grounds that compassion cannot abide suffering and 
pam. 
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Just as he would appreciate Daniels' inclusion of life plans, Dewey would 
appreciate how Callahan ''fills in" what constitutes a good life. Callahan includes 
significant events such as relationships, knowledge, and employment. Callahan's listing 
is not meant to be exhaustive, but only illustrative. Dewey would recommend adding 
some reference to participating in society or in a community as another part of a 
desirable life. Moreover Dewey would support Callahan's comprehensive perspective in 
terms of looking over the entirety of a life. That is, he looks for integrating and 
harmonizing the possible richness of life. This contrasts with a perspective that only 
scrutinizes discrete events or looks at life as a sequence of detached phases. 
It is reasonable to suggest that Dewey would reject Callahan's claim that elderly 
people are valuable because they have responsibilities towards others: "recognizing that 
[the elderly's] primary orientation should be to the young and the generations to come, 
not to their own age group" (Callahan 1988, 655). Callahan holds that this group of 
people has a responsibility to share their wisdom and experience with those who are 
younger and less experienced. It is imaginable that Dewey would criticize the unilateral-
ness ofthis arrangement: from elderly to the young. Dewey repeatedly stresses 
mutuality in relationships because mutual relationships are typically stronger and last 
longer than unilateral relationships. 
But in Callahan's defense, I think he does countenance a greater degree of 
reciprocity. He notes that in our current society, people who are retired usually are 
relegated to spending their remaining years entertaining themselves ( e.g., golf games, 
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Caribbean cruises, and bridge games). He advocates substituting entertainment with the 
more important work of nurturing and guiding the younger generations. The benefits 
that subsequently flow to the elderly will be respect and inclusion in the mainstream of an 
active society. The elderly thus move from the margins to the center of everyday 
communal life. 
Dewey would commend this idea because he wants people to be vital, 
responsive, and responsible organisms in a changing environment. Assigning this new 
role to the elderly population signals optimistic progress: knowledge of the past will be 
used today to benefit future outcomes. At the same time, this is a pragmatic response to 
today's problems of using "resources" already at hand. 
In closing, applying Dewey's theory of the good to the case of health affirms that 
health is good on philosophical ground. Qualifying as good thus makes health worthy of 
protection or pursuit. And it has been shown that Dewey's theory can be used to 
examine the very important contributions Daniels and Callahan have made to the current 
health-care reform debate. I believe that Dewey would find strengths in both 
philosophers' positions. As argued above, Dewey would find Callahan's general 
proposal to be defensible. At the same time, I think the problem about potential or 
actual social injustice would render Daniels' position to be, in the end, unacceptable from 
Dewey's vantage point. 
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Health care as a good 
In this final section of Chapter IV, there will be a closer examination of health 
care and its goodness. As noted earlier, health care's purposes are to preserve, protect, 
and restore health. As such, health care qualifies as good instrumentally in that it 
contributes to another instrumental good, namely health. Another way of justifying that 
health care is an instrumental good is that we would not want surgery, vaccinations, or 
home health visits just to have surgery, vaccinations, or home health visits. So health 
care is not an intrinsic good. It is infonnative to herein consider how Dewey's concept 
of the good "connects" with the purposes of the three components that comprise health 
care. This then is another way in which the philosophical work of Dewey is newly 
applied to practical situations. These three components are medicine, public health, and 
home care. 
With this said, a recent trend in public health policy challenges my 
position wherein I equate health care with "medicine + public health35 + home care." 
This trend began with empirical findings that showed a person is healthier-as measured 
by rates of sickness and injury-the more education, the more leisure time, the safer the 
neighborhood and job, and the higher the disposable income he has. Studies in Britain 
reveal that the strongest correlate with health is social class: the higher one's social 
35. Public health is a multi-faceted or vast enterprise because it can include everything that 
impacts citizens' health. But it can be separated into governmental programs and community 
health programs. Community health typically includes private or philanthropic health 
organizations, community outreach programs established by hospitals or clinics, and professional 
associations. 
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standing, the healthier one is (Lynch et al 2000; Marmot et al 1997; Arber 1996; Carr 
1990). 
What follows from this expansion of contributing factors or obstacles to health is 
that other programs warrant the same or comparable attention as that traditionally 
accorded to medicine. If it is true that completing university or college results in less 
morbidity, then isn't it just as sensible to assist people to attend college as it is to 
continue developing new pharmaceuticals or surgical techniques? I think the answer is 
''yes." Further empirical studies are needed as to learn all the factors that impact health 
and to what degree, and then based on the findings, to modify public policy decisions 
about spending and access. But until there is more comprehensive information on 
contributing factors, health care will encompass medicine, public health, and home care 
for the purposes of this dissertation. 
In applying Dewey's work to public health, home care, and medicine, the central 
question is how they do or do not contribute to adaptability and meaningfulness. 
Beginning with public health, it is defined for this dissertation as governmental programs 
directed towards "protect[ing] the community against the hazards engendered by group 
life" (Fairbanks and Wiese 1998, 5). Hanlon and Pickett concur that the focus is on the 
collective or the community, not on identifiable individuals. They provocatively describe 
how an individual is seen: "as a social and community integer, a member of a family or 
social group." An integer is likely best understood to be a whole number (e.g., a number 
lacking a fraction). But it is also defined as a ''unit of measurement or reckoning" or as 
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"a thing complete in itself' by The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1993) which implies 
that the individual is an integrated unit. When used in the context of public health, the 
reference to membership is paramount in that humans are not detached or isolated 
individuals. 
Public health services evolved as we recognized that it is unreasonable to hold 
each person fully responsible for her own health. Look at the reality of how we live. 
People live in collectives, be they a family or a town. People are highly interdependent, 
whether through employment or shared water systems. And people remain vulnerable to 
the forces of nature or the climate, as in the case of major blizzards or earthquakes. 
Diseases are transmittable. And the actions of others such as continuing to be in public 
when contagious with, for instance, tuberculosis or a dangerous strain of influenza, can 
substantially impact other people. These other people can be considered unknowing and 
thus not responsible for becoming ill. Similarly the "carrier" may not realize she is 
infectious and thus not adjust her ordinary behavior to avoid spreading the disease. 
Public health has several general purposes: (1) preventing epidemics and the 
spread of disease, (2) protecting citizens against environmental hazards, (3) preventing 
injuries, (4) promoting healthy behaviors by the populace, (5) responding to disasters and 
assisting communities in recovery, and (6) maintaining the quality and accessibility of 
health services across the country (Fairbanks and Wiese 1998). Reflective of the 
magnitude of these responsibilities, the national PHS is multi-dimensional. It includes 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Centers for Medicaid Services, Food 
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and Drug Administration, National Institutes of Health, Human Resources and Services 
Administration, Indian Health Service, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, and the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality. 
All of the six purposes of public health support Dewey's notion of adaptability in 
terms of preventing, restoring, or maintaining peoples' ( as opposed to a particular 
individual's) capacities to live well in a dynamic environment. For instance, mandating 
safe working conditions means that fewer people are injured in the workplace. And 
responding to help those who are affected by natural disasters involves restoring their 
asset or economic base ( e.g., repairing home, replacing destroyed vehicles, or restoring 
businesses). Such remedies increase the victims' abilities to respond to their 
environment. 
Home care contrasts with institutional care. Home care is prescribed for both 
acute and chronic conditions. After the rescue efforts of an emergency department and 
intensive care unit for a person injured in a motor vehicle accident, a patient will likely be 
discharged for further care in the home. Or after an episodic crisis in a chronic disease, 
such as asthma or sickle cell anemia, a patient will again be discharged for ongoing 
maintenance care at home. Home care is provided in two ways: by family members or 
by various health professionals. In an effort to reduce costs over the past ten years, 
hospitals have discharged patients sooner and sooner. As a result, they leave sicker and 
must be cared for longer in the home. In fact, Arras and Dubler (1994) suggest that 
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approximately eighty percent of all medical care is delivered in the home. Their 
insightful article, "Bringing the Hospital Home: Ethical And Social Implications Of High-
Tech Home Care," describes the consequences of altering the home so as to 
accommodate a seriously ill or terminal patient; altered in many instances to the point of 
the home no longer being a home. 
Home care is an extension of medical care that is provided in a hospital or clinic 
setting. Thus much of what is discussed below with respect to medicine applies directly 
to home care services. Yet there is a special factor surrounding home care that warrants 
consideration. When someone is cared for at home, there can be deeper connections 
made with family members as they express their concern and love for one another. The 
daughter who tends to a temporarily bedridden mother can demonstrate her loyalty, 
compassion, and kindness. In tum, the mother can reveal her gratitude and patience to 
her daughter. In such a situation, their relationship is reciprocal with both giving and 
receiving. The relationship thus strengthens. Therefore home care can be an 
opportunity to increase meaningfulness in people's lives. With this said, however, the 
demands of home care can frustrate, embarrass, and exhaust those involved and therein 
damage relationships. There is then no guarantee that home care offers important 
benefits for living; in some situations, tending to patients in their homes will indeed 
qualify as a Deweyan good, and in other situations, it will not qualify as a Deweyan 
good. 
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And finally medicine's focus can be therapeutic, preventive, or palliative. By 
therapy, Hanlon and Pickett mean "diagnosis and treatment of damage already done" 
(1984, 5). They note that this includes recovery (where a patient is restored to his 
previous level of functioning) or rehabilitative (where he is restored to a lesser level). 
The specific goals to be examined herein were developed by a group of 
philosophers and bioethicists. Six years ago, a group ofbioethicists and philosophers 
gathered at the Hastings Center, a well-known bioethics 'lhink tank," to debate the goals 
of contemporary medicine. This project was prompted by two developments. First, 
medical research and technology seem able to erase the barriers as to what medicine can 
do. Medicine's promise is brilliant in terms of its ability to control for or compensate for 
"Mother Nature" or bad luck. Second, in light of the increasing options to intervene, the 
associated costs have escalated such that the American system is more financially 
unstable and more people are excluded. 
These two developments appear contradictory: medicine is unlimited in terms of 
what it can accomplish, yet, at the same time, it is limited in terms of whom it could help. 
Hence the project of answering the question, "Today, what is medicine for?" Their 
answer included four goals: (1) prevention of disease and injury, (2) alleviating pain and 
suffering, (3) caring for people who cannot be cured, and (4) helping people achieve a 
peaceful death ("The Goals of Medicine" 1996). 
Does prevention of disease and injury support an organism's adaptability? Given 
the earlier discussion about disease contra illness, it is illness that is of interest here. 
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Disease is a statistical anomaly while illness is the negative outcomes such as loss of 
needed function and discomfort. Injury can be defined as "harm, detriment; damage, esp. 
to the body" (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1993, 1371). Disease and 
injury reduce a person's abilities to respond to her surroundings and thus a goal of 
preventing illness and injury connects to the concept of adaptability. 
Pain and suffering seem like obviously negative events and it seems 
uncontroversial to state that alleviating them is obligatory. I would temper this 
statement somewhat though. Pain can have a good side. There is a genetic condition 
wherein a person does not feel pain due to inadequate neurological development. As a 
result, if he is cut or burned, he feels no pain and thus there is no physical "alert" to 
remove his hand from the knife blade or from the boiling water. His life is thus 
additionally risky or dangerous compared to a person who does not have this condition. 
Pain is therefore bad only when it continues beyond its initial warning phase because it 
serves no purpose and is an undesirable experience. Eric Cassell, a bioethicist known for 
his intensive examination of the nature of suffering, defines it as damage or a loss of any 
aspect of personhood. Examples of these aspects include: 
the lived past, the family's lived past, culture and society, roles, the 
instrumental dimension, associations and relationships, the body the 
unconscious mind, the political being, the secret life, the perceived future, 
and the transcendent-being dimension (Cassell 1991, 43). 
The consequences of unrelieved suffering are loss of identity, diminished relationships, 
self-doubt, confusion, and so on. 
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So I hold that suffering and gratuitous pain undermine adaptability because they 
distract a person from pursuing opportunities or, more seriously, they can terminate such 
pursuits. When a woman has chronic migraine headaches that prove untreatable, she is 
less able to respond to her circumstances, whether they are employment or education-
related. This is the same for depression wherein a man is unable to hold onto his job in 
the wake of, for example, the death of his child. 
The third goal of medicine refers to care of those who cannot be cured. I 
consider care important by Dewey's theory because it increases meaningfulness. When 
someone tends to the daily needs of a bedridden patient, a deeper connection can often 
result (though as discussed in the section on home care, not always). When we attend to 
a person as wlnerable, discomforted, or worried, we demonstrate virtues of compassion, 
empathy, and sincerity. Moreover to care is to be responsive to the other person or to 
attend closely to them as persons. And it is to be responsible in terms of accepting one's 
duty to act as a moral agent (Benner et al 1996). "Care is about recognizing difference" 
as to how people experience their illnesses (Frank 1991, 40). Our actions say that the 
person's experience and the person matters to us, that we want to alleviate his anxiety, 
and that we want to make him comfortable. More simply put, he is of value and his loss 
or suffering is not inconsequential to me. I concur with Arthur Frank's position that 
illness and injury must be accepted because they are real and they are part of a person's 
life: "Illness is the experience of living through the disease and what happens to my body 
happens to my life" (1991, 13). 
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Returning to the medical goal of a peaceful death, it can be re-framed as the 
concluding chapter of a person's life. As such, it carries special weight in that it ideally 
should tie together and integrate all the preceding chapters. As illustrated by great 
literary works, the final chapter is what the earlier chapters are leading towards. A 
superficial conclusion or a disjointed one is dissatisfying to read; it puts into question all 
that went before. But a memorable and integrative chapter seals the intelligibility of the 
entire story. And so striving to help a patient achieve a peaceful, dignified death is ripe 
with meaningfulness. 
In summary, the preceding section has examined whether contemporary health 
care can be said to be good using a philosophical theory of the good. The chosen theory 
of the good is that of John Dewey wherein the good is an organism's growth which has 
two features: adaptability and meaningfulness. Prior to making such a philosophical 
assessment, health care was defined as being constituted by medicine, public health, and 
home care. The outcome of this assessment is that each component is good from a 
philosophical theory approach. 
This chapter represents the conjoining of theory with practice in that the theory 
of the good developed by John Dewey is applied to the case of health and health care. 
After critiquing several definitions of health, it was concluded that the most reasonable 
definition holds that health is a multifaceted ability of a person to interact with his 
surroundings. Health care is defined as efforts to maintain or restore health. Dewey's 
good, when applied to health itself, found that health qualifies strongly as a good because 
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it is needed if a human being is going to be able to successfully interrelate with his 
surroundings over the long-run. Similarly health care qualifies strongly as a good 
because it also contributes to better interrelations and more successful interactions with 
the environment. 
The next and concluding chapter tackles the macro-allocation question of 
whether health care is more, less, or equally good when compared to other societal 
programs. Additionally, the mesa-allocation question is tackled; the question asks 
whether specific types of medical treatments are more, less, or equally good. Predicated 
on this comparative philosophical work using Dewey's notion of the good, there will be 
a discussion as to how the findings can influence public health policy decisions. In this 




Dewey's Theory in Macro-Allocation and Meso-Allocation Decisions 
Introduction 
Engelhardt, Daniels, Callahan agree that being healthy is good. Engelhardt 
suggests that the reasons justifying such an evaluation are highly individualistic. Daniels 
and Callahan disagree and each philosopher offers a specific reason: pursuing 
opportunities and accomplishing major life goals, respectively. Based on Dewey's work, 
the reason is pragmatic interactions, a phrase I see as more informative than "growth" to 
represent Dewey's concept of the good. As explained in the previous chapter, health-
care's goodness stems largely from its positive impact on health. Examples were used to 
illustrate how, for instance, home care does actually promote pragmatic interactions. 
This concluding chapter tackles macro-allocation and meso-allocation decisions. 
''Macro-allocation" reflects the kind of decision making, either explicit or implicit, that 
occurs at the public policy level wherein governmental representatives work on budget 
or cost-related decisions. Moreover macro-allocation decisions are implicitly or 
explicitly part of the political campaign platforms and political rhetoric that politicians 
use to affirm that they understand the wishes of the public. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, "meso-allocation" reflects decision making of those working in institutions. 
The kinds of institutions I have in mind are hospitals or those involved in health 
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insurance. Insurance coverage is provided by private or for-profit companies, self-
insured employers, or governmental agencies. 
In "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic 
Theory" ( 1977), Amartya Sen, a well-respected professor of economics, considers how 
best to understand people's behavior. He states that contemporary economic models 
employ a characterization of a person that can be labeled as Homo economicus. An 
"economic man" acts as a "self-seeking agent. It is possible to define [his] interests in 
such a way that no matter what he does, he can be seen to be furthering his own 
interests" (Sen 1977, 3 22). Personal welfare is considered identical with personal choice 
(Ibid, 329). Moreover the consistency of"economic man's" behavior denotes 
rationality. 
Sen refers to the ongoing debate in the literature of economics concerning 
optimally distributing public goods. A private good, he suggests, is something that only 
one person can consume or use; for instance, a glass of orange juice. 36 In contrast, a 
public good is something that can be used by more than one person. In the 
aforementioned debate, a common characterization of people is as "gains-maximizers" 
wherein they want a system or program that promises to give them the largest returns or 
greatest benefits possible, but to which they have to contribute the least (Sen 1977, 
36. Sen illustrates what a private good is with the example of a piece of pie. Unfortunately, 
based on this single example, it is not completely clear whether the definitive criterion for privacy 
is that the good is completely used up and/or that the good can be used by only one person at a 
time. For instance, is an automobile a private good by Sen's definition? Only one person can 
drive it at a time. But more than one person can be transported in it at a time. Or is the crux 
here ownership in that only one person (typically) owns a car and then from ownership comes the 
ability to decide what happens to it and who else benefits from it. 
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325). 
Yet many theories of morality, Sen notes, are universalized systems wherein 
collective welfare is more important than individual welfare. Utilitarianism and 
Kantianism are examples of what Sen means by ''universalism." In other words, the 
individual is expected to care about others and occasionally ( though certainly not always) 
act so as to benefit others at his own expense. As a consequence, standard economic 
theories and familiar moral theories disagree significantly as to fundamental traits of 
ordinary human beings. 
Sen's challenge against the classic economic conception of human behavior is 
that ''the purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron" (1977, 336) or a 
"rational fool" (Ibid, 344). The reference to "social" is critical in these comments. Since 
humans do interact with each other and are mutually dependent, if a person is totally self-
interested, he would be a social moron, inept at collaboration and cooperation. Further, 
he may have admirable cognitive skills, but if unable to understand what is real-namely, 
that he lives in a community or amongst others-other people will see him as a fool. 
Sen argues that in addition to self-interest, other factors can help explain actual 
behavior. The two factors he considers in this article are sympathy and commitment. A 
person will often forego maximizing personal gain in response to feeling concerned or 
sympathetic towards another person. If there are no such feelings and yet she does want 
to help the other person, Sen says she has some type of commitment towards the person. 
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He holds that commitments are tied closely to personal morals and to relationships with 
various groups and individuals. 
Given that people's behavior can be explained by more than one factor, Sen 
recommends re-examining the structure of economic theory which has, by and large, 
allowed for only one factor, egoism. Dismissing a dualistic structure comprised of moral 
choices (i.e., non-egoistic) and actual choices, he advocates a system in which 
preferences are ranked, a system he calls "meta-ranking" (Sen 1977, 33). With this said, 
quantifying self-interests, sympathy interests, and commitment interests may not be 
possible. Accordingly, he recommends an ordinal system such that interests are ranked 
in terms of"equal," ''more," and "less." 
The approach of comparing various social and health-care goods in this chapter 
will use an ordinal meta-ranking system. If a cardinal system was employed, a 
conclusion might be ''National defense is 2.6 times more ethically-significant than the 
arts" or, perhaps, "Kidney dialysis is 1.3 times as important as prenatal care." Such 
quantitative exactness is not possible with Dewey's concept of the good for two reasons. 
First, he does not include such exactness in his own explanation of goods, be they natural 
goods, ideal goods, or the good. Second, the components of growth, adaptability and 
meaningfulness, are themselves qualitative notions in the context of human life and 
interactions. 
Prior to applying Dewey's concept of the good to competing social programs and 
medical interventions, consideration is needed as to how the meta-ranking will be used. 
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In other words, once the ranking has been done, how will it translate into specific 
funding decisions, given that there are different cost structures involved? The following 
decision model illustrates what is of concern here. 
Imagine first that the only health-care intervention developed, manufactured, and 
available in America is childhood vaccinations. In 1997, the CDC spent 840 million 
dollars to vaccinate 78 % of the children who needed to be vaccinated (Center for 
Disease Control 2002). Therefore assume that I 00% of children are actually vaccinated; 
the associated costs would be 1.1 billion dollars. Next, assume that the only national 
defense weapon is the B-52 Stratofortress planes, a plane developed for nuclear 
deterrence and able to drop every type of bomb in the military's inventory. Currently 
there are eighty-five such planes owned by the Air Force; each one has cost 54 million 
dollars (U.S. Strategic Air Command 2002). Assume further that since they are the only 
military equipment available, the number of planes must be doubled so as to provide 
minimally adequate protection geographically, costing a total of9.2 billion dollars in 
purchase and maintenance costs. 
Turning now to ranking the two social goods using a philosophical basis, imagine 
that national defense is judged to be better or "more good" than vaccinations. How 
would this conclusion then be used for budget purposes? First, national defense 
becomes the first priority; the one hundred seventy bombers are purchased. After that if 
there are tax monies still available, as much vaccine is purchased as possible until all that 
is needed is bought. This scenario is acceptable as long as there is between 9 .2 billion 
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and 10.3 billion dollars available (i.e., being able to purchase all the planes needed or all 
the planes and all the vaccines). But what if the maximum amount of tax revenues is 7.4 
billion dollars in a particular year? Is 80 % military coverage better than.full health 
coverage? Or should the vaccines be purchased and administered now and then the 
airplanes be purchased next year when the cumulative funds are 13. 7 billion dollars?37 
These questions illustrate the challenge of estimating of how much better national 
defense is compared to health care. It is possible that gross or rough comparisons could 
be made; that one is, for instance, twice as good or twice as better as another. But finer 
distinctions will likely prove increasingly tenuous. Therefore I would concede that using 
rough comparisons is the most that can be asked of this methodology. Yet this 
methodology still helps guide policy decisions such that the amount of funds allocated to 
diverse programs will be commensurate with their ordinal goodness. 
I now move from the issue of different cost structures (e.g., "How much money 
is needed for basic vaccinations versus basic defense?") to the principle of diminishing 
returns. This economic principle holds that for most products and services, there will 
not be a fixed rate of benefit delivered for each and every added unit of input. For 
instance, a physics student reads a book of fiction (the unit of input) after having spent 
an entire semester reading nothing but scientific textbooks and reference books. The 
enjoyment (the benefit) she experiences will probably be substantial. But when she reads 
the fourth fiction book, her enjoyment will probably decline, although certainly she still 
37. The amount of the cumulative funds, 13.7 billion dollars, is based on: ($7.4 billion in tax 
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Figure 3. Illustrative Diminishing Rates of Return 
($=one hundred billion) 
prefers reading it to a textbook. The import of this principle for decision making is that 
each added fiction book she reads provides incrementally less and less enjoyment. At 
some point in time, it is conceivable, perhaps with the fourteenth book in a row, that she 
will not find it enjoyable at all. Simply, this underscores that "more is not necessarily 
always better." 
How does this principle apply to comparisons of social goods, such as education 
and the arts, when a decision is to be made as to how much of each should be provided? 
Figure 3, above, is meant to illustrate how the principle actually supports Dewey's 
position; the figure is not meant to be accurate as to the rates of return of benefit from 
each social program. 
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First, Figure 3 needs some elaboration. The vertical axis measures the benefit 
gained (e.g., human adaptability) of every additional dollar spent for each program (e.g., 
health care, the arts). The horizontal axis is the amount of funds in a government's 
annual budget. The principle of diminishing returns is that, at some point, each added 
dollar spent on a particular program produces less incremental benefit. Imagine that I 
receive 5 units of pleasure by spending one dollar on an activity, 9 units by spending two 
dollars, and 12 units for three dollars. The associated rates of pleasure are 5, 4.5, and 4 
respectively. Each incremental dollar delivers less and less pleasure~ its rate of return is 
diminishing. And different goods can have different rates of return as illustrated in the 
above figure. 
This principle will apply to the case of national defense, the arts, health care, and 
education. As more and more funding is pumped into each, the incremental change will 
decrease at some point. Referring to the previous figure, if three dollars were spent last 
year on program 4, but this year four dollars are available, what would be the best way 
to allocate the four dollars? If all of it goes to program 2, the benefit is 68 units. But if 
three dollars goes to program 2 and one dollar to program 1, the total benefit is 80 units. 
Figure 3 is not meant to reflect the actual rates of return of health care, 
education, the arts, and national defense on human adaptability. It is strictly illustrative 
of the complexities to be anticipated in making discrete distributive choices. From 
another perspective, I believe Dewey would support the idea of allocating funds to more 
than one program based on his conception of humans. To rely on only one program runs 
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counter to Dewey's position: adaptability involves flexibility. Being the deadliest or the 
most intelligent flouts the inherent complexity of being human and of our surroundings 
(e.g., the natural world and our communities). Thus the objective is to strike a balance 
among the programs, first, of basic minimums of each (recall that there can be thresholds 
of adequacy as in the case of half of a B-52 bomber being unusable), and thereafter, of 
incremental amounts above such minimums. 
Competing social programs vis-a-vis health care 
Three socially-supported programs will be examined in this section in terms of 
Dewey's theory of the good: national defense, education, and the arts. The macro-
allocation question being examined here is the comparative goodness of health care 
relative to other valued social programs. Over the past few years, American health care 
and these three programs have been funded from public coffers as shown in Table 2 on 
the next page. 
First, a few explanatory notes about the above statistics. The figures for health 
care exclude personal or private expenditures as do the figures for education and the 
arts. Education covers elementary, high school, and university/college. The figure for 
the arts includes the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for 
the Humanities. 
Recall that health care fits with Dewey's theory of the good in terms of 
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Table 2. Comparative Spending on Four Social Programs 
Public Expenditures ($) 
Public Expenditures 
Relative to Health Care 
1990 1994 1995 1999 2001 1990 1994 1995 1999 2001 
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promoting both adaptability and meaningfulness for humans. Does national defense 
qualify as a Deweyan good? To answer this question, the same process is employed as 
that used with health care. Health-care's purpose is its contribution to health; its value is 
instrumental. As a result, it was health itself that was examined relative to Dewey's 
concept of the good. 
Accordingly the immediate question is about the purpose of national defense. 
First, it is pertinent to note that no single citizen, or even a few citizens, can effectively 
deter or defeat another country's military. The cost of maintaining sufficient weaponry is 
exorbitant. So there is no real alternative to having a military force that is sponsored by 
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a government, if the country exists in the midst of other aggressive or potentially-
aggressive nations. A military force can act defensively or offensively. In either case, 
the purpose of national defense is protecting the lives of Americans from outside 
aggressors and, if invaded, fighting to restore the country's independence. 
Yet if another country or group attacked America, will it really affect the 
citizens' adaptability? Consider the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on September 11th, 2001. How did the attacks affect Americans' adaptability? 
First, they were more informed as to how various groups and nations really judged them. 
There were people who hated America and Americans to the point of wanting to kill 
them and topple the country. Knowledge increases adaptability because it is obviously 
critical to be accurate in "how the world is" so as to be able to respond effectively to 
risks and opportunities. Second, the attacks resulted in a loss of activity and energy in 
the people. Fear produces tentativeness and pessimism. The U.S. Stock Exchange value 
fell dramatically, the Gross Domestic Product ( a common indicator of how optimistic or 
pessimistic the citizens are about their nation) declined, and the value of the American 
dollar (a common indicator of how optimistic or pessimistic people in other countries are 
about the United States) decreased. Therefore adequate national defense contributes to 
adaptability because individuals can go about their daily lives confidently and 
optimistically. 
Yet wouldn't it be better to have the largest and most technologically-advanced 
military in the world? Dewey would counter "no" and would appeal to the idea of 
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mutual deterrence. There is no real guarantee that a country can prevent every attack. 
Case in point is the terrorist attacks of September 1 I th on the U.S. Dewey's perspective 
is long-term, not short-term; this is one reason why he rejects egoism 
A further argument in support of adaptability is that if a country is unable to 
protect itself from invasion by other nations, then nothing else matters. In a sense, the 
argument holds that national defense is something needed before anything else. I 
question this claim by drawing upon an analogy. It is often said that liberty is the most 
important human right. Yet if a person is in pain, afraid, hungry, or alone, then freedom 
is like an empty shell. Freedom is valued largely because my actions are not interfered 
with by other people. But if I have no realizable goals because I am too ill to act or I 
have no significant relationships that motivate me to act, then "all the freedom in the 
world" does not ensure I have a tolerable life. Other aspects of life must be in place 
before liberty has much substantive importance in terms of the kind of life that the person 
can expect. The same holds for national defense. It certainly is an important enterprise, 
but I would contend that it need not be in place before any other good is obtained. 
But national defense is not just about deterring invasions. The military is also a 
vehicle for foreign policy in terms of assisting other nations in their political struggles. 
Consider the war between Kuwait and Iraq or the Tutsi-Hutu conflict in Rwanda. In the 
case of Kuwait and Iraq war, relationships were strengthened between the United States 
and various countries in the Middle East. These relationships centered around the 
production and sale of petroleum, a mutually beneficial relationship and so in accord with 
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Dewey's emphasis on shared cooperation. In the case of the Rwandan conflict, 
America's eventual involvement was part of a humanitarian effort to end genocide. This 
fits too with shared cooperation because it improves the relationships that other 
countries have with the United States in that they believe that they can count on the U.S. 
for moral support. This benefits the U.S. in the form ofincreased foreign trade as a 
result of the U.S. being seen as a virtuous nation. Based on this brief analysis, it is clear 
that national defense does preserve adaptability and does boost reciprocity between 
parties. Therefore national defense qualifies as a Deweyan good in that it contributes to 
adaptability and meaningfulness. 
Education connects with Dewey's theory on two levels: adaptability and 
meaning. By finishing high school and continuing on to university, a person gains many 
benefits: knowledge, skill development, self-understanding, socialization, and 
employability. Skill development, knowledge, and employability directly relate to 
adaptability. If a person gains more skills and knowledge, he is able to attempt or try 
more things, able to cope better with change, and more accomplished. 
In addition to increasing knowledge and skills, schooling is a primary way that 
our society socializes its children, adolescents, and young adults. They learn about 
teamwork, independence, role differentiation with strangers (student-teacher), different 
perspectives and belief systems, and commitments to non-intimates or to causes (school 
loyalty or volunteering to clean up a local river). Socialization and self-understanding I 
see as being about meaningfulness in a person's life. Because a student learns about 
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other possible ways to live and other things to be committed to, he is able to establish 
pragmatic or mutually-beneficially relationships with other people. Leaming how values 
infuse his choices, he relates and how he relates to others. Self-understanding accords 
with meaningfulness in that he knows how his upbringing and past experiences have 
resulted in the person he is today. He also knows that he may choose to be otherwise in 
the future ifhe finds that the person he is right now is not who he wants to be. Such 
self-understanding positively and directly affects his relationships with others in terms of 
honesty and authenticity. Therefore education clearly qualifies as a Deweyan good 
because it fits with both adaptability and meaningfulness. 
The arts, by which I mean museums, theatre, orchestras, and dance, may not 
seem to link closely with Dewey's notion of adaptability. Certainly in a few instances, 
people who have gained careers in dance or music have become more adaptable because 
they are more independent and self-sufficient as a result. Yet the arts do influence 
human adaptability by stimulating both our emotions and imagination. The result can be 
increased abilities to cope with both success and tragedy in terms of emotional health. 
Creativity prompts new opportunities to be discerned and problems solved in innovative 
ways. 
Meaningfulness intuitively seems to have an even stronger connection with the 
arts than does adaptability. Dewey holds that meaningfulness is shared cooperation; this 
is not the standard definition of meaningfulness. But on his behalf I suggest that the arts' 
purpose is expression which presupposes other people. Two reasons can explain this 
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point. An artist wishes to share his vision, ideas, perceptions, and insights with others. 
Or an artist wishes to either use or challenge normal descriptions and symbols. These 
descriptions and symbols come from communities of people because, as Dewey believes, 
language and symbols cannot be privately or idiosyncratically created. 
Health care's purpose is to preserve and protect health. National defense's 
purpose is to maintain sovereignty or independence and provide humanitarian aid. 
Education increases knowledge and skills and is a vehicle for socialization. The function 
of the arts is to encourage expression and imagination. All four programs qualify as 
good by Dewey's theory because all four contribute to human adaptability and 
meaningfulness, or growth. 
The next step is to rank the four in terms of these contributions. Dewey does not 
prioritize adaptability over meaningfulness or vice versa. Both are of equal importance. 
To be responsive to and responsible for one's surroundings requires shared cooperation. 
The notion of pragmatic interactions is critical here. A person will not be successful in 
solving problems if she insists on being totally self-sufficient. Life is too complex and 
humans too fallible and inadequate to be independent for any length of time. Moreover 
being part of relationships, be they familial or communal, is necessary for human well-
being. In other words, Dewey points to our unavoidable connectedness with others. We 
must connect and we should connect with others because relationships involve identity 
and belongingness. 
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It would be ideal to be able to fund all four social goods to their maximal 
contribution points. But given scarcity of funds, this is not possible. In ranking the four, 
I believe education is the most important, then health care, then national defense, and 
finally the arts. "Important" here means having the most impact on growth. The 
rationale for this ranking begins by holding that knowledge and skills are essential for an 
organism to thrive in a changing, competitive environment. Yet education also involves 
socialization so that a person belongs somewhere and among other people as opposed to 
being alone and isolated. Health care helps preserve our physical and cognitive 
capacities so that a person can be attentive, active, and cooperative. Deciding whether 
education is more important than health care can seem a bit like the chicken-and-egg 
question of which came first. But I contend that education precedes health care in the 
above ranking because knowledge and skills are most important in all, or virtually all, 
human endeavors. By means of knowledge and skills, answers to poor health, security 
breaches, and boredom can be found. Yet I would add that health-care's goodness is 
only somewhat less than that of education. 
National defense is important given the reality of America's current situation. It 
would be far preferable if "we could start over" and begin new international 
relationships. Then greater efforts could be spent on diplomacy and cooperation as 
opposed to power and expediency. But that is not possible at this time. I believe that 
even if a new approach in international relations was employed today, it would still take 
years or decades to achieve the kind of harmonious balance that Dewey imagined. 
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Accordingly, military defense is needed because America has enemies that would almost 
certainly take advantage of any military wlnerability. Similarly the military can 
effectively help humanitarian initiatives around the world. And lastly, the arts are less 
good than national defense at this time because of the ongoing tensions around the 
world. 
Part of the public and political debate on health-care reform is the macro-
allocation question of how special is it compared to other beneficial social programs. 
This is a question that even Daniels and Callahan have not tackled directly although 
Callahan has written extensively on new ways to accept our human limitations (e.g., 
death, serious accidents, diseases) without falling into despair. If Dewey's philosophical 
work is applied to health care and the other three programs or initiatives, I contend that 
the highest priority is education, followed by health care, national defense, and the arts. 
This ranking should then inform decisions about public funding for each program. As 
discussed above, the amount of tax revenues will directly influence the actual amount of 
funds distributed to each. The fact that programs have disparate cost structures must 
also be taken into account, as illustrated above in establishing minimum programs. From 
Dewey's perspective, it is also desirable that monies be allocated to all four programs so 
as to maintain diversity, as described above. 
The next step in transforming this initial proposal into concrete allocation 
decisions would include applying Dewey's good to every social program that is part of 
governmental mandates. Then there should be a comprehensive comparison of social 
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goods so as to reach a new meta-ranking of priorities. Next, an economic analysis of 
what constitutes "adequate" for each programs is needed. Part of this analysis should be 
considerations of time: what allocation ratios will result in optimizing the funds over a 
full legislative term, rather than simply considering one-year "snapshots." The longer 
perspective will capture efficiencies of scale and timing. This proposed process 
illustrates that the philosophical and analytic work in these chapters is only the beginning 
of the needed process for health reform. 
Competing medical interventions 
The final section of this chapter will examine actual medical procedures to 
illustrate the effect of Dewey's theory of the good. This is the meso-allocation decision 
to be scrutinized. For this purpose, three therapies or medical interventions are chosen: 
prenatal care, kidney dialysis for end-stage renal disease, and assisted reproductive 
technologies. Each represents a different kind of intervention. Prenatal care is 
preventive medicine, kidney dialysis is rehabilitative medicine (i.e., a patient is not "as 
good as new" with dialysis), and assisted reproductive technologies are compensatory. 
Dialysis costs several billion dollars annually (Statistical Abstracts of the United 
States, 2001 ). If dialysis is prescribed so as to mitigate the damage of end-stage-renal 
disease (ESRD), the associated costs are covered by Medicare, irrespective of a patient's 
age. ESRD is the only specific disease that is specifically designated for federally-
associated reimbursement assistance. Prenatal care is far less funded from public coffers. 
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I see prenatal care as qualifying as preventive care while dialysis is rescue care. From the 
perspective of cost-benefit analysis, prenatal care has a far smaller ratio than dialysis 
which is to say that relative to its benefits, prenatal care involves much lower costs. 
Kidney disease is caused by a variety of factors, including genetic conditions and 
diabetes. The kidneys become progressively less able to process body fluids to extract 
the normal toxins and produce urine for expulsion from the body. End-stage renal 
disease (ESRD) means that the individual's kidneys are almost exhausted and ifno 
medical intervention happens, she will die. 
In 1972, President Nixon signed legislation to modify Medicare so that any 
person requiring kidney dialysis would have the associated costs reimbursed under this 
federal health insurance plan. Prior to this amendment, Medicare's comprehensive health 
coverage was limited to citizens aged sixty-five and older. Yet coverage for ESRD was 
available irrespective of age. What prompted this change in eligibility was the 
expectation at the time that a national health insurance plan would soon be legislated 
(Nissenson and Rettig 1999). Moreover the costs for this additional coverage were 
projected never to exceed one billion dollars annually. 
Medicare's kidney dialysis coverage "is as close as anything in American 
medicine to a universal entitlement" (Ibid 162). Today the costs are roughly eight billion 
dollars annually (Ibid). The ballooning expenditures are due to the huge increase in 
patients diagnosed with ESRD and the continuing inadequate supply of donated 
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kidneys.39 
Prenatal care involves a variety of monitoring and educational programs for a 
pregnant woman. These include monthly check-ups by an obstetrician-gynecologist, 
ultrasound and amniocentesis tests as needed, blood work, counseling on nutrition, 
weight gain, discomfort exercise, coping behaviors, and parenting skills. The purpose of 
this care is for the woman to be as healthy as possible physically, psychologically, and 
emotionally, both for her own well-being and for the well-being of the gestating fetus. 
Prenatal care is considered preventive medicine in that studies confirm that women who 
receive good care tend to have less complicated deliveries, continue the pregnancy for 
the full-term more or less, and have healthier babies. 
Various cost-benefit ratios associated with prenatal care helps affirm its 
contribution to such consequences: for every dollar spent on prenatal care for low-
income women, three dollars are saved in medical costs during the infant's first year of 
life. And for every dollar invested in a smoking cessation program for pregnant women, 
six dollars are saved in neonatal intensive care costs and long-term care associated with 
low birth weight babies (www.APHA.org). Although statistics on the total monies spent 
on prenatal care are not part of governmental reporting yet, the percentage of American 
women who do receive this form of care is recorded: eighty-three percent in 2000 
The phrase "assisted reproductive technologies" spans a wide range of medical 
39. Roughly 13,300 kidney transplant operations were performed in 2000, yet 51,000 patients 
were waiting for a donated kidney as of the beginning of2002 (www.unos.org). 
(Statistical Abstract of the United States 200 I). 
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interventions, from birth control pills to Viagra to IVF to sex selection to cloning. The 
past twenty years have witnessed incredible development as scientists have been able to 
intervene further and further into the human reproductive process or to side-step certain 
steps altogether. From a medical perspective, the purposes of technologies include to a 
large extent overcoming infertility in a woman or man, lessening the likelihood of an "at-
risk" newborn, and providing greater personal control over one's sexuality. 
Let's now tum to Dewey's concept of the good as being comprised of 
adaptability and meaningfulness. I see the goals of prenatal care as involving 
adaptability. The therapies and monitoring programs increase the likelihood that both 
the woman and the fetus respond more strongly to their current circumstances as well as 
their circumstances post-delivery. What is meant by "respond more strongly" is that the 
woman is not excessively limited by her pregnancy and the fetus is able to use its 
environment for successful development in the womb. And after birth, prenatal care 
should help the woman recover fully from the sacrifices her body has made in carrying 
the fetus to term. 
In terms of meaningfulness, I would posit that it is not as strong here as 
adaptability. Yet prenatal care does contribute to meaningfulness. Recall that for 
Dewey, meaningfulness means shared cooperation tied to significant relationships. I do 
not see pregnancy as involving cooperation. Instead it involves the sacrifice to a 
woman's body and often her mind. Moreover a fetus is not a conscious being or an 
agent, two qualities central to Dewey's emphasis on reciprocity and cooperation. At 
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most, however, Dewey could accord some measure of meaningfulness to pregnancy 
based on the fact that the woman has other relationships to preserve. The most obvious 
ones are those with her partner and/or immediate family. Prenatal care that allows her to 
maintain supportive relationships with them would support meaningfulness. 
Dialysis's purpose to keep a critically ill person alive until such time as a suitable 
organ donor is located. By being alive, the person is able to remain active, however 
limited, within her natural environment and community. Yet a tension may arise when 
meaningfulness is considered. If a dialysis recipient is so ill that she is unable to look 
after her relationships and thus becomes a "drain" on them (i.e., harms them), then 
Dewey would say that meaningfulness is undermined. Dewey does not set a minimum 
for adaptability. Yet on his behalf, I would posit that ''being barely alive" is not adequate 
for the kind of active participation at the core of Dewey's pragmatic interactions. And 
so I can imagine that if deliberative activity is not feasible, he would suggest that dialysis 
does not qualify as good. This suggestion could only be tempered by, for instance, the 
patient wanting to remain alive for significant reasons such as found in religious belief 
system. Religious beliefs count as meaningful under Dewey's theory because they reflect 
membership within a long-standing and committed community. 
The assisted reproductive technologies, as mentioned, are very diverse yet their 
primary purposes focus on helping people control their sexuality and the formation of 
families. How do these purposes relate to adaptability and meaningfulness? If these two 
purposes are evaluated relative to adaptability, the results are inconclusive. An argument 
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could be made that by having children, a person has more resources with which to 
respond and take advantage of his surroundings. Children are able to assist a parent in a 
multitude of ways. An opposing argument could, however, be made that having children 
reduces one's resources as time, effort, emotions, and material resources are diverted to 
the upbringing of a child. Accordingly to be able to reasonably judge child-bearing as 
contributing or hindering adaptability, the specific intentions of the parent and her or his 
situation would have to be taken into account. 
But with this said, sexuality and families are strongly connected to Dewey's idea 
of meaningfulness. First, procreative liberty involves "control over whether one 
reproduces ... is central to personal identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one's life" 
(1999, 416). When Dewey writes about adaptability, he emphasizes the dynamic, 
unpredictable circumstances of a living organism in its environment. Being a parent or 
helping others to become parents is an ethically-rich role or task in terms of connections 
to other individuals. Controlling one's sexuality is also ethically-rich in terms of 
relationships that ensue. So these technologies can fit Dewey's theory of the good when 
they promote meaningfulness in a person's life. 
But a note of caution is warranted here. Based on experience of the kinds of 
outcomes that result from such medical interventions, not every case increases 
meaningfulness. Three medical cases, which were widely publicized in the mainstream 
media but by no means the only such dramatic cases, help affirm the serious complexities 
involved in the assisted reproductive techniques. The case of Davis v. Davis, a 
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Tennessean legal case in the late 1980's, involved a divorced couple which fought over 
possession of several frozen embryos that had not been implanted into Mrs. Davis's 
womb during the marriage (Clayton 1992). In the early 1990s, there was the case of 
Mary Beth Whitehead and the Stems. They battled over acquisition of the right to be 
rearing parents to a daughter, Baby M. Mr. Stems and Ms. Whitehead were her genetic 
parents, and Ms. Whitehead was also the gestational mother (Bartels 1990). And in the 
late 1990s, the birth of the Mccaughey septuplets was controversial because 
superovulatory drugs were used even though Mrs. Mccaughey was young and had had a 
daughter only eighteen months before. Also at the time, there were no medical data on 
the likely risks associated with septuplets. Moreover a few of the children were born 
with physical and cognitive impairments (Steinbock 1999; Klotzko 1998). 
These cases demonstrate the significant difficulties we have today in 
understanding the multiple competing and often conflicting relationships that can be 
created by assisted reproductive technologies and the burdens or risks taken on by one 
party (i.e., the parent) that may befall another, but innocent, party (i.e., the child). 
Undermining relationships is indicative oflost meaningfulness. Unfair treatment is 
indicative of seeing another person as being of less importance and therefore as having 
less meaningfulness or value. As a result, I see the technologies as raising just as many 
ethical problems as the number they solve and so I am ambivalent as to whether they do 
qualify as a Deweyan good. 
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Reviewing the application of Dewey's concept of the good to the medical 
interventions of kidney dialysis, prenatal care, and assisted reproductive techniques 
produces the following conclusions. Providing kidney dialysis contributes to the 
adaptability of the recipient as long as the kind of life being lived is not so impoverished 
that sustaining relationships is not possible. Prenatal care fits strongly with the value of 
adaptability and supports meaningfulness to a lesser extent. And the assisted 
reproductive technologies can contribute to adaptability to some extent, but their value, I 
suggest, comes from the possibility of enhancing meaningfulness in a person's life. Yet 
this possibility is fragile and the "down side" of these techniques is worrisome. 
How might these three interventions be meta-ranked based on Dewey's work? 
The consequence of this ranking will be to help guide distributive decisions at the meso-
level. Prenatal care supports adaptability strongly and it does contribute to 
meaningfulness. Therefore it is a viable candidate for program funding when meso-
allocation decisions are being made. But harms are imaginable when dialysis and assisted 
reproductive techniques are made available. Depending on the situation, dialysis does 
help the patient to be more responsive to his surroundings just as reproductive assistance 
helps the recipient find greater meaningfulness in her connections with others. 
With this said, however, the worries about dialysis and reproductive assistance 
are not worries about the techniques themselves. Instead the fundamental problems stem 
from people's mixed feelings and perceptions about mortality, sexuality, and intimate 
relationships. For instance, in Western society people's reluctance to accept their 
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mortality is evidenced by the ''youth culture" that continues to inform much of our social 
norms and expectations. Similarly I think that American society sends mixed messages 
about the worth of parenthood and children. On one hand, public and political rhetoric 
extols the wonder of children and the deep feelings and virtues involved in parenthood. 
One the other hand, though, social programs that are for children are not adequately 
funded (e.g., school lunch programs, funding for programs in the arts, surveillance of 
foster homes) and child neglect or abuse rates continue as unacceptably high levels. 
Until we honestly face the fact that we die and discuss candidly our feelings and fears 
about it and until we attain some consistency as to the status of parenthood and 
childhood, the value of associated medical interventions treatment will remain unclear. 
Dewey demands both adaptability and meaningfulness for something to qualify as 
being good. To participate in an environment that lacks important human relationships 
is, I suggest on his behalf, not a desirable or supportive life for a social species such as 
Homo sapiens. Similarly to have significant relationships with other people and groups 
of people and yet be inactive and unthinking is not desirable. Thus dialysis and assisted 
reproductive techniques can qualify as good, and thus be candidates for funding, but only 
if they actually do contribute to the person's adaptability and meaningfulness. 
Dewey's work assists in making ethically-defensible distributive decisions in that 
it provides criteria for deciding under what conditions the remedies are and are not made 
available. With respect to the issue of a scarcity of funds such that not all three 
programs can be covered to help all those who could benefit from them, the following 
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meta-ranking is suggested. The intervention that is of highest priority is prenatal care 
because it can help every pregnant woman and every newborn. In this way, it helps 
everyone for, at a minimum, everyone was once developing fetus in utero. I see no clear 
way to differentiate between dialysis and the reproductive techniques as each can 
maintain or increase adaptability and meaningfulness. Their purposes are important 
because on one side, what is at stake are life and death and, on the other side, what is at 
stake are intimate relationships. If the comparison had been between, for instance, 
dialysis and regular dental check-ups or a first-degree sun burn, then dialysis would have 
been found to be a greater priority for public funding. 
Using Dewey's work, this then is the guide for ethically rationing the multitude 
of health-care services and products. Those that contribute less to human growth, 
Dewey's term for the good, are ofless priority when compared to those which 
contribute more. The outcome will be, I think, a publicly-funded range of programs that 
serve as basic health care wherein major physical, emotional, psychological, and mental 
capacities are preserved and protected. It is the consequence of a disease or injury that 
is decisive here. The kinds of treatment that maintain or restore reason, sensation, and 
communications would be included in a publicly-funded program, for instance. But if an 
impaired ability results in no significant loss in the ability to participate actively in one's 
environment, then treatment would not be covered by public funds. The types of care 
that would not be publicly reimbursed would include those that could correct slight or 
minimal reductions in abilities. 
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Conclusion 
When I step back from the practical exercise of applying Dewey's notion of 
growth to public policy decisions, four points are telling. First, it is telling that his 
conception of the good is growth which he holds has two critical factors, capability and 
meaningfulness. The inclusion of capability results in his position mirroring much of 
what Daniels described under the label of"species-typical functioning." Harkening back 
to Darwin's work, a fundamental instinct of any species is surviving successfully in its 
environment. But Darwin saw survival as also involving exploiting an environment to 
optimize its living conditions and well-being. Dewey concedes that Darwin did influence 
his thinking about human nature as situated in a complex ecosystem of reciprocal 
interactions with the natural world and with the social or communal world. Just as 
lower-order animals attempt to make the most of their innate abilities, humans attempt to 
do likewise as part of their natures, notes Dewey. Since people naturally have higher 
intelligence and a wider range of emotions, they are expected to integrate them into their 
daily activities. Dewey does not see human beings as being superior to other creatures 
or perfect creations~ instead, humans are merely different. 
A marked difference between Dewey's and Daniels' positions concerns what 
counts as the focal point. By this I mean that Daniels allows for individuality by allowing 
for consideration of personal talents and skills in determining what medical treatments 
would be made available. As mentioned earlier, this still leaves most of a person's 
abilities being compared to whatever is deemed typical for the human species. 
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Dewey focuses on individuals in another way. Certainly he does not contend that 
a person is a completely autonomous, self-creating creature. Context matters 
significantly. His emphasis on familial relationships, communal relationships and societal 
relationships reveals his presupposition that humans are inherently and deeply situated in 
relationships. Moreover he contends that to thrive, a person must maintain and 
encourage supportive and reciprocal relationships with others or groups of others, just as 
a community must maintain and encourage supportive and reciprocal relationships with 
its members. Relationships exist over the long-term and thus people must respond and 
act in ways that promote the longevity of these connections. 
This then rules out egoism wherein what is normative is whatever the individual 
decides is best for himself Concurrently other forms or manifestations of individualism 
are ruled out: consumerism, materialism, and economic monopolization. There are, of 
course, people who would reject Dewey's descriptive claim that all humans need to 
maintain a variety of relationships as well as his normative claim that all humans should 
maintain the well-being of such relationships. But I think he would agree that there may 
be ''free riders" who can successfully capitalize on the fact that the majority of people do 
follow social conventions so as to maintain a harmonious balance with other people. But 
being a pragmatist, he could add that perfection is not the standard for a viable theory of 
human nature and interactions. A sound theory need not accurately describe every 
person, but only most people. 
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I see this emphasis on relationships in Dewey's work to be what is missing from 
Daniels' work. Admittedly Daniels does include consideration of the society in which a 
person lives in terms of what she can reasonably expect to be part of a normal range of 
opportunities for her. But this idea deals more with what choices she is permitted to 
make in her life than with inescapable relationships' responsibilities and duties. I do not 
mean to imply that making choices and having alternatives are trivial. What I do mean is 
that Daniels does not accord sufficient ethical weight to relationships in comparison to 
Dewey. Thus I see using Dewey's position for characterizing the kinds of health care 
that should be provided publicly as more ethically-justified than using Daniels' position. 
Dewey's work is also superior to that of Callahan in my estimate. I am very 
much concerned that Callahan has not considered which medical interventions can be 
deemed unjustified for people who are not elderly. Dewey's work has no set limitations 
to particular groups of people. Moreover Dewey would dismiss scrutinizing one 
particular group and not all other groups on the basis that society is itself a kind of 
ecosystem. As such, all groups are equally important at the outset and each has a 
legitimate place. Dewey would recommend to Callahan that he needs to equally consider 
all groups so as to ensure that each is appropriately bearing the burdens of resource 
limitations. Certainly this is something that is not out of reach in Callahan's work. Thus 
criticism of his proposal centers on its incompleteness, not necessarily its invalidity, in 
that the burdens of scarcity exclusively fall to the elderly and inadequate arguments are 
presented to support this position. More simply put, it is hard to believe that the medical 
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treatment of those who are not elderly provides significant benefits or benefits that 
support achievement of major life goals. 
However with this said, there remains the problem of how to '1:ranslate" the 
criteria for goodness into usable guidelines for discrete decision making at the policy 
level. As argued above, rough guides may be all that can reasonably be expected 
because what is being examined is difficult to quantify. Yet Dewey's work does offer 
criteria with which to make rough comparisons in terms of the value of the purposes of 
different programs and specific treatments. 
This is reminiscent of the work that ensued when the state legislators of Oregon 
re-structured the distributive basis of the state's Medicaid program in the mid-1990s 
(Broome 1993; Eddy 1991; Fleck 1990). The legislators decided to select specific 
criteria as to what counts as value or being good and then apply the criteria consistently 
to all available medical treatments. The first attempt resulted in counter-intuitive 
rankings in certain cases, but what was learned in the initial phased contributed to a more 
defensible second attempt. This parallels the work in this dissertation. Dewey's 
philosophical work on understanding human nature and the human condition provides a 
defensible characterization of the good. This then is useful beginning the needed process 
of comparing valued programs and interventions when, in light of resource scarcity, 
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TABLE 3. U.S. Total Health-Care Expenditures ($ billions) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 
proj 
42.0 74.9 132.1 247.5 428.7 699.5 895.1 991.4 1,092.4 1,211 1,424 
2010 2020 2030 
3,787.8 7,839.4 15!696.6 
Sources: For 1965 to 1985, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998. For 1985 to 2001, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
2001. For 2010to 2030, Health Care Financing Review, 1992. 
-00 
00 
TABLE 4. Average Annual Growth Rate in Health-Care Expenditures(%) 
1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990- 1993- 1990-
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1995 
15.6 15.2 17.4 14.6 12.6 9.3 5.4 8.3 
1997-1999 1999-2010 2010-2020 2020-2030 
5.4 8.8 10.7 10.0 







TABLE 5. U.S. Population (millions) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 
194.3 205.1 216.0 227.7 238.5 249.9 258.1 263.0 268 272.9 275.4 
2010 2020 2030 
302 320 333 
Sources: For 1965 to 1985, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998. For 1985 to 2001, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
2001. For 2010 to 2030, Health Care Financing Review, 1992. 
-'° 0 
TABLE 6. Average Annual Increase in Population(%) 
1965- 1970- 1975- 1980- 1985- 1990-
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.1 
1997-1999 I 1999-2010 I 2010-2020 I 2020-2030 
0.9 0.9 0.6 0.4 





TABLE 7. Annual U.S. Inflation Rate (or Consumer Price Index)(%) 
1965 I 1970 I 1975 I 1980 I 1985 I 1990 I 1993 I 1995 I 1997 I 1999 I 2000 
1.6 5.7 9.1 13.5 3.6 5.4 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.2 3.4 
Sources: For 1965 to 1985, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998. For 1985 to 2001, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 2001. 
TABLE 8. Breakdown of the 1999 Gross Domestic Product by Major Sector 
%of %of 
$ billion $ billion Total Total 
Private activity: 7860.7 88.6 
services 1772.6 20.0 
financiaVreal estate/insurance 1692.1 19.1 
manufacturing 1529.4 17.2 
retail 847.3 9.5 
wholesale 709.3 8.0 
construction 361.1 4.1 ..... 
~ transoortation 272.4 3.1 
utilities 216.3 2.4 
communications 264.6 3.0 
a2ricuhure/forestrv/fishin2 150.9 1.7 
mining 121.9 1.4 
other 77.2 0.9 
Public (governmental) activity 1015.1 11.4 
TOTAL 8875.8 100.0 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001. 
...... 
'° \.;J 
TABLE 9. U.S. Gross Domestic Product($ billions) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 719.1 1,035.6 1,583.9 2)84.2 4.213 5803.2 6642.3 7400.5 8318.4 9289.2 9963.1 
2010 2020 2030 
17,238 29,594 49~936 




TABLE 10. National Health-Care Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 
5.8 7.2 8.3 8.8 10.2 12.1 13.5 13.4 13.1 13.0 14.3 
2010 2020 2030 
22.0 26.5 31.4 
Source: calculations based on Tables 3 and 9. 




































197S 1980 198S 
64.7 118.5 188.6 
50.2 85.6 128.7 
12.9 32.1 65.8 
12.9 23.2 33.5 
86.5 134.0 252.7 
16.0 31.8 29.3 
10.9 21.3 25.8 
9.9 9.4 4.3 
16.6 21.2 26.3 
38.1 93.9 158.8 
318.7 571.0 913.8 
13.6 19.9 32.7 
332.3 590.9 946.5 















1.8 12.1 25.8 55.3 99.3 155.8 
b. Health is mostly Medicaid or its predecessor programs. 
















1998 1999 2001 
est. 
381.7 390 433.6 
239.4 237.7 262.6 
198.l 190.4 219.3 
131.8 141.3 175.3 
264.1 274.9 299.1 
55.1 56.2 65.3 
41.5 42.5 51.1 
3.5 2.6 (0.8) 
43.1 43.2 45.4 
263.1 324.1 305.3 
1621.4 1702.9 1856.2 
46.4 52.1 68.9 
1667.8 1755 1925.1 
329.9 331.5 394.6 
-'° °' 
TABLE 11. Federal Budget Allocations by Sector($ billion) continued 
Sources: For 1965, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1980. For 1970 and 1975, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985. 
For 1985, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988. For 1993, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997. For 1980, 1990, and 
1995, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998. For 1997 and 1998, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001. 
TABLE 12. Federal Budget Allocations as a Percentage of Yearly Total Budget 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1998 1999 2001 
est. 
Social Security 14.8 15.4 19.5 20.1 19.9 19.8 21.6 22.2 22.9 22.2 22.5 
Income Security 8.0 8.0 15.1 14.6 13.6 11.7 14.7 14.5 14.4 13.5 13.6 
Medicared - 3.2 3.9 5.4 7.0 7.8 9.3 10.5 11.9 10.8 11.4 
Healthd 1.5 3.0 3.9 3.9 3.5 4.6 7.1 7.6 7.9 8 9.1 
Defense 42.8 41.8 26.0 22.7 26.7 23.9 20.7 17.9 15.8 15.7 15.5 
Education 1.8 4.4 4.9 5.3 3.1 3.1 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.4 
Transportation 4.9 3.6 3.3 3.6 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.7 
Commerce & 1.0 1.1 3.0 1.6 0.5 5.4 (1.6) (1.2) 0.2 0.1 (0.4) 
housin2 
- Veterans' benefits 4.8 4.4 5.0 3.6 2.8 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 \0 
--.J Other 15.3 10.7 11.5 15.9 16.8 16.0 17.0 16.8 18.5 21.6 19.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
d. If the expenditures for Medicare and Health are combined(% of total annual budget): 
1.5 6.2 7.8 9.3 10.5 12.4 16.4 18.1 19.9 18.8 20.5 















Parks & recreation 
Other 
TOTAL 
TABLE 13. State and Local Government Expenditures($ billion) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 
28.6 52.7 87.9 133.2 192.7 288.1 342.3 378.3 
12.2 16.4 22.5 33.3 45.0 61.1 68.4 77.1 
6.3 14.7 27.2 45.6 69.6 110.5 167.1 193.1 
0.8 1.8 4.4 8.4 13.7 24.2 32.6 38.0 
4.5 7.9 14.4 23.8 36.0 50.4 62.6 67.9 
2.4 3.4 7.4 13.2 17.4 28.5 35.6 38.6 
2.5 4.5 8.5 13.5 21.0 30.6 36.4 41.1 
1.3 2.0 3.5 5.7 8.9 13.2 15.4 17.0 
1.3 2.3 3.5 6.1 10.4 15.5 18.8 21.5 
6.9 7.8 17.3 33.6 57.0 75.0 81.4 91.2 
1.1 1.9 3.5 6.5 9.2 14.3 16.2 17.9 
18.8 32.7 68.1 109.4 175.2 261.3 333.3 366.0 















a. If Health and Hospitals are combined: 
5.3 9.7 18.8 32.2 49.7 74.6 95.2 105.9 110.5 114.4 
Sources: For 1965, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1980. For 1970 and 1975, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985. 
For 1985, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988. For 1993, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997. For 1980, 1990, and 




TABLE 14. State and Local Government Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Expenditures 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 
Education 33.0 35.6 32.8 30.8 29.4 29.6 28.3 28.1 28.7 
HijWways 14.1 11.1 8.4 7.7 6.9 6.3 5.7 5.7 5.6 
Public welfare 7.3 9.9 10.4 10.5 10.6 11.4 13.8 14.3 13.7 
HealthD 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 
HospitalsD 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.7 
Sanitation 2.8 2.3 2.8 3.1 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Police protection 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.3 
Fire protection 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Housing & comm- 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
unity development 
Utilities 8.0 5.3 6.5 7.7 8.7 7.7 6.7 6.8 6.6 
Parks & recreation 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Other 21.5 20.3 24.8 25.5 26.5 29.7 27.5 27.2 27.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
b. If Health and Hospitals are combined: 
6.1 6.5 7.0 7.4 7.6 7.7 7.9 7.8 7.6 



















TABLE 15. Medical Research and Development Expenditures by Country for 1995 ($ billions) 
COUNTRY $ billion Ratio to 
U.S.A. 
Japan 82 0.46 
Germany 38 0.21 
France 27 0.15 
U.K. 21 0.12 
TOTAL 168 0.94 
U.S.A. 179 1.0 
Source: Samuelson, 1997-1998: 79. 
N 
0 ..... 
TABLE 16. National Health-Care Expenditures of Developed Countries as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
U.S.A. 9.2 10.7 12.4 13.9 13.7 
U.K. 5.8 5.9 6.2 7 7 
Canada 7.4 8.4 9.5 9.5 9.5 
France 7.6 8.5 8.9 9.8 NIA 
Germany 8.4 8.5 8.3 10.2 10.5 
Sweden 9.4 9 8.6 8.4 NIA 
Australia 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 NIA 
Japan 6.6 6.7 6.7 7.2 NIA 





TABLE 17. National Health Statistics of Developed Countries for 1997 and 2001 
1997 1997 1997 2001 2001 2001 
death qi infant qi life qi death qi infant qi life qi 
rate8 mortalitl exoectancv0 rate mortality e ~rnv 
U.S.A. 8.8 6.6 76.0 8.8 6.8 77.3 
U.K. 11.2 + 6.3 - 76.6 - 10.4 + 5.5 - 77.8 -
Canada 7.2 - 6.0 - 79.3 - 7.5 - 5.0 - 79.6 -
France 9.0 + 6.0 - 78.6 - 9.1 + 4.5 - 78.9 -
Germany 11.1 + 5.9 - 76.1 - 10.4 + 4.6 - 77.6 -
Sweden 11.3 + 4.5 - 78.2 - 11.1 + 4.4 - 78.5 -
Australia 6.9 - 5.4 - 79.6 - 7.2 - 5.0 - 79.9 -
Japan 7.9 - 4.4 - 79.7 - 8.3 - 3.9 - 80.8 -
qi indicates whether U.S.A. ratio is better(+) or worse(-) than that of the other country. For instance, compared to the U.K. in 1997, 
the U.S. death rate is lower in the U.S.A. and thus is better. 
a. deaths per 1,000 people 
b. deaths per 1,000 infants 
c. calculated at birth, the number of years he is expected to live 
Sources: For 1997, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997. For 2001, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001. 
N 
0 w 
TABLE 18. Number of Americans Covered by Insurance or a Health-Care Plan (millions) 
1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 
Governmental 53.6 59.4 56.6 64.8 66.6 64.6 
Private 137.3 174.6 182.1 182.4 185.9 188.5 
Not covered 36.8 34.6 34.7 39.7 40.6 43.4 
Total population• 227.2 234.0 248.9 259.8 264.3 269.1 
a. Because an individual may have both private and governmental coverage, each column will exceed the total population. 
Sources: For 1997: Statistical Abstract of the United States 2001. For 1985 to 1995: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997. 




TABLE 19. Number of Americans Covered by Insurance or a Health-Care Plan as a Percentage of Total Population 
1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 
Governmental 23.6 24.9 22.6 25.1 25.3 24.1 
Private 60.4 73.2 72.9 70.7 70.6 70.3 
Not covered 16.2 14.5 13.9 15.4 15.4 16.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 




TABLE 20. Number of Americans Enrolled in a Health Maintenance Organization Program 
1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 
Number (millions) 9.1 21.0 33.0 38.4 46.2 66.8 
As % of total covered 4.8 9.0 13.8 15.5 18.3 26.3 
Sources: For 1997: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1998. For 1985 to 1995: Statistical Abst
ract of the United States 1997. 




TABLE 21. Employee Enrollment in Employer-Subsidized Insurance Plans 
1989 1996 
Small employers 
(less than 200 emolovees) 72% 66% 
Large employers 
(more than 200 enmlovees) 73% 67% 
Source: Ginsberg, Gabel, and Hunt 1998. 
Abbreviated Description of Britain's Health System 
Prior to 1948, health services were provided either by salaried professionals 
working at large hospitals or by independent professionals working out of private 
offices. Costs were covered by fee-for-service or by philanthropic donations and there 
was little regulation beyond the licensing of practitioners. By 1948, three major 
problems faced the system: (1) erratic introduction of new techniques and products, (2) 
inequitable access to whatever treatment modalities were available, and (3) an absence 
of innovation or of responsiveness to patient needs. Moreover the lack of coordination 
and cooperation among providers made care more expensive because of a failure to 
realize economies of scale in terms of sharing facilities and equipment as well as 
harmonizing purchasing agreements. Characterized as part of ''what ought to comprise 
modern citizenship," the 1948 Labour government instituted the National Health 
Service (NHS) (Fierlbeck 1996, 530). 
The NHS' s mandate was comprehensive, universal, and equal ( as per medical 
need) health care. Each year, the government specified a fixed proportion of general tax 
dollars to be allocated to the country's health system. This pool of funds was then 
distributed to hospitals, virtually all of which were owned by the government, and to 
general medicine practitioners to cover their expenses in caring for the population. 
Most specialists and sub-specialists remained salaried employees of the hospitals. No 
user charges were levied against any citizen requiring any form of medical or public 
health care. And district and regional health authorities (DHAs and RHAs) coordinated 
virtually all health services. 
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By the mid-1980s, public and political criticism focused on the lack of sufficient 
services, resulting in unacceptable waiting lists, some of which were known as '"never-
never lists"' (Powell 1996, 256). The public and the opposition Labour party demanded 
a substantial increase in governmental funding. But the British economy had been in a 
long decline and tax revenues had decreased commensurably and yet the NHS had 
grown into the largest employer in Western Europe (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). 
Some influential members of the Conservative government believed that the NHS had 
become highly inefficient and moribund. The government therefore chose to revamp 
the system, rather than boost funding, in hopes of directing funds away from wasteful 
projects and of increasing the productivity of existing allocations. 
With reform in mind, input was sought from Alain Enthoven, a Stanford 
University economics professor who had developed the concept of"managed 
competition" to address the growing financial stresses within the American health 
system. Pursuant to Enthoven's analysis of the British system and confident ofits 
political majority, the Thatcher government passed the NHS and Community Care Act 
in 1990, with no pilot or testing of its radical recommendations. The Act emphasized 
competition to weed out inefficiencies and stimulate innovation, professional and 
administrative incentives and disincentives to control costs and improve quality, and 
bureaucratic decentralization to promote accountability. The only explicit resource-
rationing involved kidney dialysis for end-stage renal disease. If a patient was age 65 or 
older, this expensive treatment would not be offered to him. 
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Four reforms were most controversial. First, an internal or quasi-market36 was 
created by administratively separating providers from purchasers. Second, although 
still owned by the government and operated on a non-profit basis, all hospitals became 
autonomous providers. Third, since funding was to "follow the patient," all general 
medicine practitioners, or GPs, were to eventually become fundholders or GPFHs 
(James 1995, 195). As a fundholder, a physician received an enhanced capitation fund 
from the government with which she would contract with any provider all non-
emergency medical services for her patient group.37' 38 As such, GPs became 
"gatekeepers" to the entire national health system. If a citizen did not wish to be part of 
a GP's practice, his care could be handled by two other forms of purchasers: a DHA or 
a Family Services Health Authority ( or FHSA). 39 And fourth, contracts between 
providers and purchasers became the operational mechanism for all medical care. 40 
Thus capitalism, independence, restricted access, and legally-binding contracts became 
part of the British health system. 
36. A quasi-market has several key features. On the supply or provider side, the primary goal 
is not to maximize profits, but, for example, to achieve high quality of products, universality of 
access, or safety of the products. Suppliers are typically publicly owned. On the demand or 
consumer side, purchasing is centralized and decisions are made by a third-party, not by the end 
user. Yet a market does indeed exist due to the presence of multiple providers and purchasers 
negotiating contracts for the best package of services (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). 
37. Once a GPFH's patient's annual care reached £5,000, all added expenses are directly 
covered by the NHS (Mechanic 1995). 
38. Any financial savings or efficiencies realized by a GPFH can only be reinvested in the 
practice; they could not constitute part of the GPFH's direct income (Ibid). 
39. A patient cannot be refused care or de-listed by a DHA or FSHA on the grounds that the 
expected medical costs would be high (James 1995). 
40. Pricing was regulated by the government: contracts were to be based on average costs, a 
maximum 6% return on capital, and no cost-shifting (Propper 1995). And to promote 
cooperative relationships, the contracts cannot be enforced through the court system. Instead 
disputes were to be resolved through binding arbitration (Jost, Hughes, McHale et al 1995). 
209 
After eighteen years of Conservative majorities, a Labour government was 
elected in 1997. The country's health system has once again fallen under severe 
criticism. The multiplicity of providers and purchasers has driven up the percentage of 
funds consumed by bureaucracy and administration, and thus away from direct patient 
care. The system has become inequitable and, hence, unjust. The shift towards 
privatization41 has been substantial and "instead of money following the patient, the 
patient follows the contract',42 (Labour Party 1996, 275). Admittedly, Britain has witnessed 
considerable technological progress, but an enduring concern remains in "'not letting the best be 
the enemy of the good"' (Blaug 1998, S72). In other words, technological progress must not be 
at the cost of society's overarching values. In the case of Britain, these values stress inclusion 
of all citizens and equality of consideration over cutting-edge technology and competition. 
41. Prescriptions, dentistry, opticaVopthamological care, and long-term care of the elderly are 
handled by the private sector. As such, costs are covered by out-of-pocket user charges or 
through private or employer-paid indemnity insurance (James; Powell 1995). Today, 81 % of 
total health-care funding in Britain comes from general taxes, 14% from payroll taxes, and 4% 
from direct user charges (Maynard 1994). 
42. The system is seen as now being two-tiered. The care of patients who "belong" to GPFHs 
is superior, in terms of higher quality and shorter waiting times, to that of patients seen by non-
GPFHs, DHAs, or FSHAs. 
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Abbreviated Description of Canada's Health System 
Prior to 1966, the ten provinces and two territories had total jurisdiction over the 
health care of their residents. The country's constitution, the 1867 British North 
American Act (BNA), stipulated that health was a provincial and territorial 
responsibility, except for the care of military personnel, native Canadians, and the Inuit. 
After the signing of the BNA and until the mid 1960s, Canada's health system was 
typified by non-profit, privately-owned facilities43 and fee-for-service, independent 
physician practices. Each province partially funded medical treatments and facilities to 
help lower the final billings of hospitals and physicians to their patients. 
Provinces cannot directly tax the income of their residents or the profits of 
corporations. Instead taxation remains a federal responsibility as per the BNA. Annual 
tax revenues are apportioned either to federal or to provincial departments to provide 
services to their respective residential and corporate base. Because Canada's population 
is very unevenly distributed just as its natural resources are unevenly distributed, the 
economic base is also distributed unevenly from province to province. To mitigate 
large differences in federal funding to the provinces, funds are equalized. This means 
that prior to actual payment, some of the funds earmarked for the highly populated or 
"have" provinces are re-directed to the less populated or "have not" provinces. Thus 
economic or demographic prosperity in one region is shared with regions not so 
43. "Privately-owned" here means, first, that a provincial government does not own a hospital 
or clinic's assets. Second, it means that the assets are owned by the facility itself. And third, 
most of these privately-owned facilities are managed by community or local boards. 
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advantaged, rather than allowing emergent disparities in lifestyle and opportunities to 
increase over time. This idea of equalization has informed much of the evolution of the 
country's health system. 
In 1966 the Liberal federal government passed the Medical Care Act for three 
reasons: ( 1) to deliver on its party's ideological platform of expanded social programs, 
(2) to lessen intra-provincial differences in health-care provision, and (3) to acquire a 
legitimate voice in an area of constitutionally-defined provincial responsibility. Health 
care was viewed as a common good for every Canadian "cradle to grave." The Act 
supported the creation of provincially administered insurance plan44, each of which was 
to focus on five objectives: universality, accessibility, comprehensiveness, portability, 
and non-profit management of all health facilities and programs. In recognition of this 
focus, the federal government agreed to match each province's funding allocations to 
health care. 
The Canadian system, nationally known as Medicare, provided unlimited, 
unrestricted access to all specialties and facilities with no charges to patients. 
Physicians retained full professional autonomy over their patients' treatment and care. 
Cost control was achieved by means of capped budgets. Each year a hospital or clinic 
petitioned its provincial ministry of health for adequate funds to covers its operating and 
its capital budget.45 And every year, unions or associations representing physicians 
44. Canada therefore has "'socialized insurance,"' not socialized medicine as is commonly 
alleged by American commentators (Evans 1992, 741). 
45. Separate negotiations of these two budgets contributed to effective cost control by limiting 
costly technological acquisition and facility construction without necessarily restricting day-to-
day operations. Furthermore it was difficult for a hospital to successfully circumvent cost 
control by diverting annual operating funds to highly expensive equipment or building projects. 
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negotiated fixed fee schedules with each provincial health ministry.46 Admittedly 
shortages at the end of the year were carried forward into the next year's funding 
request. Thus deficits were eventually covered but did generate considerable scrutiny 
of hospital operations. In this way, no patient was denied treatment but there was a 
general atmosphere of fiscal conservatism. 
By the early 1980s, several trends came together to prompt further federal 
health-care legislation. Canada's recession proved recalcitrant despite efforts to 
stimulate the economy, and so general tax revenues continued to decline. Yet overall 
health-care expenditures continued to increase much faster than any other sector. This 
growth, coupled with expenditure increases in other social programs, transformed the 
federal deficit into an economic and political millstone. Furthermore decreased tax 
revenues meant that hospital budgets and physician fee schedules either remained static 
year-to-year or any negotiated increases were far below the inflation rate. Many 
physicians responded by directly charging patients user or office visit fees. Cognizant 
that the public would reject tax increases, provinces gradually excluded some medical 
care from coverage and waiting periods for various treatments grew. As a consequence, 
private insurance companies began to offer competitive comprehensive insurance plans 
to individuals and employers. 
The Conservative federal government tackled these worrisome trends by passing 
the 1984 Canadian Health Act (CHA). The Act replaced the federal-to-provincial cash 
46. As an illustration of the incomes physicians can earn under a capped fee system, 
Saskatchewan and Quebec allow income levels of$ 300,000 to $ 400,000 per year before 
reimbursement for medical services is at progressively reduced rates (Barer, Lomas, and 
Sanmartin 1996). 
213 
transfer policy and it revoked the promise of 50-50 sharing of Canadians' health-care 
costs. Instead the federal government stated that it would begin transferring not cash, 
but tax percentages47, to the provinces. Federal funding participation would be allowed 
to drop as far as zero, depending on annual tax revenues. 
The CHA also established an '"all in or all out"' relationship between physicians 
and provincial insurance plans (Evans 1992, 744). If a physician chose to extra bill her 
patients, she would be summarily interpreted as choosing to totally opt out of every 
provincial plan. As a further measure to prevent the emergence of a two-tiered system 
in Canada, private insurance plans were prohibited from covering services already 
covered by a provincial plan. And yet coupled with these significant changes, the CHA 
emphasized anew the five core principles of the initial Medicare legislation. 
Today Canada has the second most expensive system in the world in terms of 
the percentage of GDP allocated to health care; first is the United States. 75 % of the 
nation's total health expenditures are covered by public insurance; of this percentage, 
only 40 % is covered by federal tax allocations to the provinces (Catley-Carlson 1992; 
Wilsford 1995). No provincial insurance plan continues to reimburse all care: dental, 
most prescription drugs, ophthalmology, physiotherapy, and elective surgery are not 
covered. 70 % of Canadians have private insurance through their employer's benefit 
plans (Silversides 1995). Two provinces require monthly premiums to be paid by all 
residents. One province has levied a payroll tax. Two provinces have allowed private 
47. As of 1977, the federal government had transferred 13.5 points of personal tax and 1 point 
of corporate tax to the provincial tax formulas (O'Neill 1996). 
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eye and MRI clinics to be set up. Complaints about excessive waiting times and overly 
slow introduction of the latest equipment and procedures fill frequent newspaper 
headlines. 
Recently there have been repeated calls for increased federal involvement to 
stem "the balkanization of health-care benefits across the country" (Wyman, Freeley, 
Brimacombe et al 1995, 1601). From the perspective of most Canadians, health care 
remains a "sacred" social program. As Shifrin notes, Medicare "ranks with the Charter 
of Rights as a declaration of the inviolable essence of Canadian citizenship" (1993, 
1868). At the 1997 annual conference of the Canadian Medical Association, a 
resolution in support of a private health system appeared likely to pass. But after much 
heated debate, which I expect was fueled in part by acknowledging Medicare's 
relevance to national identity itselt48, physicians opted to help lead the country's efforts 
to repair the existing system so as to once again fulfill the five defining goals of the 
initial 1966 concentrated pockets of population, two national languages, and various 
separatist movements. Continual financial pressures at the provincial level have been 
addressed over the past five years primarily through organizational change, namely 
regionalization.49 Authority and responsibility over provincial-federal funds now 
resides with regional boards as per a process labeled "devolution": some authority has 
shifted downwards from the provincial health ministries and some authority has shifted 
upwards from local hospital and health boards. The advantages seen in regionalization 
48. Evans (1992) suggests that Medicare has been one of the most effective mechanisms to 
unify Canada, a country that continues to deal with the divisive forces of immense geography, 
concentrated pockets of population, two national languages, and various separatist movements. 
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are increased responsiveness to patient needs and technology demands, greater 
economies of scale, and enhanced community involvement in health policy decisions 
and tradeoffs. Badgley (1982) argues that, in actuality, these early regional bodies had 
virtually no authority and no input concerning local needs. Serving only as "storefront 
dressing," they were expected only to support and institute provincial health policies. 
49. A few provinces instituted regionalization in the 1970s albeit on a very limited scale. 
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